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Transcript: "Has Religion Influenced American Diplomacy and War?" with Andrew Preston.
Chris: United States foreign policy is of great interest to all Americans because of the important thread in the American narrative that says we should use our blessings of freedom and wealth to benefit the world: Foreign policy matters. The burning question for us on this podcast is how did religion influence American foreign policy and war if at all? To help us answer this question, we will talk with Andrew Preston, professor of American history at the University of Cambridge and author of Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy. Mr. Preston specializes in the history of American foreign relations, specifically the intersection between national and international, including the influence that domestic politics and culture, particularly religion, have had on conduct of US foreign policy.
Also as with each episode in our podcast series, Religion in the American Experience, we hope listeners come away with a better comprehension of what religion has done to America and what America has done to religion and thus more fully comprehend the necessity of this idea of religious freedom to America in fulfilling her purposes in the world.
Thank you, Andrew, for being with us today. Your book is absolutely fantastic. I read it years ago and it revealed to me an entire part of American history that I had not really heard of and that's almost endless in its influence and that is, religion's role in US foreign policy. So before I start any specific questions, can you tell us just generally how religion has influenced US war and diplomacy?
Andrew: Well, thanks for having me, Chris. I should say that first off. It's a real pleasure to be here. And thanks for the questions and the, and the discussion around my book. When I wrote this book almost 10 years ago, you said you read it a while ago, not many people were working on religion and US foreign policy. And now it's a whole subfield in political science and in history. So it's really, it's been, it's been really exciting. The religious influence in American foreign policy has been sometimes tricky to demonstrate because you don't always find policymakers saying I want to do A, B, or C or X, Y, Z because of my religious beliefs, especially when you're talking about high-level diplomacy. You don't always find that kind of record in NSC meet meeting minutes or, you know, things like that.
Andrew: So sometimes you have to read between the lines. Sometimes it's tricky but once historians and political scientists began to know what to look for, the job became easier. And it also became much more interesting because, as you said, it all of a sudden opened up this whole vista on how we should see American foreign policy. And then to get, to get back to your question, what is the general influence? Religion has over time, over a long period of time acted as a kind of conscience for American foreign policy and for American foreign policy makers, even for policymakers who themselves weren't religious because of American domestic politics, because of the the very vibrant role that religion plays in American domestic politics. And then the fact that domestic politics and political actors then apply pressure to policymakers and force them to confront moral questions in foreign policy. Religion has in, in that way had a huge influence on the conduct of American foreign policy and not just in the last 10 or 20 years, but the last 200 years.
Chris: Okay, so it took some sleuthing on your part to get at those tools that allowed you to see the influence. So it was a little bit of a, a job to do, I guess.
Andrew: Absolutely, and that's what, that's what is fun about it. That, that's the, that's the most fun you can have as an historian is, is piecing things together and reading between the lines and getting to know the context and getting to know the people.
Chris: Sure, absolutely. Well, thank you for doing that because it's just super revealing. So the second sort of introductory question would be tell us about the title. The title grabbed me. It just grabbed me in all ways. Tell, tell us about that title, where it came from? Why you used it?
Andrew: The title comes from the Book of Ephesians and it's where Paul is telling new Christians what they need to do. They need to what they need to wear effectively, he is using this metaphorically. And they need to wield the sword of the spirit and also brandish the shield of faith, along with another number of other accouterments. And he doesn't use those two phrases side-by-side in Ephesians in this, in this passage. But I put them together uhh because to me they capture exactly what the religious influence on American foreign policy was and still is all about.
Andrew: So on one hand, you have the sword of the spirit, which is the kind of, which is familiar to a lot of people. That's the kind of interventionist Messianic, we are going to reform the world type of ideology that has been present in American foreign policy from Manifest Destiny all the way up to the present. And in fact, when I began my book, I began my book during the, the years of the George W. Bush administration and at the height of the Iraq War. And a lot of people a friend of mine actually put it like this. A lot of people assumed that I was sort of writing a history of the Bush administration's foreign policy. And when I told a friend that actually I was going back much further in time uhh 200 years, I ended up going back 400 years. But he said, "Are you're writing a history of Bush backwards?" Basically the use of religion to justify war and empire and all that kind of thing. And that's definitely a part of the story and that's the sword of the spirit. But as I did more research, the shield of faith was also extremely important.
Andrew: And historians had not paid nearly enough attention to internationalism and pacifism and solving conflicts and promoting interfaith dialogue, promote, using religion as a, as a tool for peace. And so I have called that the shield of faith. And where the religious influence is most powerful is a blend of the kind of reformist interventionist impulse and the more pacifistic kind of internationalist impulse and where the two have combined in order to produce this very, very compelling moral vision for American foreign policy. And that, that's why the book is called Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith. If I could say one more thing about that, it I, I can't claim any credit. I can't claim credit for thinking of that, even though I came across that John Foster Dulles used the, used those those verses.
Woodrow Wilson did, lots of my historical actors in the book talked about the sword of the spirit and the shield of faith. But my wife and I were I, I live in England and based in England. We were going for a walk in the country with our dog and one of the things we love to do is to stop into these little village parish churches that are, you know, like a thousand years old and full of history. And we went into one in Northamptonshire, which is a neighboring county to, to where I'm from, Cambridgeshire. And there was a large memorial plaque on the wall of the church, this beautiful little church in the middle of nowhere. And it was to the dead of the two World Wars which is very common in English village churches. And this plaque had the, the passages, had the verses rather, and my wife said because I was, we were just talking about my book and I was just talking about what I would later identify as the sword of spirit and the shield of faith. And she said, "There it is. There is your title right there," because it just perfectly captures the book.
Chris: I agree. It perfectly captures it. So let's dive in. Andrew, thanks for that helpful foundation you laid there for us. We are just going to cover four of your thirty chapters. So we are going to talk about FDR and his faith, the religion and religious freedom used by the Johnson and Kennedy administrations, the Vietnam War, religion's influence on that, it's prosecution and then we are going to touch lightly on the epilogue of 9/11 a little bit after that. So Andrew, can you paint for us a religious portrait of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
Andrew: He was - so if I was painting just a quick portrait, he was by instinct non-theological as in non-doctrinal. To him, religion was a living thing. It was about spirituality, but it was also about ethics. But it wasn't something that you would think about, think a lot about. He wasn't a theologian but his religion was very deep. It was very profound. His wife Eleanor, who wasn't a religious person as far as we know, said that that was the most it was the thing that he felt deepest and was most mysterious in him was his faith. He was an Episcopalian and he was also by instinct as well as I would say not by doctrine because I just said he wasn't doctrinal. But to him, religion was inherently interfaith. He was an Episcopalian. As I just said, he was a Protestant. But to him, religion was a force for community, a force for coming together as well as a source of ethics. And he thought that religious commonalities inherently trumps religious differences and that should be then the basis not the only basis but a basis for politics and foreign policy.
Chris: Okay, and I should say we are starting with FDR but there is a whole, I don't know the chapter number of that chapter. But there, we're, we're skipping all this other religion, religious influence on American foreign policy pre mid-20th century and yeah.
Andrew: It's a big book. It's a big book, you know, so you can just go and say... [chuckles]
Chris: Uhh so anyways, people should read it and, and from the beginning.
Andrew: Oh thank you.
Chris: Okay, so that’s the portrait. That's helpful. I just visited Hyde Park last summer and you know, was moved by his religion sort of in the same spirit of what you relate there. I'm going to quote something from your book regarding FDR, "Building on Lincoln's ecumenical civil religion, Roosevelt was the first president to prioritize faith itself as opposed to Protestantism or even Christianity as the essence of American democracy." Can you tell us, Andrew, about how FDR used his religious beliefs and his faith in the prosecution of foreign policy, its significance and ramifications?
Andrew: Yeah. It's, it's a huge question. I should, I should sort of prefaced my answer by talking about that quote that you just read and say that I wanted to sort of pay due respect here to previous presidents who also made gestures to what we now call or what came to be called in this, in FDR's period in the 1930s and 40s, the Judeo-Christian tradition. So George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson spoke in very vague terms and not very often in ways that we would later call the Judeo-Christian tradition. So looking at how Christianity owes its roots to Judaism and how Jews and Christians should cooperate in American politics and American society and in American culture.
Chris: Right.
Andrew: But it was FDR who really elevated that notion to something that we might, to, to something that was included in the American civil religion and even I would say in the American body politic and the political fabric of the nation. This idea that Will Herberg in 1955 called the idea of a nation as Protestant, Catholic Jew. And from there, we can talk about this perhaps later in the podcast if you want, although other historians have, have talked about this a great deal from, from that notion of this kind of tri-faith America, what the historian Kevin Schultz calls tri-faith America. You then have it opens up spaces for further and further religious pluralism. For FDR in the 1930s, it was a way of distinguishing what was good about America and what was bad about what was going on elsewhere in the world, especially in Nazi Germany, but also in the Soviet Union as well as, well, to a lesser extent in Japan. But really it was about Nazi Germany.
And for FDR the religion was important for the reasons I already said because it was a source of personal comfort, a source of spirituality, a source of ethics. But for him, it was a source of democracy. And the reason it was a source of democracy is because without freedom of conscience, you couldn't have a democracy and without democracy you couldn't have peace. Peace either at home or in the context of the late 1930s and early 1940s, you couldn't have peace abroad. And one of the reasons why the freedom of religion was so politically important and geopolitically important to FDR is because if everything rested on freedom of conscience, you couldn't have, you couldn't have freedom of conscience without the freedom of religion. And he talked about this endlessly in the late 1930s and early 1940s. It's there in the Four Freedoms, in the second of the Four Freedoms, in the freedom of worship.
And it's there in some of his most important speeches leading up to World War II. Remember, this is a time when most Americans did not want to get involved in Europe. And his biggest task was convincing not the people we now call isolationist. Your Charles Lindberghs and your Gerald Nuys, people like that. His biggest task was because the isolationists, those sort of hardcore isolationists weren't the majority. The biggest task was convincing probably a plurality of Americans who were very internationally-minded, including Christian pacifists, including a lot of Protestant and Catholic and Jewish leaders. Very internationally-minded but did not want to get involved in Europe. And so one way of, of co-- of winning this argument was by appealing to what was starting to be called the Judeo-Christian tradition in a way that meant this is what is good about America, but even if Nazi Germany isn't going to attack us, this is why we have to worry about the Germans because what they're doing is they are snuffing out the freedom of religion.
And if we go back to this idea of what we might call FDR's faith-based democratic peace theory, democracies don't go to war with one another. You can't have peace without democracy. You can't have democracy without freedom of conscience. You can't have freedom of conscience without freedom of religion. That's why Americans should pay attention to what was going on in Germany. That's why they should worry about what the Germans were doing to religion. And if you're listening to this podcast or watching this video and you're interested in this, just do a quick Google "1939 State of the Union Address". And FDR's 1939 State of the Union just begins by laying that all out. Here is why we should care about freedom of religion because it's not just about what is happening to Jews and some German Christians. It's really about the fate of the world.
Chris: In the chapter that you call interestingly "The Revolutionary Church In A Revolutionary Age." And in that chapter, you write, I'm quoting here, "Perhaps without realizing it, Kennedy and Johnson reflected a shift that was taking place in religion's influence on politics and especially on foreign policy. In a modernizing society that was both increasingly secular and pluralistic, religion's role could never again be assumed. The presidents could look to faith but they could not rely on it." Why did you use the term "Revolutionary Church" in the chapter's title? And can you take us through a few examples of how the Kennedy and Johnson admin-- administration saw religion and religious freedom as part of their foreign policy toolkit or not?
Andrew: One more thought about FDR. One of the reasons I enjoyed, I did not expect to do anything on FDR when I began this book because if you read much of the biographical literature on him, including by people who knew FDR better than I ever will, people like Arthur Schlesinger, they either ignore his religious values and his, his religious faith. Or they say that it was a kind of on, you know, it was kind of superficial that he would go to church on Sundays sometimes. And that, that I kind of took that at face value took that assessment. And the more research I did, the more interesting if FDR became, FDR's religion became because it, religion was such a central part of his life. It was a very, very important part of his life and it was a very important part of his, his politics and then he made it a very important part of his foreign policy.
Chris: Yup.
Andrew: One of the trickiest chapters or the, the two of the trickiest chapters that, that I wrote that we're going to discuss I think in the 1960s deal with those, that deal with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. And partly because of Kennedy's Catholicism, which a lot of people have written about, but I'm not sure anyone is really, politically there is a lot of really good stuff on, on the politics of Kennedy's Catholicism. But I'm not sure we've got to the bottom, just like I'm not sure we had got to the bottom of FDR's Anglicanism. I'm not sure we've got to the bottom of JFK's Catholicism as a personal faith. Although Fred Logavell's biography on JFK that came out recently just starts to get us there. He doesn't deal with the presidency in this volume, but it starts to get us there. And LBJ was this like a lot of other presidents like Ronald Reagan was like some other presidents had and sort of was wonderfully but frustratingly eclectic and diverse in his religious views, not just in religions he respected or read or but he would dabble in all sorts of religions and I don't mean in a superficial way but in a fairly, I would say in a fairly profound way.
And you ask why the revolutionary church, one of the really interesting things in writing these chapters in the 1960s was trying to get to grips with JFK and LBJ and some other people too. I've got some stuff that I found really interesting on Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his faith in the Vietnam War. But it was also trying to get to grips with their religion in this time of incredible turbulence, socially and culturally, including in religion. And so the revolutionary church is about Vatican II. It's about the Death of God Movement. It's about Liberal Protes--Mainline Protestantism and a lot of the activism that Mainline Protestants took part in in civil rights and second like feminism and all sorts of things. And then of course, it's also I have a later chapter about, I don't want to call it the backlash because I think that does an injustice to conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists and conservative Catholics. But then you have this kind of counter, what I call the Counter Reformation of the 1960s coming in as well.
Chris: Okay, you write in this chapter this "Neither Kennedy nor Johnson nor most of their advisers understood the new American religious landscape or grasped the importance of religious pluralism in a globalizing world." Why did you say that and what were the effects of this?
Andrew: Yeah, so this is one of the, the trickiest things about these about these chapters. So Kennedy and Johnson, especially Kennedy, came in as a modernizing pre-- not just a modern president but a modernizing president. And he surrounded himself with modernization theorists, people who called themselves modernization theorists. And inherently tied up in modernization theory is this assumption of secularization, that is it, you know, it goes back to Freud and it goes back to Weber, it goes back to all sorts of thinkers from the 19th and early 20th centuries. Then as societies become more modern, they will become more secular. And it's just, it's, it's an inescapable process. And people like Walt Rostow and other modernization theorists in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations weren't that concerned with religion. But as far as I can tell, they did have this, this kind of assumption that as the world was becoming more modern, it would become more secular.
And therefore, they didn't have to deal with religion. By the same token, Kennedy's Catholicism, which of course was a white-hot subject in 1964 for liberals as well as conservatives. I mean, for a lot of people, a lot of a lot of people who supported the Civil Rights Movement said they weren't going to vote for Kennedy because he was a Catholic. I mean, it's, it, it, it just seems so foreign to us today when the Supreme Court has a Catholic majority and Catholics are just part of the mainstream. It's easy to forget just how visceral anti-Catholicism was as late as the early 1960s. Even more so, I would say, than Mormonism is for political candidates in today in politics, where people like Mitt Romney have to deal with that issue of Mormonism and there where some people just wouldn't vote for him no matter what because he is a Mormon.
Andrew: The point here is that after Kennedy gets elected in 1960 because Catholicism is such a third rail he doesn't want to deal with religion. He talks in very vague platitudes about religion, but he is not going to go down the route that FDR and Truman and Eisenhower did in using religion as a political tool because if he does that he tries to use it as a political tool. The risk that this is going blow up in his face is really, really enormous. So he just tries to contain it and move it aside and that, as I was saying, it works quite nicely with his administration because most of them, even the religious ones like Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk, but they are happy to deal with foreign problems in this containerized way where religions is, is just not a part. And the consequences for foreign policy for that I argue in the book were actually quite profound because it made them miss a lot of the ferment, the growing ferment in for lack of a better term what was happening in world religions. What was happening in the 1960s with Islam and into the 1970s, what was happening in Southeast Asia. There, there is this quote that I, in the, in the book, I don't have it in front of me so I, I hope I don't mangle it but what?
Chris: I have it. But I have it, yeah.
Andrew: Is this the one about, is this the one about the Buddhist Crisis?
Chris: Yeah. Should I read it?
Andrew: Right, you please do. Thank you.
Chris: As we got it. Yeah.
"The 1963 South Vietnam Buddhist Uprising caught the Kennedy administration flat-footed. ‘How could this have happened?’ A perplexed JFK asked his advisors about the Buddhists, 'Who are these people? Why didn't we know about them before?'"
Andrew: Yeah, it's an amazing and I think I go on to say something like it's shocking that Kennedy was shocked that, that by the Buddhist Uprising.
In 1963, the Catholic leader of South Vietnam ,because there was a substantial uhhm uhh population of Catholics because Vietnam had once been a French colony. And Ngo Dinh Diem, the leader of South Vietnam was a Catholic. His brother, his brother, his older brother was the bishop of Hue. They weren't just Catholics. They were a prominent, very active Catholic family and they were America's allies in the fight against communism in South Vietnam. And in 1963 uhh the Buddhists who felt repressed under the Diem government launched a peaceful, a, a series of peaceful protests. This is, these are the protests that led to that very famous and, and very troubling image of the Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc burning himself alive in protest. Probably one of the most famous if not the most famous photo image from the Vietnam War.
And this is what Kennedy is talking about when he says who are these people because he doesn't know the Buddhist themselves, you know, but of course, they are the largest religious group in Vietnam. They are absolutely essential to politics and the fact that Kennedy, the president of the United States who is escalating the conflict that would be later, not much later become the Vietnam War. The fact that he is perplexed by, by these people just is, is to me still baffling when I think about that. And the, the Kennedy administration just didn't have a handle and I argue in the book that they didn't have a handle on it just as they didn't have a handle on the early signs of the Shia Revolution in, in Iran because they just didn't want to deal with religion. They just didn't, they thought religion was a dying force that it, it was politically irrelevant that you had these kind of wild-eyed mystics either and in terms, in terms of Muslim clerics or Buddhist monks or whoever. And the fact that they were burning themselves to death in protest just showed how irrational they were and these people aren't the way of the future. And that of course was just a, it wasn't only a fundamental misreading of what was happening because they weren't taking religion seriously. It, it was a fundamental error and it was a basic error in the conduct of American foreign policy.
Chris: Right. You talked about, a few minutes ago Robert McNamara, and then you mentioned the Buddhist who burned himself alive? Can you tell us that story about the Quaker who left his home one morning and asking his wife what can I do to help him stop this war?
Andrew: It's right. This is, this is Norman Morrison. So this is in 1965 and Norman Morrison was very idealistic and very, very much against the war. And he drove to the Pentagon and got close enough. He was right under McNamara's window, but got close enough to McNamara's window where McNamara could see him. And he covered himself with gasoline and was still holding his daughter. And then somebody who realized what he was about to do, people who were kind of mystified as to what was going on and they saw what he was about to do, told him to, to, to put the baby down so the baby wouldn't be hurt, which he did. And then he, in protest against the escalating war in Vietnam, burned himself to death. And that shook, we know that that shook McNamara up, even though McNamara was a very, very buttoned-up guy and didn't talk about his feelings and just wanted to repress that image and just not deal with it and just move on. And he was like that with everything in life.
He was known as an IBM machine on legs and as somebody who is extremely clever, very rational, one of the founders of systems analysis when he was at Harvard Business school. Ran the Ford Motor Company, brought it back to profitability in the 1950s. Was a master of data. It was always stats, stats, stats with McNamara. So a very rational man, but also it turns out quite spiritual. So there is this, this kind of, you know, we talked before about how do you get to know someone's faith? Well, it's a mysterious thing. It's a very powerful, powerful thing. And McNamara later turned against the war without saying he turned against the war. But he started testifying in Congress as to how badly the war was going and how it wasn't going to go well and he was implying that the US should leave.
This is in 1967 and privately at the, in the, at the Pentagon in, in the White House, he would have these breakdowns into 1966-67 and early '68 where he would burst into tears. I think a psychologist would probably say it's because he wasn't talking about his problems. He wasn't talking about the war directly. He was trying to bottle it all up. And I argue that this, that this, this moral act of conscience by Norman Morrison, the guy who burned himself in protest, contributed to McNamara's spiritual crisis about the Vietnam War. And it awakened in him a lot of the values that he held as a Christian, as a Presbyterian. And also his, his sort of his ethical compass. It sort of set his ethical compass off. And it made for him the war, this war that was going badly, that was costing the United States so much not just in, in blood and treasure but also in terms of the, of the the conscience of the nation, the morality of the nation. As Martin Luther King said in 1967, it really caused McNamara to have this breakdown on the war and to leave the administration.
Chris: Do we know anything about his religiosity besides that he was a Presbyterian?
Andrew: Well, he was an Elder. He wasn't just, you know, a, a notional Presbyterian. He was a, he was, he was an active Presbyterian. He read widely in, not just sort of conventional Protestant books in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, but he read widely on ethics and spiritualism morality and how religion either influenced or in-- intersected with a lot of those currents of thought that were becoming of course extremely popular in the 1950s and 60s. So he was certainly well-versed in a lot of these, in a lot of these issues.
Chris: Okay. Thank you. Again with this, with this chapter we could go on and on and on, but we have to move on.
We are talking with Andrew Preston, professor of American History at the University of Cambridge and author of Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy.
Now, to Vietnam and the religious beliefs that supported it or agitated against it. Andrew and so then influenced American political processes in the US prosecution of that war, I want to talk about two sides of the coin here. I want to talk about the religions and religious influences that supported it and those that criticized it. I'm going to start with the latter by quoting Martin Luther King in 1967. In his “A Time To Break Silence”, responding to criticism of his anti-Vietnam War stance, "Have they the critics forgotten that my ministry is in obedience to the one who loved his enemies so fully that he died for them. What can I say to the Viet Cong or to Castro or to Mao as a faithful minister of this one? Can I threaten them with death or must I not share with them my life?" Andrew, what is this representative of in context of American religious reaction to the Vietnam War?
Andrew: I think first and foremost what historians have recovered over the last 10 or 15 years, it is, it's first and foremost about Martin Luther King's own, the importance of his own spirituality and his own theology and his own Christian witness. And I think we, we do him an, an injustice if we forget that first and foremost, he was a man of faith and a preacher. But it also speaks to a wider crisis of conscience and a crisis of ethics in the United States. Vietnam was a difficult war to explain, right? It was the, I mean, the Johnson administration had difficulty explaining it even just to the general public. The Johnson administration had difficulty explaining it why America was fighting, had difficulty explaining it to the, to the Congress, to the national media. So it was a, it was a very, very tricky war to justify. That's not to say that Johnson didn't believe in what he was doing. I think he did. I think he was tormented about it and he would ask the Secret Service to drive him to churches in the middle of the night so he could sit in silence and pray. So he was tormented about it.
And it didn't matter what church, this again speaks to Johnson's inherent, his instinctive ecumenism. It's no coincidence that FDR was Johnson's hero on almost everything but also on religion which is something we often forget. But King speaking out in 1967, not for the first time. It's a myth that that's and he partly contributed to the myth by calling it a time to break silence, calling his address the time to break because it wasn't a sermon. It was just, it was, it was a speech but it was in Riverside Church and he, he called it a time to break silence. But he had spoken out against the war in March of 1965 just as it was beginning to take off and he got so much pushback on that from all quarters, including people within the Civil Rights Movement that he then kept quiet for another two years. And when he did speak out against it, it was, it was actually he was a latecomer in the sense to this angst, this moral angst that, that a lot of the country, not all of the country but a lot of the country was having about the war.
Andrew: How do we justify, you know, the, the most powerful nation in the history of the world. The richest with the most powerful military, this industrial giant that can project power halfway across the world and rain down devastation on this incredibly impoverished, non-industrial society that was fighting for national independence, right? I mean, if you put communism to one side, which a lot of historians of the Vietnam War do or at least separated from Vietnamese nationalism, at the heart of what the Vietnamese were fighting for was national self-determination, which is, you know, going back to Woodrow Wilson, going back to the founders. That's a very American thing. So it was a, it was a, it was a really it was a really tough war to support and it was a very tough war to remain silent about. And King's, King's speech is the most eloquent testimony to that.
Chris: Can you mention some of the religions that would have sided. You say Martin Luther King was a latecomer. What, what religious traditions were generally opposed to the war? Is that a fair question?
Andrew: It, it's a fair question but it's a difficult one to answer because it was pretty much across the board. So certainly Mainline Protestants the, the National Council of Churches and a lot of their affiliates, the main, the mainline denominations, most of the leadership of those organizations and churches were opposed to the war, some earlier than others. I should say in defense of King, one of the reasons he was a, a slightly latecomer to this is because when he did, when and when he was one of the first to speak out about it, there was a worry in the Civil Rights Movement that he was going to damage the Civil Rights Movement by getting on the wrong side of Johnson. So it was a political decision to, to, to then be quiet about that.
But American Jews were very critical of the war from a very early point. Quite a few Catholics, obviously, there were also quite a few Catholics who were supportive of the war because it was a very complicated thing for America, for not just American Catholicism, but for the Catholic church because of the prevalence of Catholicism within Vietnam and the religious issues in, at play in Vietnam. But a lot of Jesuit priests spoken against the war most famously the Berrigan Brothers. And eventually an organization formed called CALCAV, Clergy And Laymen Concerned About Vietnam. And it was led by Richard Newhouse a Lutheran later Catholic but at the time Lutheran. Abraham Heschel and Daniel Berrigan. So Protestant-Catholic-Jew, tri-faith nation. And they, they were one of the earliest along with new left student organizations like SDS. They were one of the earliest segments of American society to, to, to campaign against the war.
Chris: Okay. Well, let's flip that coin over and I'm going to quote something from also a 1967 statement, this one from the American Council of Christian churches, which supported the war, "America must win Vietnam. There is no other acceptable course. To surrender or show weakness before the communist onslaught would be the greatest disaster ever to befall America. The conflict with communism is God versus anti-god, Christ versus Antichrist." What does this represent Andrew?
Tell us about the, the religious influence supporting the Vietnam War.
Andrew: So that represents a lot of things. But at heart, it represents two things. One is just the, the fervency of American anti-communism in the Cold War. And I'll, I'll unpack that a little bit. But the other it represents is just what Vietnam came to stand for by the time that statement was issued in what we now call the cul-- or what would later come to be called the culture wars, which don't begin in the 1990s when the term was coined but I would argue began in the 1960's and 1970's. And so when people are forced to choose sides and if, if the other side is uhh seen as unpatriotic and critical of America in a time of crisis and so on and so forth, then the people who are naturally inclined to support the president's or to fight communism are gonna double down. And there is this kind of something that, that we see in American society or indeed in lots of societies. Bur we have seen in American society uhhm periodically, but I would say unfortunately increasingly up to, up to the present.
Andrew: And so in the 1960s what the American Council of Christian Churches wanted to highlight was the fact that yes, this is a difficult war to support in some ways. But when you boil it right down to its, its essence, it's what Reagan would later call a noble cause. This is a, a struggle against communism, Godless communism. Communism that was if you, if you inverted everything that communism stood for, this is what people used to say during the Cold War. If you inverted everything that communism stood for, Americanism was on the other side. So you'd have the dictatorship of the proletariat and you'd have a liberal democracy. You would have atheism and you would have freedom of religion. You would have a command economy and then you would have the free market and so on and so forth. So it was, it was kind of the ultimate other and it was assumed to be and there was a lot of evidence for this that it was inherently aggressive and that communism wanted to spread. Uhhm and so, there are moments where fault lines, it could be in China, it could be in Korea, it could be a Vietnam, Latin America, Berlin, or other places in Europe where, where communism was see-- was being seen to advance.
And this gets to the kind of almost eschatological flavor of that statement that you've just read that you quoted from my book that if communism wins in one place, it's going to keep winning. And it's going to snuff out everything that America stands for and eventually it's gonna snuff out those freedoms in the United States itself. Now, it seemed far-fetched to a lot of people at the time that Vietnam would be that important uhhm but to a lot of other people it made total sense. And by this time, by the late 60s, there is this inexorable logic to that, right? We go back to Franklin Roosevelt and what I said about FDR and the, and the Germans. That's the exact same argument that FDR made about the Germans. And then when the Nazis are gone from 1945 when they're defeated and as the Cold War begins to escalate, Harry Truman and then later Dwight Eisenhower applies it to the Soviet Union. It's the exact same logic and as I said, given that what was, what was happening in world politics in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s there is, you know, there was, it wasn't like the people like Carl McIntire were making this up out of whole cloth. Now, what they were doing was following that logic to its, to the nth degree, to the absolute end of that logical chain in making Vietnam so important in this global struggle against communism.
Chris: Right and they definitely, you know, put it into a very stark religious language. God and [crosstalk]
Andrew: Can I, can I say one more thing about that too.
Chris: Absolutely.
Andrew: So it is, it is, so and so I don't mean to drone on a bit but, so really interestingly Billy Graham in the 1960s paid a lot of attention to what was going on in world politics and also in Vietnam. And Billy Graham is one of the people who of course helped launch the Cold War crusade in a very ideological sense in the 1940s and 50s. But by the 1960s, he certainly hadn't lessened his anti-communism. He still didn't like communism at all. But what was going on in Vietnam? This is why Billy Graham perfectly symbolizes the struggles of the 1960s. The struggles I was referring to earlier about what a difficult war it was to support with conscience and also to argue in favor of and to justify. Billy Graham stood by his friend Lyndon Johnson. He stood by his friend Richard Nixon. But privately, we know that he was anguished about what was going on in Vietnam. And so, to me, Billy Graham's dilemmas, his struggles this kind of turmoil that he saw in the world and where Vietnam didn't really fit into any of those neat categories in the 1950s and seeing him struggle with that to me is very profound but also very telling of the turbulence of the decade.
Chris: I agree. I, I have read a biography, a couple biographies of Billy Graham and I think you're right, right on there. We are out of time just about but I don't want to end the podcast without giving you a chance to at least bring us up to speed through a decade after 9/11. Give us in a nutshell religion's influence on America's response to 9/11and everything that sort of has, sort of has come after that with regard to war in, in the Middle East.
Andrew: Well, as I said earlier when I began this book in I began in 2003. That's when I began research on it and began telling people I was writing it and I said that a friend of mine said, "Oh you're writing a history of Bush backwards." And there is certainly there has been over the last 20 years, there has been a strong religious strain of supporting the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the war on terror, a kind of American exceptionalism to remake the world, to spread democracy, and especially to protect religious freedom. But that's not the only part of the story. And even that part of the story is much more complicated than we allow for. So Bush is remembered for Iraq and I think that's probably right. That's the, the most important thing that he did as president and that is what historians are going to be spending most of their time trying to puzzle out and work through in the coming decades.
But Bush was also the president who did more to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa than any other president. He made it a real cause of his including at the height of the Iraq War. He would take time away from the war planning in the war on terror to consider HIV/AIDS. And I don't think you can really comprehend that without understanding Bush's own personal faith, the faith of some of his advisers like Michael Gerson and others and then how that faith then translated into politics. So I would say about Bush that he is more complicated than I think we realize now and we won't sort of like with Eisenhower where our understanding of Eisenhower underwent a real revolution in the 1980s because of scholarship finding new sources and thinking, having time to reflect about Eisenhower. I think something similar might happen with George W. Bush, certainly with his religion.
Andrew: And then Obama is, is no easier to figure out in a lot of senses. And, and I don't mean in a lot of senses of the way that people talk about in, in highly political terms, in highly politicized terms. Obama's heroes were a lot of peace activists and community developers, but it was, it was also Reinhold Niebuhr and he cited Reinhold Niebuhr is his favorite philosopher and he actually very bravely invoked Niebuhr in his speech in Oslo accepting the Nobel Peace Prize and saying look, I'm, I'm an American president. I, I can't live a pacifistic life. I can't be a pacifistic president. There are times where I might have to, as Niebuhr said, choose the lesser evil, but do so for moral reasons. And to be a Christian realist. To be a realist but to have Christianity kind of be his moral compass through there. So I found both Bush and Obama very interesting. I, I only deal with them as you said very briefly in an epilogue to at the end of a very long book that was published in 2012. But I do conclude by saying that both Bush and Obama, in their very different very eclectic ways, fit perfectly within the tradition of the religious influence on American war and diplomacy.
Chris: Thank you for bringing us up into the 2000s. Andrew, as we conclude, do you want to share any lessons or takeaways from the book, either in terms of perhaps important historical transformations you have charted or in terms of simply helping us better understand our present moment?
Andrew: I wish I could help us understand our present moment better. If, if I could I would be a very famous man because understanding the present moment is a challenge for us all right now. But the one thing I would take away, I would want people to take away from my book is that religion and politics, it does not just mean, it doesn't just push in one direction. It's not shorthand for the Christian right or the religious right or whatever, whatever shorthand people want to come up with. That it's, that it's more complicated. And as Obama had, said many times that it's also more productive than a lot of people assume. On the other hand, I would also want people who don't need reminding of religion's importance in politics and foreign policy to consider that it's not the only story and that it fits in with a much wider puzzle of what American politics is, what American foreign policy is and what it, what they mean within the American body politic.
Chris: Thank you, Andrew. We have been talking with Andrew Preston, professor of American History at the University of Cambridge and author of Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy. Mr. Preston specializes in the history of American foreign relations, specifically the intersection between national and international, including the influence of domestic politics and culture, particularly religion have had on conduct of US foreign policy. Andrew, thank you for being with us. It has been very enlightening and I hope you have enjoyed the time with us as well.
Andrew: Very much, Chris. Thank you.
Transcript: Tornado God with Peter Thuesen
CHRIS: 2020 has brought America the COVID-19 pandemic, the largest wildfire season in California history, according to the California officials, and so many hurricanes that we have had to start using Greek letters to identify them. These things have traumatized Americans and America itself.
When Americans have experienced trauma, they have often reached out to religion hoping for some emotional comfort, physical assistance and answers to help them understand the sometimes chaotic and destructive world that surrounds them.
Peter Thuesen just published what is, for these reasons, a very timely book
called Tornado God: American Religion and Violent Weather, which, and I’m quoting here from the book cover flap, "captures the harrowing drama of tornadoes, as clergy, theologians, meteorologists, and ordinary citizens struggle to make sense of these death-dealing tempests. Mr. Thuesen says something that all Americans should listen to: ‘in the tornado, Americans experience something that is at once culturally peculiar and religiously primal In the whirlwind, Americans confront the question of their own destiny’ "
Peter J. Thuesen is a historian of American religion and Professor of Religion Studies at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis and co-editor of "Religion and American Culture: a Journal of Interpretation." He was awarded the Frank S. and Elizabeth D. Brewer Prize of the American Society of Church History for his book In Discordance with the Scriptures: American Protestant Battles over Translating the Bible. Mr. Thuesen has a PhD from Princeton University and taught previously at Tufts University and Yale Divinity School.
We are very happy to have Peter here to help us understand a very particular part of American religious history – religion and tornadoes, even as we experience our own natural calamities. Also, we hope to better understand generally what religion has done to America and what America has done to religion, and thus be better equipped as citizens to ensure that the American experiment in self-government endures.
Peter, you begin the book with the April 1974 “Super Outbreak” tornado system and the particular tornado that touched down in Xenia, Ohio. Can you share this story with us and why you chose it to “frame” the rest of the book?
PETER: Sure, well, and first I want to thank you Chris for having me for this podcast, I’m really excited about what you are doing and I’m thrilled to be able to take part in this.
The Xenia story is I think particularly compelling and poignant. As you say, yes, it was part of what later became known as the “super outbreak.” There was a rash of tornadoes that broke out over the American continent that afternoon on April 3, 1974. And, in Xenia alone 34 people were killed and so it indelibly imprinted that town with this disaster. But Xenia also is I think kind of symbolically significant partly because of its name. The word means “hospitality”, from the root meaning “hospitality” in Greek. And so the question I explore at the beginning of that section of the book is, what was Xenia welcoming, or well, it wasn’t really welcoming this thing into its midst, there on April 3,
1974? Was this a visitation of God or was it something else? And that’s the question that Xenia residents had to wrestle with powerfully in the aftermath of the tornado. Was this God that did this to them or not? And that’s the perennial question in American history. We are subject to the forces of nature and yet are those forces somehow linked to God’s plan, God’s providence? The newspaper accounts of Xenia residents reflecting on this afterwards are so powerful – some of the personal stories of loss are so powerful. And that has been true for every weather disaster in American history but I was particularly touched by the Xenia story partly because I live relatively close to Xenia in Indianapolis, so it is not a long drive away. There is that midwestern profile that I am familiar with, and so I decided to open the book with that.
CHRIS: When I read that first part, there is a picture in the book of three people at their slab, the Lauderbachs, husband, wife and a very young child. And, you know, you just, they are looking up at the camera and you just stare at them but then their surroundings where their house was, it is just a slab. So it becomes very personal even from my perspective, I don’t live near it, I don’t study this. But you mention that the newspaper reports were very revealing, very poignant. Can you share one or two, of either the letters or the editorials that came out as a result of the tornado in Xenia? I was especially struck by the letters, I think you quoted three from out of town residents, sort of trying to explain, from their perspective, why it had happened in Xenia. That was very interesting.
PETER: Right well you saw there some of the typical responses that have happened in the wake of disaster. I mean there was one person who wrote into the local paper who said that Xenia always had a reputation for wickedness so this must be God’s retribution for that. But then a local newspaper editor took issue with that quite strongly and said that his God is not a God that would do this kind of thing to people. And what is so striking to me as a historian about that is that the debate really is as old as America itself. I mean in the sense that Americans since the beginning of European colonization when they brought the Christian tradition with them as a way to reflect on these things, Christian and other traditions but particularly the Christian tradition, they have been debating these events in such terms. And, so, really, Xenia just in the newspaper back and forth in the aftermath provided a kind of microcosm for these long running debates in American history.
CHRIS: OK, yeah, well, you talk about time, this was in 1974. So, I want to go back to 1694 Cotton Mather – you have a story in there about Cotton Mather who was giving a sermon about “the God of glory thundereth” – I grabbed that from his sermon, that is not the title, but he used that scripture - and then what happens to his home while he is at church talking about this. Can you briefly tell us about this and perhaps more importantly, what it tells us about how early Americans, so this is in the colonial period, saw natural calamity such as tornadoes or lightning strikes?
PETER: Sure. I love Cotton Mather, he is one of the most interesting figures in American history. Of course, the whole family of Mathers is illustrious. It was this ministerial family steeped in the long Calvinist tradition. And they were highly
intellectual, and Cotton Mather was very smart, and he knew he was smart, and so he was a little bit full of himself. And only Cotton Mather could have gotten into this sort of situation it seems. He was preaching and he felt an urge to put down his notes and to speak on God and the weather basically. And it was during that sermon that someone handed him a note to say that his house had just been struck by lightning. And rather than just dropping everything and ending his sermon and rushing home, Mather, to model an unconcern for worldly things, continued his sermon. And so he went on to make the point, and this was later published, that though there are natural causes to the weather, the weather is still under the control of God, “the high thunderer” as he put it.
And that is the tension that began to emerge in colonial clergy and other figures who wrote about this in the 17th and 18th centuries. That on the one hand, the weather is governed by natural law and is predictable in that sense. Over time American learned more and more about how the weather worked. But on the other hand, for theists, for believers in God, the weather is still under God’s control somehow, and how do you balance those two? And, you know, Mather may not have wanted to admit it, but he sensed this tension. In fact, over time, the clergy started becoming worried that people would, as they put it, “stop at second causes” – “second causes” was the phrase for those secondary forces in nature, the wind, the humidity, and so forth, that govern the weather. And they warned people – don’t stop at second causes, remember that there is a first cause behind all of this, don’t forget the first cause and that’s God. So they sensed this atheistic possibility and they wanted to guard against it and so that is what that story from Cotton Mather’s sermon illustrates.
CHRIS: Right, sounds like it would be a great little video, you know, of him getting the note.
PETER: Oh, I wish we had it. Yes, I know.
CHRIS: Fantastic.
CHRIS: You write also in this same chapter something very, very fascinating that from an American religious history perspective, that Protestants & Catholics confronted physical calamities in significantly different religious ways. And I think we all know Protestants were the majority, Catholics were a very small minority. But even so, they really viewed violent weather let’s say, in different ways. Can you tell us about this and its implications?
PETER: Well, yes, I mean, one of the key differences was that in a Catholic way of being religious, there were more mediating figures, kind of buffers, between the individual and God and those included the saints. And, so, the Saints provided a measure of protection for people that Protestants were bereft of once the Protestant Reformation rejected, for the most part, the old Catholic cult of the Saints. Martin Luther, the early great Protestant reformer, is a prefect example of this. The details of it are somewhat disputed and whether the way Luther wrote about this particular story is entirely accurate is also disputed, but there is this famous story of Luther being caught in a thunderstorm and he is terror struck and the first thing he thinks to do is pray to St.
Anne, who is among other things, the patroness of people caught in thunderstorms, and so he makes a spontaneous vow, according to the old story, “St. Anne hep me and if you help me I’ll become a monk.” And so when he survives this calamity of course he is not going to renege on his vow, and so he enters a full-time religious life, takes a vow of celibacy that of course he later then in the course of the Reformation, renounces. So, the Saints provided protection, but then later Luther comes to reject that mediating function of the Saints by in large, and other Protestants rejected even more strongly. So the way I put it in the book is basically that for Protestants there is very little if anything standing between the individual and Almighty God when it comes to the sometimes frightening power of the weather.
CHRIS: Right, in fact, there is one sentence that you wrote that really almost came out and slapped me, right, you said: "Protestants faced the world alone” because of what you just explained. So, are there any implications for the entire American experiment in self-government of that sort of statement? Because this was a Protestant nation, more than anything else at the beginning. What are its implications, if any, in your mind?
PETER: Well, that is a really interesting question. I think, I mean, one could say that one implication is that once Americans become convinced that God is on their side then that is a powerful contributor to American nationalism and even the weather itself can buttress that kind of nationalistic fervor. I tell in the book about how in a couple of situations in English Protestant history there was the wide-spread feeling that God had supported the Protestant cause through meteorological intervention basically. So, when the English were facing the Spanish Armada in 1588, a storm helped defeat the Spanish Armada. Then a century later in 1688 the weather was said to have assisted William of Orange in invading England and overthrowing England’s last Catholic king.
And so the so-called “Protestant winds” of 1588 and 1688 were seen as interventions on behalf of Protestantism, and that kind of laid a foundation for later American nationalism. So, Americans in their doctrine of Manifest Destiny overspreading the American continent became convinced that God was on their side and even the weather would not stand in their way. Even the weather would sometimes assist them. And yet, the weather has a powerful way of frustrating expectations and so that is a recurring theme too, that as soon as people thought that weather would cooperate, it didn’t.
CHRIS: Peter, throughout the book I noticed that Americans reached out and grabbed the same few biblical verses, it seemed, over and over and over when they had to make sense of the whirlwinds’ awesome and terrible destruction around them. Can you share perhaps what some of those verses are or just generally how Americans used the Bible to decipher these whirlwinds.
PETER: Well, that is a great question, because one of the things that is most striking about the American experience with violent weather is that people, particularly Christians, who were the majority religious adherents in American history appealed to scripture again and again in trying to make sense of violent weather. I realized in the course of this project this was happening so much that I convinced the publisher to
include a scriptural index as part of the book because there are certain citations that occur again and again. So a tornado happens and someone inevitably appeals to a verse like Nahum 1:3, where it says “the Lord hath his way in the whirlwind and the storm”, and that’s just one small example. The Hebrew Bible is full of verses that use meteorological imagery to illustrate divine power. I think there is something very primal about that across religious cultures. And you see it vividly in Hebrew scripture. And so those verses just jumped out to Americans in the wake of a storm and seemed to confirm a Providential reading of disaster even while raising lingering questions about what kind of God sends that kind of destruction. So, I mean, the Bible was both a touchstone I think and at times a source of comfort but also a source of religious questions about these terrible things.
CHRIS: Peter, along the Bible theme, you tell us in the book about two particular “Biblical winds”: one is the Pentecostal wind “the mighty rushing”, and it is sort of a positive one, and then the apocalyptic winds in the Book of Revelations, as destructive winds. Tell us about those two and how they were understood and used by Americans to try to understand violent weather.
PETER: Yes, well, that is one of the paradoxes of the wind as an instrument of God’s power, that is both a wind that builds up and enlivens people but it is also a wind that at times destroys. And so what I refer to as the Pentecostal wind is this story of course of the first Pentecost in the book of Acts where a rushing mighty wind descends and in that instance the wind becomes an image of the power of the Holy Spirit. But at the close of the Bible the wind figures into the element that brings destruction at the end, the unfolding apocalypse – so the four winds of the apocalypse recur throughout Christian history as an image of destruction – you find that in some medieval art for example.
And, so it is really two sides of this religious coin in the human experience, that God both creates but also destroys. And that is something that Americans perennially wrestle with.
CHRIS: You quote Henry Ward Beecher saying, and here I’m quoting from one of his sermons: “here is where the storms end. God no longer rules by force and fear, but by hope and love.” Can you speak Peter to the changes in how Americans understood violent weather in religious terms between colonial times and post-Civil War?
PETER: Yes. I mean, and I think a big part of the change is the rise of what we would begin to recognize as modern science, and a more scientific understanding of the weather. And with that a rising optimism that these once mysterious forces could be understood and maybe even mastered. You mentioned Henry Ward Beecher, and so by the latter half of the 19th century, I mean he was maybe the most famous preacher of his day, so very prominent figure. And he was involved in a tornado disaster, or the aftermath of it rather, that occurred in Iowa at Grinnell, lowa; Grinnell College was pretty much wiped out by a tornado in 1882. So the leaders of the college then went back east and appealed to Beecher in Brooklyn and others for help in raising money to rebuild the college. And Beecher used that incident partly as an occasion to talk about how he felt that a scientific world view was replacing an old superstitious one and in the face of
disasters like that and people could turn them to good, that good would come of them, and that people no longer be, as he put it, a “trembling and ignorant race” before the forces of nature. The namesake of the Grinnell College, Josiah Grinnell, even commented “that cyclone was a real windfall.” That seems in retrospect to be a rather callous comment since 30 townspeople were killed in that disaster. And yet what he meant was, we built Grinnell up better than ever before or after this. And that was typical of this emerging scientific optimistic confident mentality in the latter half of the 19th century. And so, Beecher was basically repudiating much of his old Puritan inheritance that assumed that weather disasters were punishment for some kind of human misconduct. Instead, he wanted to push the view that these were natural, and God’s purpose was to enlighten and to build up and not to destroy.
CHRIS: Wow. Very interesting.
We are listening to Peter J. Thuesen, historian of American religion and Professor of Religion Studies at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis and co-editor of "Religion and American Culture: a Journal of Interpretation." Mr. Thuesen has a PhD from Princeton University and taught previously at Tufts University and Yale Divinity School.
CHRIS: Peter, I want to move to talking about the deadliest tornado in American history, as you know, the “Tri-State Tornado”, which hit Missouri, Illinois, and Indiana on March 18, 1925. Can you first describe, perhaps briefly, the physical picture for us then how people saw this in religious terms?
PETER: Yes. I mean the Tri-State Tornado is really an event that still stands out even in light of our recent weather disasters, that have been exacerbated by climate change.
The Tri-State Tornado still stands out as an especially destructive force. We’re not absolutely sure, but we think it was a singe tornado that moved across those states, a long-track tornado that maintained its destructive power over hundreds of miles. So nearly 700 people were killed in that disaster. And some of the little towns along the way were absolutely wiped off the map. One bigger town Murphysboro, Illinois, wasn’t completely destroyed but so many residents of that town were killed that it is indelibly imprinted in that town’s memory and history. And after the storm passed people were left absolutely stunned. I have a picture in the book of a man with a stunned look on his face, by his overturned piano in a pile of rubble that presumably was once his house.
And there is another photo I’ve seen of a child whose head was bandaged and he’s holding a dog and fortunately the dog is still alive. But there are cases like those of these poignant examples of people who were left speechless and stunned by the destructive power of this storm. And the way I talk about that storm in the book is that – it was a reminder even in the wake of the rise of modern science in the 19th century, that the forces of nature could only be mastered so far. Henry Ward Beecher’s optimism met its match in a sense in that disaster. And so it, I think, put the brakes on some of the hope that the tornado would someday be conquered.
CHRIS: Yeah, no, I think, I’m reminded of something I read, and I’m going to quote something you wrote in this chapter and I’d like you to explain what you meant. You write “The Tri-State Tornado represented the obverse of American exceptionalism – that instead of Nature’s nation, blessed by God, the United States was the singular recipient of Nature’s wrath … the Tri-State Tornado was a symbolic tipping point toward new ways of thinking about God, nature and American chosenness.” There’s a lot of stuff packed in those sentences. What do you mean? What does all of this mean maybe in the larger picture maybe of American exceptionalism, thoughts about that, you know, chosenness, etc.?
PETER: Right. Yes, the Tri-State Tornado, I mean, I should back up a bit and say, it wasn’t the first shock to the American system in the wake of scientific advances of the 19th century. At the end of the 19th century, in 1896, a massive tornado hit St. Louis, Missouri, and St. Louis was at that time was the 4th largest city in the United States and some 255 people were killed in that and a large section of the city was destroyed. And so 1896 St. Louis, and then the Tri-State Tornado in 1925, in the wake of disasters like that, and I should add too, the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, which killed some 6,000 people, I mean, if you want to talk about scale of disasters, that is even greater. But disasters such as this began to cause certain theologians to question, certainly the optimism of someone like Henry Ward Beecher, but also to question the long regnant assumption in American history that Americans were somehow particularly blessed by God. And one of the first people to do this was someone who was actually a young boy when the St. Louis tornado of 1896 hit. He was living nearby in St. Charles, Missouri, and this was Reinhold Niebuhr. And Reinhold Niebuhr in the wake of these disasters of the late 19th early 20th century began to rethink American exceptionalism and also to rethink the way the Bible had been used to interpret the weather. And so one of the passages that Niebuhr most focused on was Matthew 5:45 from the Sermon on the Mount where Jesus says the rain falls on the just and the unjust. And Niebuhr came to the conclusion that in that passage we see what he called an illustration of God’s “trans- moral” mercy. That nature is basically blind to the recipient of either its blessings or its curses. And this had huge implications for the way Americans thought about their own experience. I mean Niebuhr said we can’t assume in effect that nature is on our side. In fact, very often it is not. It is from that, that Niebuhr developed all sorts of related conclusions about American destiny and chosenness. In the in the 20th century as Niebuhr reconsiders this old colonial providential view of American chosenness, he realizes what he calls the radical implications of this passage. And so it’s the first in of a number of 20th century reflections I think on how difficult God’s providence really is to understand. Whereas previous thinkers in the American experience often assumed that the interpretations of providence was relatively easy.
CHRIS: That reminds me of the story, I’m going back here in time when Benjamin Franklin and the invention of the lightning rod and how people saw that when there was big storm that hit Boston, which had the most lightning rods. Can you elaborate on that story briefly, that really shows how Americans in the colonial period saw things, with regard to science now, this was a scientific thing, the lightning rod.
PETER: Sure, there was this controversy in the mid-1700s over lightning rods. Many people conclude that lightning rods brought down God’s wrath, that they were tempting fate (well, but not in an atheistic sense) – they were angering God by attempting to protect people from God’s wrath and deflect the power of the lightning. So people like Benjamin Franklin and others were engaged in this debate. I mean it was the same sort of debate that occurred interestingly over smallpox inoculation. Is that a presumptuous thing for people to do to try to protect themselves against illness if illness is seen as a providential punishment for some wrongdoing? So some of the colonial clergy had to step up and defend the practice of inoculation. I mean Cotton Mather did. Jonathan Edwards did. Jonathan Edwards took an inoculation for smallpox right after becoming president of the College of New Jersey – Princeton – and it killed him. So it’s a sad story in Edwards’ case. And yet, he was trying to defend modern science as something that was in keeping with a religious and pious view of the world. And yet, you know, on the popular level a lot of people felt that inoculation was dangerous because it interfered with God’s providential purposes.
CHRIS: And, did you notice, so you also would also look at, you know, sermons of local churches, right. You were looking at intellectual theologians, you were looking at newspaper editors and letter writers, and you were looking at local church sermons, right?
PETER: Well, one thing I think is that in the context of a sermon, in the context of a religious service, the burden, the recuring burden on clergy has always been to find a way to comfort. And so the question that is interesting to trace is, how did the clergy rise to that challenge, and did they make the same arguments in the17th or 18th century as they make in the 20th century. One thing that I see over time is that by the 20th century there are many more clergy willing to say “we don’t think that God is involved in the tornado at all”, and that becomes a way to comfort. Whereas the colonial clergy, as I suggested in talking about Cotton Mather, would have been much more averse to making such a statement. Even though they were aware of secondary causes in nature, they feared if you stressed that angle too much that you would be on a slippery slope to atheism. Whereas in the 20th century, clergy increasingly I think resort to pretty much an outright denial that God is involved in deadly weather and twisters. And it’s understandable that they would use that as a way to comfort, and yet that doesn’t answer the basic questions for religious people, of how we should understand our place in the natural world if we are religious and want to maintain a theistic frame of reference.
CHRIS: Yeah, right. So even closer to us in time, Peter, is the 2013 tornado that hit Plaza Towers Elementary School in the city of Moore, which is just outside of Oklahoma City, and it killed seven children there. You write this and I’ll quote: “the geographical location of [this tornado] was significant”, being where the Bible Belt and Tornado Alley overlap, which I found very interesting to consider and think about. And I think in your book much comes out of this analysis, right, that here are two things that are overlapping, can you explain that to us, what you are talking about there and its significance?
PETER: Yes, well, Oklahoma is the focus of the much of the last part of the book and of course it is because it is tornado alley, even taking into account that climate change may be shifting tornado alley gradually eastward, Oklahoma still is the home to more violent, destructive tornadoes than anywhere else on earth. And so, residents of Oklahoma have always had a special relationship with violent weather. And it’s special for another reason, or maybe I should say it’s representative for another reason, in that evangelical Protestantism is especially important in the religious experience of that state. And so violent weather tends to be viewed through an evangelical lens, this is the Bible Belt angle. And by Bible Belt angle I mean through a Biblical lens, because of course for an evangelical Protestant the Bible is still the principal authority and principal source of comfort in wake of disaster. So this event that you mention, the 2013 Moore tornado, it was a massive F5 tornado that just literally chewed up huge sections of the town. And made a direct hit on Plaza Towers Elementary school, which I later visited a couple of years later after it had been rebuilt, and 7 children were killed, it was in the middle of school day. And so it raised the old problem of theodicy - how you explain evil or suffering with particular acuteness. And because of the evangelical influence in Oklahoma, many people commented in the press, we can’t know why God allows these things and yet we still have to have faith that God is in charge. And yet, there was also what became a well-known incident when one person in the town was interviewed by CNN’s Wolf Blitzer, and he said to her at one point in the interview “do you thank God for the fact that you survived?” She hesitated a moment, “Well, I, I’m an atheist.” And it was an awkward moment for Wolf Blitzer because he was caught off guard. She was then later defended by atheist organizations for her honesty. But it put on display this long running tension in American history between viewing the weather naturalistically and something God is very much involved in. And so the Moore tornado 2013 I think put that all on display particularly powerfully.
CHRIS: Peter, before we leave this 2013 tornado event, in 2010 Oklahoma put out a poll, asking Oklahomans who the most powerful person in the state was. Share with us that anecdote, I think it is fascinating and sort of reflective of this overlap between the Bible Belt and violent weather in some ways.
PETER: Yes, well, the surprising thing was that the beloved local weatherman Gary England came in first and Jesus came in second. It is reflective of the fact that the weather is in some sense a religion in Oklahoma. At least it puts people in touch with things that they consider most important. I mean there are have been a number of local journalists who have written about this phenomenon. Holly Bailey wrote a great book in the wake of the Moore tornado in 2013. She talks some about this that and how weather watching really is a quasi-religion in Oklahoma, anytime tornadoes are in the forecast they send helicopters up so that if a tornado happens they can actually follow it and film it as it is moving across the landscape. And so there is this, even though it is mixed with fear, people are attracted to them and at the same time they fear them. To me that is the perfect emblem for the power of the divine, the divine is both attractive and fearsome at once. So that is why I love Oklahoma for a laboratory for thinking about these things.
CHRIS: So, towards the end of the book you talk quite a bit about Hurricane Katrina, not a tornado but definitely calamitous weather, and you write this, and I just want you to elaborate on your observation: I am quoting here: “While admiring [the benevolence of faith-based groups that descended upon the Gulf coast after Katrina], [historian James Hudnet-Beumler] could not shake the feeling that it was ‘some kind of Protestant penance for a societal and governmental failure….” Can you elaborate a little bit, I know you are quoting other people, but tell us a little about this and what it means in context of American’s religious understandings of violent weather?
PETER: Yes, well, I’m glad you brought up Katrina because Katrina brings in another whole dimension of this and that is the issue of, or the tension I should say, between divine control and human responsibility. And if we want to talk about perennial debates associated with the weather, that is certainly one. I mean, what is beyond human control
- and so that is the side that religious people would view as the divine side, what is beyond human control versus what is within humans’ power. And Katrina is in our recent national history the most glaring example of a failure of Americans to do what is within their power to help ameliorate a disaster. And so much has been written about that, about all the structural problems that contributed to that disaster. Ted Steinberg, another historian, has written about this and basically his argument is that the old phrase “Acts of God” is misleading, because there are really no “Acts of God” in the sense that there is always going to be human involvement in disaster and human reasons for suffering. So that is something that Americans had to reckon with and they’re increasingly going to need to reckon with as disasters, hurricanes in particular, become more destructive in this new world we find ourselves in of human-induced climate change. Hurricanes are becoming more intense, they’re causing more catastrophic flooding, which raises all kinds of questions about our priorities and what we as a society owe to each other to the common good to try to minimize both loss of life and economic destruction as well.
CHRIS: Well, this has been fantastic. I just have one last question. You write on the second-to-last page of your book “…in religion the tornado is an emblem of everything that humans cannot capture.” Why did you write that and what could the implications be to me as an American and to America itself?
PETER: Yes, I do think that the tornado is a particularly powerful emblem, it’s certainly a particularly American emblem, in that the United States is home to more violent tornadoes than any other nation on earth, I mean other nations can certainly have tornadoes, but our particular geographical situation gives rise to more violent tornadoes than anywhere else on earth and so that’s why tornadoes loom so large in the American imagination. But in terms of religion, when I say that they are an emblem of everything humans cannot capture, I meant, they have throughout our history given us questions that have again and again proven unanswerable, or at least questions whose answers that have been proposed will never satisfy everyone. And I don’t expect that to change either. I don’t expect the march of modern science which has certainly gotten better and better at predicting tornadoes, ever to completely dispel the mysteries that tornadoes
raise. And among those mysteries is the very basic question of how we as humans relate to the natural world and how the natural world relates to the divine world for Americans who are religious.
Thank you, Peter. We have been listening to Peter J. Thuesen, historian of American religion and Professor of Religion Studies at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis and author of Tornado God, published by Oxford University Press earlier this year. Thank you so much Peter for taking time to participate and for all your efforts that went in to writing the book.
PETER: Thank you, Chris, for having me.
Transcript: Religion in the 1800 Election with Ed Larson
Religion has profoundly influenced the sweeping American narrative, perhaps more than any other force in our history, from the time before European colonization to the present. The start-up National Museum of American Religion is working to build a museum in the nation's capital that will share the story of what religion has done to America and what America has done to religion, inviting all to explore the role of religion in shaping the social, political, economic and cultural lives of Americans and thus America itself.
I’m your host Chris Stevenson – join me for our twelve-part podcast series, Religion and the American Experience, as we follow scholars deep into America’s religious history, and learn how it can inform and animate us as citizens grappling with complex questions of governance and American purpose in the 21st century.
Episodes will be released every Monday between now and the end of the year on Apple Podcast and Spotify.
Interviewer: Religion and the concept of religious freedom as a governing principle in the United States has always played a role in our politics and that includes in presidential elections. As we are all aware, 2020 has been no different. History can help us navigate today's contentious zone of church and state, and the contest between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson in 1800 may be particularly beneficial.
Ed Larson author of A Magnificent Catastrophe: The Tumultuous Election of 1800, America's First Presidential Campaign, holds the Hugh and Hazel Darling Chair in Law and is University Professor of History at Pepperdine University. He has a PhD in the History of Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a law degree from Harvard. Prior to becoming a professor, Larson practice law in Seattle and served as counsel for the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington, D.C. Mr. Larson is the author or co-author of fourteen books and over one hundred published articles, including the Pulitzer Prize-Winning Book Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate Over Science and Religion is latest book on Earth and science was published by Yale University Press in 2017. Mr. Larson was a resident scholar at the Rockefeller foundation's Bellagio study center held the Fulbright Program's John Adams Chair in American studies and served as an inaugural fellow at the library for the study of George Washington at Mount Vernon. Thank you, Ed, for being with us today.
Ed: Thank you for having me on the program.
Interviewer: Ed, in the introduction, you write of this contest between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson in this way and I'm quoting here, "America's two greatest surviving revolutionary leaders had separated and the country was coming apart. One election took on extraordinary meaning," close quote. Why did you write that and what exactly does it mean?
Ed: When the country was founded, both in the Revolutionary War, when Adams and Jefferson were friends, and when the Constitution was drafted, with Washington taking over as president, again, with Adams as Vice President and Thomas Jefferson is Secretary of State, they work together.
But that's how all the Revolutionaries did, the leaders of the Revolution. They were yoked together and certainly there were loyalists versus patriots in Revolutionary America, but there wasn't a partisan divide. And when the Constitution was drafted, there was no notion, no sense, no even inkling of national political parties. So some states were divided with traditional party lines say, New York and Pennsylvania had established parties, political parties, but it wasn't a thing in the nation. And so they'd set up a system that did not conceive of political parties and that's how the original electoral college system worked, where they - where every state was expected to pick its best people. They could either do so in elections as most did or direct legislative pick. And those electors would then meet state by state in each state and vote. Each had two votes for the two people with up best qualified to lead the country. And that sort of notion, sure, the electors would be known locally, that's how they'd be elected. In theory, the Founding Fathers thought they would be elected in congressional districts where people would know them, and then they would have a sense of the best people in the country to run the system.
So there's just no, no notion of partisanship, but what had happened, late in Washington’s second term, Washington abhorred partisanship, Adams really did as well, two distinct political parties developed by the time Washington step down after two terms of office, a great believer in the rotation in office and serving as president isn't for power, it's for service, and so he steps down after two terms. And but - by this time, the outlines of two national political parties had started. One, surrounding Alexander Hamilton of which John Adams was part, the Federalist Party that believed in a strong federal government, believed in tariffs to protect manufacturing, believed in a vigorous military, supported trade with England at a time of growing International war between Revolutionary France and traditional Imperial England allied with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and what was emerging in Germany - Prussia. And so you, on a whole variety of issues. They split from another forming party, which was the Party of the Working People, Party of the Farmers, Party of Immigrants, uh, and it was coalescing around James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. James Madison was really the party leader. Now, The election was held under a sort of the old rules, the first time, but there were ink - there were notions of partnership surrounding at this would have been 1796 and in that election, because they use the old system that not really running as a tight party ticket. It turned out that the lead candidate of both factions, you call them then, came in first and second. Adams barely edged out by two electoral votes Jefferson so, Adams was President, Jefferson was Vice President.
Well, the next two - four years, the Adams administration was a catastrophe with respect to partisanship in America. These two parties exploded and there are a variety of reasons, none more important than the than the war, the worldwide war, which was trying to drag America in. France had been are our traditional ally, it had saved us during the revolution. England and been our old mother country. We traded enormously with both of them primarily with their colonies in the Caribbean, it was our main source of export, food exports to the Caribbean sugar colonies of the incredibly wealthy sugar colonies of Barbados and Jamaica, and the other ones down in the Caribbean. And the two countries were pulling us apart. Now Jefferson, because of his historic interest in anti-monarchism, hope that the French Revolution would turn out well and traditional ties and he'd served as Ambassador France, his party leaned toward France. Adam's party leaned, because of Hamilton, who believed he wanted - as he said he wanted to make America into a better England. An England with more freedoms, but still like England, a manufacturing country where Jefferson wanted an agricultural country. So there were a lot of things particularly the war that pulled these two parties apart.
And so that by 1800 when Jefferson and Adams launched the first real campaign for president, we're talking about organizing, we're talking about get-out-the-vote campaigns, we're talking about raising funds, we're talking about every member of Congress all of whom had been elected on a nonpartisan basis. Every single member of Congress, House and Senate had split up and we're part of Partisan Caucuses. There were party newspapers so that every town would have at least two newspapers funded from central sources. Jefferson/Madison would give money to one, Hamilton and his people would give money to the other. And so in every town, and I read them for the book, it would be like today, if you watch Fox News for a while and MSNBC, you get two different views of the world. Same facts, different world. Well, the facts are reconfigured, same story told in a very different way.
And so America by 1800, had truly pulled apart into two distinct camps, built around Madison's, well, it's tough to know what that party’s called because they call themselves Republicans, their opponents called themselves Democrats, which is a name that historians tend to use, Republican and Democratic Party or the Jeffersonian Party on one side and then Hamilton's Federalist Party which, because everyone knew Hamilton couldn't win anything, he was so unpopular that they ran - ran again with the hopes of winning a more moderate candidate, Adams. And so you had a rematch of the Adams-Jefferson fight, but not fought as really a pure factions, but both prepare civilly four years before. Now, this time, it was no holds barred. It was rock-gut that politics and to push that, and Jefferson excepted a hard-partisan Aaron Burr is his running mate because Aaron Burr could deliver New York. He envisioned so many of the ... Hamilton was good at this too, hardcore partition politics, but Burr is a master of it. And so Jefferson and Burr would have been one ticket. Jefferson for President, Burr intended to be Vice President, and Adams running with his - his new running mate now, now that he had a party ticket, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the largest slave owner in the South trying to combat and reach just get Southern votes, because otherwise, the thought would be they'd be for Jefferson.
Interviewer: Thank you for painting that picture. I'd like to move straight to the chapter, "For God and Party." Can you tell us about the state of religion and Religious Freedom in 1800 America?
Ed: Religion has always played, as you noted, an important part in American life and American society and it did so in 1800. 1800's a funny time because it's - it's between the Great Awakening and - sometimes called the Second Great Awakening of the Great Revival. There was a tremendous revival of religion before the Revolution led by a variety, George Whitefield coming over for - Whitefield coming over from England, the Wesley's, um, Methodist Movement, Baptist, a surge in that. And then, later on, there's going to be the, um, in the beginning in the 1820s, you'll have the Great Revival which really cements America as a - as a Protestant Nation, so you're in that in-between period.
And the revolution sort of shook things up with everything. Before the Revolution, most states, not every state, but most states had established churches and that meant you had a church that was favored by the government and received tax money. In the South, that tended to be the old Anglican Church, which during the war split and became the Episcopal church because it broke its ties with the crown. And in the North, in New England intended to be the Congregational Church, which was a pretty much a Calvinist church the [(14:00)] descendant of the Puritan church, and they were the established church in places like Massachusetts and Connecticut. And then, you had a couple places which traditionally didn't have an established church. You had a Quaker-friendly Pennsylvania. You had Baptist-friendly Rhode Island that did not establish churches and you did not have to profess belief in God or Christ. In most other states, it was pretty - pretty close. Most states had, um, religious tests for office. You had to be profess belief with God, and God in some states, profess belief in Jesus Christ. You really couldn't be a Catholic in Massachusetts. There'd never been a mass held in - in Massachusetts, sort of odd given the name of the names and mass in Massachusetts, but it had been very much dominated and they had an established church, the Congregational Church, the Calvinistic Congregational Church.
But during the revolution, you sort of had a bubbling up of that and with the overthrow of the Anglican Church, the Episcopal never had quite the standing, so in southern states led by Jefferson and Madison in Virginia, the Episcopal Church was disestablished. And you had the beginnings of a Revival Movement with growth of Methodism and growth of Baptist churches also an increased immigration of Lutherans in these areas in, you also - in Pennsylvania you had more Anabaptist coming in Mennonites, coming in. And then, in New England though, you had the Congregational Church hanging on and remaining established. But among the elites with the revolution you had a - and it was partly - partly the revolution, partly just the age of the enlightenment, you had a growing [(16:00)] amount of Deism, but even more Unitarianism. The difference being with Unitarianism, you still have an active God, you don't - you don't rely on Christ, but you do believe that typically Unitarians back then would believe in an active Providence. George Washington's a classic example of that, deeply believed in God, deeply believed in Providence, but didn't accept Jesus Christ as the Son of God; Jesus Christ was a teacher. So that would be - Franklin may be played with Deism earlier, but he - Benjamin Franklin, but he moved over in that respect, John Adams certainly moved in that respect becoming some sort of a Unitarian. Thomas Jefferson, you know, moved into Deism but then he moved later on into a Unitarianism sort of viewpoint. So you had that, so you had the elites. Hamilton would move in that direction. He led the elites, great growth in, Unitarianism or Providential Theism is how the great, there's a really fine Evangelical historian at Messiah College John Fea, and he calls it providential, uh - Providential Theism and I think that really captures, and I think he invented that term.
And you had that at that top, you still had some strongly Christian leaders like John Jay, there were some, but you had the country, a growing, you had a breakdown and establishment throughout most of the country except New England. And you had a rise in Baptists, Catholics, more Catholics were coming in the country, Lutheranism and a lot of this Methodism, a lot of these believe deeply in their religious. Religion meant a lot to them, the Baptist, but they believed in the separation of church and state because they had seen the limitations of America when you had a favored church and these were all dissenting groups, [(18:00)] whether you'd be Catholic or Jewish or back then, Baptist, Methodist, Lutherans. They relished the growing freedom of religion in America and they viewed that freedom in America, get rid of kings, get rid of monarchs, get rid of their toady churches that back them up and let religion be free. That's part of their vision of America. So that dynamism is all swirling around at the time of the election of 1800.
Interviewer: So can you briefly summarize then how the Federalists, Adams' party, and Republicans, Jefferson's party, saw religion in their approach to governing at the end of the 18th century?
Ed: Truly both of them took religion very seriously. Jefferson was really quite the religious scholar. He published his own version of the Bible. He knew his - he knew his religion and religion meant a lot to him just as it had with Franklin. When you get Adams and - and Washington, they don't seem quite as interested. But Adams comes from New England, and the Federalists in general, and this would include people like Governor Morris who is a - who was a senator from New York and a writer, key writer of the Constitution. He was a total Atheist. There weren't many Atheists back then, and he was and yet, these people tended to believe that religion, because you know - democracy was something new. Republican Government was something new. How do you trust the people? And they believed that belief in God was essential. Even if they didn't believe in themselves because elites, you know, don't have - elites can be trusted because they're elites. But the common people, they have this belief that if they didn't believe in God, you couldn't trust them. You couldn't trust them to not lie, not cheat ... because God was what made people moral. [(20:00)] And so they deeply believe that government needed the prop of religion. You needed - That was very much a civil religion. It wasn't, you know what you or I might do is, you know, this spirit in you. No, it's a civil religion and they believe deeply in civil religion.
So Adams, when he was president would call days of prayer and fasting. I mean, people who knew him well said, "What a hypocrite?" “He doesn’t believe any of this stuff himself”, but he did believe in it for the country, and he went to church. Washington went to church too. He had left the church before. While President, he went to church be all - he has left before communion because he couldn't bring himself to take communion because of the meaning of communion. So he go to church for the ... and then, leave. Um, Adam stayed for the whole thing and he would call days of prayer and fasting and he presented himself as the candidate of established religion.
Now, Jefferson thought it was all hypocritical because he knew Adams and he thought we had the same religious beliefs basically. But he thought that Adams had played the religion card quietly, four years before in the election of 1796 - he had thought that the Federalists had quietly ... because there wasn't a major campaign but there was a whispering campaign. He thought they'd played religion against him and he just said, "That's not going to happen again. We're going to answer them led by Madison who is the party leader. We're going to answer these guys point by point." And so, you had the Federalists wrapping themselves in religion. And you had Jefferson's people saying, "Well, Jefferson just as religious as Adams. Jefferson is a member of the Episcopal Church." You'd read articles, you'd read broadsides. You can read them all the time. We don't know [(22:00)] whether he goes more or less than Adams. But he's, you know, he's a Christian, he's believer in Christianity. And, but then they twisted it on him; the twist was they - while the Federals were reaching out to the established Christians and saying, "You can't have ... Jefferson's a Deist or worse." By that time he wasn’t, he was a Unitarian but he's a Deist or worse, worse being Atheist. "You can't trust him," and they picked through his writings. "He never mentions God in the Declaration of Independence. He wrote the Declaration and doesn't mention God. How can that be? How can you elect such a person?" And one time, and he was the author of "The Virginia Bill for the Separation," basically Religious Freedom, where they disestablish the Episcopal Church. "He's the author of that. He doesn't believe in a state church."
And so they kept pounding on that and - and Jefferson would come back and so he made it directly, his party made direct pleas to these new vibrant religions, whether it be Lutheranism or - or the Calvinist in the - in Southern States, the Baptist, the, the Methodist, which were growing, um, certainly, the Catholics, reached out to all of them and said, "That guy wants to establish…." The rub against Adams all along when he was a monarchist. He wants to be King John the First and turn it over to his son, John Quincy, John the Second. He built a big army. Well, he built an army during the - during the - during his term of office because he feared that France was going to invade. It was a foundless fear, Adams had actually believed it but personally, but it was a sort of a trumped-up war. He also had the Alien and Sedition Acts, wich Jefferson thought were unconstitutional that protect estate. Taxes have gone up to pay for a whole fleet of naval ships. He started a war on the high seas [(24:00)] with the French to, [(24:00)] ostensibly to protect American shipping. Jefferson said it made it worse. The taxes were high. He's trying - He's trying to take over. He's trying to be a monarch. He's trying to restore monarchy. And the established church played into that because dissident religions had always felt think of the pilgrims that left England.
They left England because they couldn't stand an established church in England, appealed to those people and so, Baptists, especially in Virginia and other places over in Rhode Island went behind - went behind Jefferson. Jefferson played the religion card hard and he says, "I believe in religion and I believe everybody should be free to practice their own religion." So he played on his support for Religious Freedom. While Adam said, "You can't trust an Atheist. You can't trust a Deist. You can't trust these people. We need to have a Christian America," and the church that he really appears - that - that appealed to is a growing Presbyterian Church.
So you see a divide between this new Presbyterian Church as well as the Congregational Church in New England, which of course backed Adams cause that traditionally what he'd been. And then on the other side, but the Congregational Churches by this time is sort of losing its religion anyway. And then on the other side, you see the dissident groups, especially the churches brought in by the immigrants. Immigrants, because Adams had passed an immigration restriction laws and tried to throw out all the immigrants, a naturalization law as part of his America First Policy as President. These immigrants who tended to be Lutherans or Baptist or Mennonites or some sort of, some of them were Jews certainly, a lot were Catholics, alot from Ireland. These people rally behind Jefferson so you ended up having this divide over religion, and if you read the articles and newspaper, if you read [(26:00)] the stitches, if you read the op-ed pieces or the letters to the editor, I mean, both sides, people backing in Jefferson fear that their religion would literally be abolished and they would be forced to support the State Church if Adams won, Jefferson's people. The people for Adams thought Jefferson was going to turn America into another France at this time during the Revolution France. Revolutionary France had outlawed the Catholic Church and closed, turned Notre Dame into a Temple of Reason and, um, that's what they said, that's what they were told in the Federalist newspapers that that's what Jefferson was going to do.
A story I love is, there's this one - when Jefferson wins, there's this one older person in a town in Connecticut, which was a Federalist stronghold with an established church who goes over to a - a person he knew in town who he wasn't very close to, he happened to be the editor of the local Jeffersonian newspaper and had his Bible and said, "Will you hold my Bible for me?" And he said, "Why?" "Well, I've heard Jefferson. So once he becomes President, he's going to come and take all of our Bibles and I don't think they'd think of looking in your house for it." So that's the fear that was actually palatable in America by the time of the election.
Interviewer: I read in your book this ad that the Federalist newspaper called The Gazette of the United States printed almost daily you write in September and October of 1800. Can you - So I can quote it here from your book and then maybe you can ...
Ed: Sure.
Interviewer: ... elaborate a bit. I mean, it has everything to do with what you just said so,….
Ed: And in his preface of that I should note that this wasn't just any newspaper. Um, they had Flagship [(28:00)] newspapers because - and this was the Flagship Federalist Paper. This was it. And if you read and I have, you know, basically all the newspapers, they just reprinted, the you had - you had the Gazette of the United States, this one. You have the Aurora which was the key, um, Jeffersonian newspaper, um, and published in both in the Capitol, Philadelphia. Um, and then, lesser importance, but this was the anchor of the party. This was like Fox News or MSNBC. This was the core and this ad you're talking about, every day in big, big bold letters on the front page with a big black mark border so it just dominates the front page and I'll let you read it.
Interviewer: Quote, "The only question to be asked by every American laying his hand on his heart is, shall I continue in allegiance to God and a religious president or impiously declare for Jefferson and no God?" Close quote.
Ed: That's how they pitched it in and it was picked up as the party line which again, Jefferson - Jefferson's people came out so strong. It says - It's simply not true. It's simply not true. All they're talking about is an established church. And Jefferson's is as good a Christian as Adams, which is probably factually correct though neither of them would be qualified as very good Christians. In the way, I would define that term about believing in Christ as your Savior. I don't think either would have said that but they - they, um - it was, um, and Jefferson's people came back and said, "No, we'll protect your religion," and it turns out that backfires because of the enthusiasm of the Baptists and the Lutherans and the Catholics.
In fact, [(30:00)] later - later after the election, just as Jefferson thought that the religion card had defeated him four years earlier, John Adams later, after reflecting on the election, he says, it was very close again. I mean, it was it was extremely- it was razor-thin both elections and Jefferson only won because thanks to Aaron Burr who carried New York. He lost a few electoral votes here and there other places, um and the result is he won a narrow victory, one-state victory where he lost a one-state victory before, so we're talking about a one-state flip, nothing big. But Adams later said, "You know, what lost me was religion. They just said after it was all over, they said, 'Give me an Infidel. Give me an Atheist. Give me anything but a Presbyterian President’.'" Because the idea back then is Presbyterian was going to push an established church. And you know, the funny thing is Adams was never a Presbyterian.
Interviewer: The Republican newspaper, Aurora presented, the choice as quote, "One between an established church, a religious test, and an order of priesthood with the Federalists. Or Religious Liberty, the rights of conscience, no priesthood, truth, and Jefferson." I'd like to - to go back a little bit and ask you to tell us what Jefferson did in Virginia to push - to push Religious Freedom, to push the separation of church and state that made him such a Religious Freedom revolutionary.
Ed: That's a wonderful question because the way the Aurora was painting it, just want to underline. They had a consistent messaging, consistent messaging throughout all thirteen columns. Well, um, by that time, sixteen states, every state. Whether you're in Vermont or South Carolina, [(32:00)] Georgia, Tennessee, it's consistent. The two parties had consistent messaging, which is pretty impressive because we never had parties like that before.
But the messaging as you're picking up, was both sides took religion seriously. Both sides played for the religious vote. Both took religious voters seriously and made really, for all their superficial, you know, you sort of read it, it's really not superficial, um, in the sense that, "Yeah, it's worded in a little tacky way." But both of them are making strong arguments. In the way of Jefferson, what Jefferson built on was Jefferson had worked hard. He'd been governor. He was governor. He had pushed the disestablishment of the Anglican Church, even though he was an Anglican, even though he was traditionally been an Episcopalian, remained an Episcopalian. And by the way, when he becomes President, he goes to church regularly, to a Baptist Church. He does as President just as Washington and Adams had. He took religions seriously.
But what he had done is over the entrenched opposition of the Anglican Church and the Virginia Gentry, he worked hand-in-glove with James Madison to pass a law that said, "We no longer have a religious test for office," By that, you don't have to, as you did in most states, had to say, swear that you believe in God or swear that you believe In Christ. I mean, both of those existed. He got rid of that for Virginia, that had always been the law before. And it also said that no money, no money shall go to, no government money should go to support the any church, and that every church is free. And it's written if you read the statute. It's written in the [(34:00)] , couched, very much in religious language that this is the way you honor God.
And whenever Jefferson spoke publicly about this, and he did regularly, he said, "I deeply believe in religious consciousness; I have my own beliefs. I have my own religious beliefs. What they are between me and God," he'd say. He wouldn't go in at length to his own religious beliefs, but every person should have the freedom to believe and practice their faith and not be forced to support any other religion belief. But it was always couched as "This is the religion as it says right in the statute, most pleasing to God." Now, Madison, of course, had gone to Princeton University, Princeton College. And Princeton College, was very much a reli - when he went there, it was very much a deeply religious school. So he had with sort of Scottish Presbyterianism and he had - he knew this religion too, just as Jefferson knew it. And they - and - And so they couched in religious terms and he always spoke consistently in that way, and that ends up being crucial for both.
Madison wins his election for Cong ... he runs for Congress in the very first election and he's running against James Monroe as an Anti-Federalist, he's running in Federalist in Anti-Federalist District, but he wraps himself up into - into the statute for Religious Freedom. He says, "This is what I gave you," and because it's sort of the Hill Country, there's a lot of Lutherans and there's some Baptists, there's some Methodists, and they all rally to him and he narrowly wins victory. So, he had had the experience of running on religion, and if you looked at it, then he offers the first, the First Amendment which includes Anti-Establishment Clause. He backs that, he pushes that through single-handedly almost, he pushes it through Congress, [(36:00)] nobody else seemed to care about the Bill of Rights but Madison and, um, then when he finally dies, when Jefferson dies, if you- if you go to his grave, he lists three accomplishments on his grave. That's it. He doesn't list being President of the United States. One of the three lists is that he's the “Author of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom," that's one of the three he wants to highlight.
Interviewer: How revolutionary was that? In your estimation.
Ed: Well it was - it was worldwide - it was revolutionary. It was revolutionary in the sense that it wouldn't happen in England. They're still an established church in England, wouldn't have happened in Canada. It wouldn't happen in China. It wouldn't happen in the Arab world. Um, but it wasn't - What it was was the leading edge of freedom in America.
That America had been - the United States, yes, they still had established religions in most of the states, most of the colonies before the Revolution. But with the Revolution, people started valuing individual freedom and really what more important is your religious freedom and they look to the king and the kings ... didn't matter was the King of France or the King of Sweden or the King of - of um - of England. Ever since the days of Constantine and certainly, the Byzantine Empire, religion props up a monarch. And since we were in very anti-monarchical times, the idea of people should have freedom of conscious, now, that had come to America in part because many dissenters did come to America. Quakers came to America, Puritans came to America, Pilgrims came to America, certainly people [(38:00)] from France, the Protestants driven out of France, they came to America, the Huguenots, and so, some Jews came to America, some Catholics came to America, Maryland in particular around Philadelphia as well. And so we had some of that background, so you take that background and you throw on top of it a revolution where your overturning monarchical ways. Yes, it was revolutionary, but it was in the logical path toward liberty and freedom with which America was moving.
And then, you get the shocking experience of France where France, when they overthrow the king who had been a, you know, a tyrant in France, “let them eat cake”. And the French people had been, you know, terribly treated by the monarchy and the nobility. Well, the Catholic Church, which had been such a visible prop of the monarchy goes with it. And so you have this - there it was really revolutionary, but there it was an expunging of religion as happened later in Mexico. There was an expunging of Catholicism. If you ever want to read a wonderful book that I love by Graham Greene, The Power of the Glory talks about, you know, what was happening to the Catholic Church in Mexico. That was to come soon. You already had the situation in France and Jefferson was more - what was happening with Jefferson and religious freedom in America was more within the evolutionary American tradition. And it led, I deeply believe, and I think most historians would agree to this. It helped lay the foundation for the great revival that was coming. The - The Great Awakening had opened up a variety of religious beliefs and weakened the established churches as people with the Great Awakening came to have a once again a deeper personal relationship with God and with religion, same way with the Great Awakening. [(40:00)] You would have again with the Great Revival, but there, it's even more diverse because you have Mormonism coming up, you have a variety of different pseudo-Protestant beliefs develop, but you also have an enormous growth among Baptist and Methodist and particularly those two, particularly Baptist and the Methodist. So it's part of that trend and this opening - this idea that America is opening, "We're going to protect you and your religious beliefs." Freedom – Freedom, free exercise, but also prevent you from being - from established religion, um, imposing religion on you, let you be free in this way. This created the - the fertile soil that has made it so that religion has remained vibrant in America much more so than in Europe, which was sort of still bundled down with established religions because even established religion even comes back in France after you have the restoration of the monarchy there.
Interviewer: Thank you. That's a great description of - of sort of Jefferson in his legacy with regards to Religious Freedom in the context of the world. I appreciate that.
Ed: If I can add one thing I know. That's where certainly the Federalist got it wrong. The Federalist always, that's why the party disappeared, it always looked backward. They thought you need an established church for integrity. They also thought you need a mercantilist - I'm going to make a parallel here, a mercantilist, economic system. Mercantilism is basically government guided and you have high tariffs to protect particular industries. You do not have laissez-faire capitalism. You don't have [(42:00)] the free market and that's what they thought because they look back how France and England operated. They look back. We need stability. We need an established church. They look back to England and France how it had been under the ancient regime. And Jefferson breaks with that. He had read Adam Smith. He brings in, Hamilton's gone at Treasury and he brings an Albert Gallatin who is a great believer in - in open free capitalism and not government protection and - and letting capitalism operate. And we had a booming economy thanks to that. And same way with religion, so they're parallels and they were our future. Jefferson, in so many ways, um, he gets criticized for this area and that area, deservedly so, slavery and lots of things. But boy, on the economy and religion, what he laid the foundation of, for whatever reason, it - with those respects, he often called the election of 1800, "The Revolution of 1800." That it was a revolution just as 1776 had been a revolution. And in the economy and religion, It really was in a way, it was a completion of the - of where America was moving.
Interviewer: We have been talking with Ed Larson, author of A Magnificent Catastrophe: The Tumultuous Election of 1800, America's First Presidential Campaign, who holds the Hugh and Hazel Darling Chair in Law and is University Professor of History at Pepperdine University. Ed, we are very grateful that you participated with us today. It's been very enlightening. I hope that's been helpful to our listeners.
Ed: Thank you so much. It's been great talking with you.
The podcast series Religion in the American Experience is a project of the National Museum of American Religion. Episodes are released each Monday starting October 19, 2020 through the end of the year on Podbean, under Story of American Religion, Apple Podcast and Spotify.
Transcript: Evangelicals Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy 1970s-1990s
Interviewer: Evangelicals have been active and influential in all parts of the American Experience. For this interview, the term Evangelical is defined as believers who won - have had a born-again experience resulting in a personal relationship with Jesus Christ to accept the full authority of the Bible in matters of faith and conduct of life and three are committed to spreading the gospel by bearing public witness to their faith. Their impact on U.S. Foreign Policy is large, fascinating, and full of experiences with direct bearing on our politics today. This is especially true as Americans look abroad to the Middle East and China. Two places where one, the United States has been actively engaged in the last several decades and two, the culture is wrapped in powerful religious ideas, very foreign to Christianity in general and Evangelicalism in particular. Today, we are grateful to have Professor Lauren Turek with us to discuss her book, "To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Relations". The case studies in her book detailed the extent of Evangelical influence on American foreign policy from the late 1970s through the 1990s. Miss Turek is an assistant professor of History at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. Lauren earned her Doctorate in History from the University of Virginia in 2015 and holds a Degree in Museum Studies from New York University. She is a specialist in U.S. Diplomatic History and American Religious History and is currently at work on a second book project which will explore Congressional debates over U.S. Foreign Aid in the 20th century. Turek has also developed exhibitions at a number of museums, historic sites, and cultural institutions. Lauren, thank you for being with us.
Lauren Turek: Thank you so much for having me. I am excited to talk with you today.
Interviewer: Lauren, would you explain what was happening in the 1960s for Evangelicals that will help frame your book scope for us?
Lauren: Sure. I am actually going to telescope out a little more than that and just talk about what the world was looking like for Christians in that era and the dynamics of world politics at the time. So one of the things that we see if we think about the 1960s, what is happening in the world is there is a process of decolonization that is going on where countries that were formerly under colonial rule by colonial powers are gaining their independence, many have gained independence by the 60s and that is leading to a number of people in these new countries to seek to question a lot of the assumptions about Colonialism to kind of push for kind of Anti-Colonial Nationalist Movements. And because of the important role that religious groups, especially Protestant groups had played in missionary work in the early days of Imperialism and Colonialism, going back to the 19th century, there was a significant critique coming from people living in throughout the Global South about missionary work, critiques that missionary work was sort of inherently, culturally imperialist. And what we saw in many Western countries including the United States among Mainline Protestants was a reaction to that, a concern that they did not want to be contributing to a culturally imperialist model. And so there were changes in the way that the missionary movement approached its goals. So we started to see where a lot of Mainline Protestants started to call people back from the mission field or to redefine their approach to missions to think about how they might do more to solve the problems of poverty or instability abroad to take a more kind of social justice orientation to their work. Evangelicals watching this happen were quite concerned about the redefinition of missionary work to have this broader focus and what they saw as a potential diminishing of the emphasis on spreading the gospel because Evangelicals really firmly believed that they had a responsibility to go out, share the gospel with the entire world in order to make all, uh, you know, spread the news to all of the people of the world. They were concerned that without active missionary work, without an active focus on Evangelism, the folks throughout the Global South would not have the opportunity to hear the gospel. They would be missing out on this and Christians would be kind of forfeiting this key role that they're playing. So we start to see in the 1960s as Evangelicals, especially in the late 1960s, Evangelicals grow increasingly critical of these moves by Mainline Protestants right at like at Uppsala. And they start to articulate new plans for themselves about how they can do more missionary work, how they can do more active missionary engagement in parts of the world where they - not that they weren't active before, but that they could expand their - their involvement there so that they could spread the gospel. So what we see is this flourishing of - of concern of anxiety about the world around them and about these what they say are, you know, two billion souls who have not been saved or two billion people who have not heard the gospels. So there's a real desire to go out and reach the unreached.
Interviewer: Great. And so this - this in the book you define or you don’t, I think there was a - an official term called Mission Crisis. That's what you just described, correct?
Lauren: Yes. Yes. So, folks, there were a number of Missiologists, uh, like, uh, a man named Barrett who - who really wrote extensively about this fear, this anxiety. That there was this crisis of missions that people were leaving the mission fields and that Evangelicals had to do something or all these people would go unsaved, they would - they would not have heard the good news of, you know, Christianity. And there's - it's hard to sort of overstate just how much anxiety this caused for these religious groups. I mean, Billy Graham is looking at a world that seems to be beset by all sorts of crisis. If we think about what's happening, especially in the late 1960s, there are - there's social unrest throughout the world, there are protests in many countries, there's sign of emerging economic challenges, there's a lot of - eventually in the 70s, a lot of political scandals so he’s looking out on a world that seems really, umm, to be affected by a kind of spiritual malaise, but also just sort of a dangerous world and he's worried that, you know, Evangelicals really need to take action. They need to - they need to get involved. They need to do something because first of all, this is an opportunity, right? When people are feeling that there's a sort of spiritual malaise, they might be very receptive to hearing the gospel but also because he feels a responsibility to all of these people that they - that they hear it. And so, this helps us understand the series of conferences that they've start to organize in the late 1960s and to the 1970s to try to bring Evangelicals from around the world together to come up with some sort of strategy. And not a sort of top-down one, but, a collective strategy for how they can go out and effectively reach these two billion people.
Interviewer: Right. So let's - let's move right into the 1970s. Can you give us the why and how the Lausanne Movement which you're referring to here, begun in the mid-1970s and what it meant to Evangelicals and their interactions with the world?
Lauren: Sure. So in 1974, the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association held a huge Congress in Lausanne, Switzerland. They brought together twenty-four hundred Evangelicals and some other folks from throughout the world, and it was a really unique event. First of all, what they had done was they made sure not just to invite Evangelicals from the United States or Europe, they made a conscious effort to invite a wide number of delegates from countries in the Global South. So it was, first of all, one of the most diverse gatherings that they had had. And they didn't just invite those delegates to listen, they invited some of these delegates to share papers and to talk about Evangelistic strategy. And the kind of tagline of the conference was, "Let the Earth Hear His Voice," right? So in other words, this is the plan we're going to try to come up with some way to share the gospel with everybody. And the papers that the invited speakers generated their circulated before the Congress so that everybody has a chance to read them and comment on them. There are response papers that are generated. So the Congress is really a big working session and there are a number of working groups put in place. They also draft the Lausanne Covenant, which is a document that most of the Evangelicals who attended sign and it's a statement - essentially a statement of mission or a statement of purpose going forward to lay out how Evangelicals are going to evangelize the world. And I just want to stress Evangelicals are again, it's not a top-down movement, there are lots of different denominations that fall into Evangelicalism and Non-Denominational groups and Parachurch groups. So it's not as though there's one person directing all of this and so a lot of the activity that's happening is to provide some kind of structure for groups that work really independently. But the Lausanne Covenant defines a goal for world evangelization and it's pretty broad in how it talks about its - its objectives. And there's these sets of debates that emerge out of the Congress that reflect some of those challenges of the 1960s and 1970s, the challenges of decolonization that I was just mentioning. There are a couple Evangelical theologians who come from countries in Latin America who share papers that are deeply critical of the Western missionary model, folks like C. Rene Padilla and others who are coming from Latin America who are looking at the situation in their countries and they're saying, "There's no way that we can hope to reach people or hope to share the gospel with people if they are suffering from poverty, if they are suffering from inequality, if they are suffering from threats to their livelihood. So we need to break man’s slavery in the world." Padilla says, "If we're going to be able to evangelize people ..." And he basically calls for a social justice orientation for Evangelicals. And many of the Western, the U.S., the English Evangelicals who respond to Padilla's calls for - he actually calls for a moratorium on Western missions. He says, "We should stop this entirely and let people from these countries focus on these problems and focus on evangelizing themselves," and the response that he gets from Evangelicals in the United States. they acknowledged the problem of cultural imperialism, but there is this anxiety that we see where Evangelicals are so worried that
so many of these countries in the Global South don't have any Christians nearby who could be local Evangelists. And so they say, "Well, we can't put a moratorium on missions because then we really won't be able to spread the gospel," and they - they kind of hit back against Padilla and others like him. And they suggest that, "Well, we really just need to focus on Evangelism. Evangelism has to be our primary goal." And it's not that Padilla doesn't want Evangelism, it's just he wants local Evangelism. And so that idea starts to kind of germinate for Evangelicals. And in the Covenant, both - both Evangelism and social action are discussed, but it is very clear in the Covenant that the primary focus is going to be on Evangelism. So there's a kind of a discussion of social justice. It's very clear that they acknowledge that they need to deal with some of these social problems about the ... Evangelism is still at the fore front but those debates continue. And so in the years and decades after that first Congress in Lausanne, there are a number of follow-up meetings and also small regional meetings where groups in the Global South talk about ways in which they can encourage, and it's - what they call sort of Indigenous and Evangelism or Local Evangelism. There are working groups in the United States who are trying to figure out ways to share the gospel message in a way that is perhaps less culturally insensitive, or is more responsive to the individual cultures of each place that they're looking to. And this is where we start to see efforts to create radio programming that is in a given language that really reflects the cultural dynamics of a particular place. So the outcome of this movement is, first of all, a considerable amount more communication between Evangelicals throughout the world. There's a kind of network that emerges where they're talking with each other more, where they're trying to be a little bit more coordinated with their efforts even though they're still pretty dispersed, and where they're very aware of what's going on in these other countries. It doesn't mean that there's no debate or that they don't, you know, disagree about how they should go about evangelizing but it is a really signal moment that brings all of these Evangelicals together and gives them a sense of focus or a sense of purpose to this unified mission.
Interviewer: Well, Lauren with that great understanding of the Lausanne Covenant let's move into the chapter where you deal with religious freedom in foreign policy. Let's see how this all played out. So you noted that in the 1970s, as Evangelicals surveyed the world within the framework of the Great Commission, which is Jesus' invitation to go and baptize all people. Communist and Muslim states stood out as hostile to Evangelism in part because Evangelicals define religious freedom as and I'm quoting here from the book, "The freedom to practice and propagate religion in accordance with the will of God." Can you elaborate Lauren, on the ramifications of that definition?
Lauren: Absolutely. So it's really - this goes back to that definition of what an Evangelical is and the sort of third point that you highlighted, a point that comes from an excellent sociologist of religion Mark Shibley - was the really core belief that doing - being an Evangelical involves Evangelism. It involves sharing your faith, and that is a core part of both practice and belief. And so for Evangelicals, if they cannot share their faith, they feel that they are not being able to fully practice their religion, that they are - their beliefs are being imposed upon. And this really is highlighted for Evangelicals in particular in the situation unfolding in the Soviet Union. Evangelicals had long been concerned about religious freedom in the Soviet Union. There's of course lots of rhetoric about godless communism in all of this, but in terms of actual - looking at the actual policies, they're very concerned about religious practitioners who were facing state persecution for practicing their beliefs. And this goes back quite a ways. What changes in the 1970s is that Evangelicals begin to organize more effectively as a political lobby to push the U.S. government, to take particular actions, to try to sanction the Soviet Union, and pressure it to change its policies. The Soviet Union ostensibly had a kind of religious freedom part of its constitution, but obviously was not actually - that wasn't actually in practice. What they see in communist countries, in particular, is not only can people from not so - so first of all, in - in the Soviet Union, it's not that you couldn't belong to a church, right? There were Baptist Churches, but they had to be registered with the State in order to be acceptable. And obviously, in the process of registering with the state, they had to comply with certain sets of rules. And one of the things that they weren't allowed to do, not only were they not allowed to evangelize others, they could not educate their children, in their faith the way that they wanted to. So there was this real sense from Evangelicals, especially those who were practicing in unregistered churches who were trying to practice clandestinely so they would not be kind of under the observation of the State. They were already doing something kind of dangerous by practicing clandestinely by educating their children, by trying to evangelize. And Evangelicals in the United States reading stories or hearing from folks who faced arrest or psychiatric treatments for psychiatric treatments or assaults or long prison sentences for doing what Evangelicals in the West viewed as a kind of core aspect of their practice of faith was very alarming to them. And so in the 1970s, as other religious groups like Jewish groups in the United States were similarly very attentive to religious persecution in the Soviet Union, there's a tremendous amount of persecution against Jewish, Soviet Jews and they were very effective at using the 1974 Trade Act in Congress. So they - they add an amendment to that Trade Act, the Jackson-Vanek Amendment which created a kind of barrier to trade essentially that it said if countries are not going to allow kind of free immigration for their people so that Jews can leave and that sort of thing, we're not going to trade with those countries or we're not going to extend most favored nation status at any rate. So U.S. Evangelicals looking at the success of Jewish interest groups in, first of all, highlighting the threat to their ability to, you know, survive in this in communist Society. They're inspired by that in many ways and they say we should be advocating more forcefully for our co-religionists. And so we start to see similar advocacy in Congress starting in the mid-1970s. They bring up the cases of religious persecution that they hear about, they highlight specific cases of religious prisoners of Evangelical Baptist, Pentecostal prisoners in Soviet labor camps. They call for their release. They really advocate for people in the Soviet Union to have more access to Bibles, to have more access to practice their faith freely. And it is a really effective way to organize because there's a general sense within the Congress, there was a lot of support for Soviet Jews, - then is a lot of support for Soviet Christians, is a very effective way to make an argument that the Soviet Union is restricting not just religious practice, but Human Rights in their country. At a time when there's bipartisan support for pushing back against that and so it becomes a way for this lobby to grow more powerful and more politically effective at this time. And so they're able to actually get some prisoners released. They are able to push to deny trade to certain countries. They are able to kind of keep this in the minds of policymakers where if they're meeting with their Soviet counterparts, they're asking about religious prisoners so that it's never kind of far for people's minds. So that's how it kind of develops in the 70s where they take this concern about religious practice of religious freedom and their anxiety that in some of these countries are not able to spread the gospel and these people are still unreached. And they can actually translate that into actually testifying before Congress, actually writing lots of letters to Congresspeople and really organizing very effectively around this concern.
Interviewer: Let's - Let's dive a little bit deeper here. So when the National Security Council briefed President Reagan, so now we're moving into the 80s, before the Geneva Summit in November 1985, they highlighted the "Extraordinary burgeoning of religion in the USSR as by far the most dramatic development in Soviet dissent in recent years," and that by the time Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981, Evangelicals had a defined foreign policy agenda, which you spoke about here, that underscored religious freedom. So, can you give us an example or two of how this played out during the Reagan presidency?
Lauren: Sure. So there's actually a few ways of this plays out. I mean, this - so the Siberian Seven, of course, had been - they were a group of two families of Pentecostals who had, uh, kind of taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy in the late 1970s because they were not, - you know, they were facing persecution in the Soviet Union. Um, they - there had not been much they had not been able to be gotten out safely during the Carter Administration. And of course, Reagan was very sympathetic to their plight very concerned about their situation. And so when Reagan met with his counterparts in the Soviet Union when Reagan's, you know, advisors were meeting with their counterparts with the ambassador's we're meeting, the Siberian Seven came up quite often. It came up quite often in the records of their conversations just really pushing the Soviets to let these folks emigrate. The Siberian Seven is - are in some ways, a kind of a different case from what many Evangelicals were sort of hoping for with the Soviet Union because they do essentially want to - to leave and come so they can practice their faith freely. And they do get released during Reagan's presidency. Reagan pursues this in a kind of quiet diplomacy approach, right? He's not publicizing his activities. He's now outwardly criticizing the Soviet Union. He keeps things very quiet as he works the kind of back channels to help support their release. Now, Evangelical activists, a lot of them did not necessarily want to open the floodgates to have Evangelicals in a situation where they're all going to emigrate from the Soviet Union. What many Evangelicals in the United States and the Soviet Union actually want is for policy changes in the Soviet Union so that people who live there can stay and then evangelize their Brethren. So the Siberian Seven is actually kind of interesting case. It attracted a lot of attention. It certainly brought a national attention to the problem of religious persecution in the Soviet Union. But when many Evangelicals were hoping to see were actually ways to use the levers of foreign policy, to pressure the Soviet Union, to change its own internal policies. Which is challenging because of course, the Soviet Union's a Sovereign nation. It really reacted very strongly against the suggestion that it should be changing its internal policies just because the United States didn't like them. These are cold war adversaries that was not something they were keen on, but that's really a lot of what Evangelicals were hoping to see. And some of the folks who are able to immigrate to the United States kind of, uh, say like, "Well, I would like to be able to continue to evangelize my countrymen." It's, it's, that's the kind of desire that exists. So there's that. So - So Evangelicals see Reagan as a potential Champion for their goals, their, you know - he does get the Siberian Seven released. He is very attentive to the problem of religious persecution in the Soviet Union. He speaks about the Soviet Union and its religious repression. So they're certainly happy that he is promoting that particular vision and really embracing the idea of religious liberty or religious freedom as a core human right. That doesn't mean that they always aligned with the Reagan Administration on policy. For example, one of the things that the Reagan Administration was really eager to do in its time in office was to try to chip away at some of the, sort of relationships between the Soviet Union and its clients states or sort of friendly allied states in the Eastern Bloc. And it put in place a policy of differentiation to do that where they would be more receptive to countries that might be willing to have a more independent foreign policy from the Soviet Union. And Romania is a really good example. Romania was also a country that was deeply repressive for Evangelicals. There are reams of testimony that Evangelicals were giving in Congress about how brutally repressive this is the conditions were. That they were, you know - they had all sorts of lurid stories about how they were ripping up Bibles and using the pages as toilet paper and all of these. Just really sort of very, you know, the kind of imagery that would really grab people in Congress. And - And you know, they talk about churches being bulldozed. So there's just this, this sort of imagery there that really grabs people and gets people upset. And meanwhile, the Reagan Administration sees the Romanian government as one that is perhaps going to exercise a bit of independence from the Soviet Union, and so they're eager to extend normalize trading relations with them. And Evangelicals are saying, "Absolutely, not. We don't want you to do that. They're abusing the kind of - They're abusing Evangelicals. They're abusing people's right to practice their religion," and so they end up really pushing hard against Reagan policies there. So Reagan can be an ally but it's, it's kind of - it's sometimes mixed, right? They will push back if they think that he is not pursuing their general goal of pushing for religious freedom in all of these countries that they see as hostile to their faith.
Interviewer: We are talking with Professor Lauren Turek about her book, "To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations," which details the extent of Evangelical Influence on American Foreign Policy from the late 1970s through the 1990s.
Lauren, in July of 1990 as the Soviet Union is starting to unravel, Mikhail Gorbachev reached out to Western NGOs, including some U.S. religious organizations for advice on making the transition to democracy as well as for aid and fostering civil society in Russia. Can you tell us about this project, Christian Bridge, what it was? What it did including its successes and failures?
Lauren: Sure. So there's this, in the - in the 90s, as, in the late 80s and early 90s, as the situation in the Soviet Union is starting to change and it's becoming increasingly apparent that they're at a transition moment, Gorbachev invites a group of - a group of Evangelicals to come to kind of meet with - with leaders in Moscow. They actually come. They, they - It's a whole group of Evangelicals. They include the sort of executive director of the National Association of Evangelicals, one of the editors of Christianity Today, one of the leaders from the National Religious broadcasters, and then a bunch of folks who work on Slavic Missionary Work or who are doing kind of Radio Evangelism. So it's this really kind of high-level group of Evangelicals who go. They're very well connected and they - they go because they get - they get invited to come to Moscow. It seems like this sort of exciting opportunity to go and they meet with the Soviet leaders. I have pictures of them kind of meeting with leaders of the KGB, meeting with, meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and talking about how the kind of religious values that they promote could potentially contribute to shoring up some aspects of Soviet Civil Society. They are - The Evangelicals who go are very wary. I mean, they don't know exactly what's going to happen. They are not sure. There has been this kind of a bit of religious opening in the Soviet Union. They're not sure if that's kind of window that's been opened is going to snap shut, but they go because this might be an opportunity. And what ends up happening is they form this kind of ad hoc group called Project Christian Bridge, which is an effort essentially to kind of advise the Soviet Union on how they can bring these Christian values, these moral principles to bear on improving Soviet Society. And so what they do is they, you know, tthey've got all these participants, they go back home, uh, and they try to figure out ways that they can, you know, help in a post-soviet context, uh, to educate people in the military, to educate the media, and so on and so forth, to try to help folks in those areas. Their main focus of course, is Evangelism. They - They believe that the best way to you know, create Civil Society there is to build up the number of Christians. And so what we see are a lot of efforts back in the United States as part of Project Christian Bridge to develop suggestions for how increased religious freedom in the Soviet Union could actually help with this Project of Building Civil Society. So there's lots of - lots of ways to try to provide aid to the what is by then the kind of former Soviet Union to the Commonwealth of Independent States. They also start to coordinate these visits from Russian officials to U.S. churches. So what see are - for example, some of the big leaders of the army in the former Soviet Union traveling to the United States, traveling actually to Tennessee to meet with leaders in the Pentecostal Church, the Church of God to talk to them about, you know, moral values and instilling moral values and - in their people and so on and so forth, which is just really surprising, right? The idea that the Russian military wants to find ways to instill kind of Christian - Christian ideals among its soldiers, and - and maybe it's officers in the Russian army and they have all these talks if you look, there some newspaper articles from, um, Columbia, Tennessee highlighting the visit of these Russian Military Officers to learn about U.S. Christian or U.S. Evangelical values, U.S. Evangelical practices. And there's a real push to ensure a new laws in the Commonwealth of Independent States in Russia to have more religious freedom. So that what we end up seeing in the aftermath of this is that there's actually this enormous inflow of religious groups from the United States to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It's this, it's just - And it's not just Evangelicals, there's an influx of, you know, all sorts of different faiths that come in because there's this new openness that has emerged. Now, the reaction to this in Russia after a few years the, you know, the Orthodox Church in Russia sees this as inherently threatening to their own hold on power, right? Their own grasp of the populace. So they're very concerned that all of these religious groups coming in preaching on street corners, opening institutions in their country that that's going to detract from their ability to maintain their hold on their believers. But, what we see is there - is this kind of short period of a few years where all of these religious groups are coming in and trying to evangelize in Russia. Eventually, the Russian Orthodox Church is able to clamp down on some of the freedoms that had been opened up to allow for this but there continued to be of Evangelical engagement through - through groups like Project Christian Bridge and others that were working there to ensure kind of Evangelical presence in - in Russia. But you have two other case studies I want to get to here in the time remaining. The second case study is Guatemala. Can you tell us about the February 4, 1976 earthquake that struck that country, and what happened religiously to them as a result?
Lauren: Absolutely. So on February 4th, 1976, there's this tremendous devastating earthquake that hits in Guatemala. It causes widespread devastation throughout you know, from - from kind of radiating out throughout the area. I mean, the description of homes that have been destroyed, people, in ...- incredibly injured or folks who died. It - There's just a tremendous amount of devastation. And there's of course, an immediate response from religious groups in general in the United States to go and provide aid to the people who are suffering in Guatemala, to help them rebuild, to help them recover from this devastating event. There was in fact so much aid from religious groups that, um, members of the Presidential Administration we're starting to direct folks directly to those different groups. And it's again, it's Catholic groups, Christian groups. Sorry, Protestant groups, Evangelical groups, etc. so there's just this - this outpouring. Now, there were already a number of Evangelical groups that had been involved in Guatemala. They had been doing missionary work there since the, you know - for a very long time. But the earthquake and the desire to go help after the earthquake was also this tremendous opportunity for Evangelism. And so what we see is that some smaller Non-Denominational Evangelical Churches from the United States go into Guatemala after the earthquake to kind of set up shop to help folks recover, but also to build some Churches. And one of the churches that goes down is a church from California called Gospel Outreach Church. And they are, uh - they actually started as a kind of hippie church in the in this sort of, Days of the Jesus Movement in the 70s, but they had become a more kind of conservative traditional Evangelical Church, by 1976. And they actually, there - the man who goes down and it's a Reverend Carlos Ramirez. He goes down to Guatemala, with a group of folks from the Gospel Outreach Church. They go to help. They go to help people rebuild from this earthquake and they start a new church, there called El Verbo, the Church of the word. And while they're there, they start to build a following. And there have been a lot of, theologians and religious studies scholars who have talked about the ways in which, in the aftermath of the earthquake, the message of Evangelical Christianity, which has kind of apocalyptic overtones which talks about,- which talks about and contextualizes events like an earthquake really effectively that they were able to bring people in impart because of the shock of the earthquake. That their ideas and ideology became really appealing, and so they build this following in Guatemala City. And one of the people who comes to join their church is a man named Rios Montt, Efraín Ríos Montt and he had been a - well, he was a General in the Guatemalan Army. He had at one point, run for president, but because of corruption in the government, he was not able to, - he felt that he had been unfairly treated in the election that he, had been blocked. And so he had kind of spent some time in Spain and had come back, and he was - he was in need of some spiritual help and so he finds the teachings of the Gospel Church very - of El Verbo, very appealing so he becomes a member of this church. Now, fast forward a few years, and he's working at the church. He's actually a director of their Christian Day School. He's, you know, doing his administrative tasks. And he hears on the radio that there has been a coup, the government has been overthrown by a group, a young - a group of young military men, a military, - a sort of military coup and he is being called to the Palace, to the National Palace to come because he's been named as one of the new leaders of government by these - these young military folks. So he consults with Carlos Ramirez with the other Reverends at the church and he actually gets their blessing. They kind of they, you know - there's some news articles or news coverage from the time and they say they kind of laid hands on him. They prayed and they came to the view that he had been chosen by God to lead Guatemala into a new kind of become - to become a kind of model of Christianity in this area, and so he goes. And although he was only one of three people that the coup plotters had kind of put in charge, there were two other military leaders so they have this Military Junta, he very quickly marginalizes the other two military leaders and declares himself the sole leader of Guatemala within a short period. And this is all taking place in early 1982. And he makes all of these speeches on the radio where he talks about how he's going to turn Guatemala to God. Now, Guatemala. of course, is a nominally Catholic country at this time, it's you know - it's not as though there had not been a lot of missionary work there already, but he says he's going to turn the country to God by which he means he's going to support in particular Evangelicals and the particular type of Protestant Christianity that he practices. What actually happens is he kind of vows to end corruption and do all of that and he does make some changes in the urban areas. So the kind of urban Guatemalans, the middle and upper-class, they do sort of see him as helping them. But, he identifies "communist insurgents" quote-unquote, communist insurgents, in rural areas as a threat not only to his leadership but as a threat to his desire to spread his Christian vision throughout his country, right? Because he sees in the same way that - that other Evangelicals do communism as kind of inherently threatening to religious freedom and religious practice. So he unleashes the army on indigenous people, the Mayans and other indigenous groups who are living in the highlands in Guatemala, in this - in this sort of deeply devastating counterinsurgency campaign, where they're literally putting people into strategic hamlets and model villages, what they call the Model Villages, but they're essentially strategic hamlets to, break up communities or put them in this kind of refugee camps and then, they kill or disappear just thousands and thousands of people. They essentially engage in genocide. But there's that language and rhetoric of religious freedom and so he also at the same time is trying to cultivate a close relationship with the Reagan Administration. He's playing on the language of Human Rights, he's saying, "We're going to bring Christianity. We're going to promote an end to corruption," and he's asking for U.S. aid to do that. He's asking in particular for military aid to help him put down this insurgency of what he terms an insurgency. He invites Evangelical leaders from the United States down to come and tour the country, to meet with him, to pray with him, to see some of these strategic hamlets, and they pledged a tremendous amount of aid to him. Pat Robertson goes on the 700 Club and calls for U.S. citizens, U.S. watchers of his show to not only call their Congresspeople and push them to provide military aid to this regime, but to support private fundraising that they're doing to try to send whatever material they can to help him in his goals. And the Reagan Administration encounters a lot of pushback, right? There are members of Congress who are watching what's happening in Guatemala. They're hearing from Secular Human Rights Organization saying that this is a really devastating Human Rights situation. People are being killed. And they're unwilling to provide that aid, and so we end up in this situation where Evangelicals are pushing very hard to have that aid extended. The Reagan Administration is trying to find ways to work around Congressional resistance to this, and eventually, they are able to offer the sale of some helicopter parts, but Evangelicals, Rios Montt is not necessarily keen on that. He wants - He wants the aid to be provided to him. Evangelicals help him secure the helicopter parts that he needs from sources in Canada and Israel. So they are able to actually materially help him with his efforts. Now he's later ousted in another coup. A lot of the military men were not super thrilled that he was kind of emphasizing the religious dynamics. He was constantly using religious rhetoric and his speeches. They ousted him in part because they're frustrated with that and with the incredible influence that his church members have - his church advisors have on his leadership. But it's this remarkable, moment where we see the Confluence of Evangelical concern, U.S. Evangelical engagement with this region, U.S. Evangelical concern about spreading the gospel and some of this communist and anti-communist rhetoric that we're seeing. So he's - it's a tremendously interesting case study.
Interviewer: No, I agree. Very interesting. Before we leave it and go to South Africa and Apartheid, I want to - to note from your book I learned that before the earthquake, uh, Guatemala had a seven percent Protestant population. And by 1982, so six years later, they had flipped it. They were then twenty-two percent Protestant. And as you say they were ...
Lauren: And they just grew from there.
Interviewer: Okay, right. That's what you said. So, um, just from the missionary aspect, also very very fascinating, let's move to South African Apartheid. So, can you explain how Mainline Protestant religious leaders and Evangelical religious leaders differed in their approach to Apartheid in South Africa, which was a major U.S. Foreign Policy issue in the 80s and 90s?
Lauren: Sure. So this is when I think about the case study is that I chose, one of the things that I was trying to do was look at the wide array of ways in which Evangelicals might have influenced policy. So the case of the Soviet Union, we see them being very effective at using the language of religious liberty to - to get particular legislation and particular policies. We see an on-the-ground effectiveness in Guatemala and congressional resistance in - in that case. South Africa, there's a tremendous variation in terms of not just Evangelical perspective in the United States about the problem of Apartheid but Evangelical perspective in South Africa about what the response should be to Apartheid. And then of course, there is the kind of what we see the perspective from Mainline Protestants and many Catholics where there's a huge amount of religious-based activism to try to end Apartheid in the country of South Africa, right? So there's a lot of protestant activism on that, both in the United States and in South Africa. And in fact, in South Africa, it's, it's you know, folks like Desmond Tutu, and other sort of really well-known religious leaders. They tend to be like Anglican or other Mainline Protestant churches. So they are advocating for an end to the Apartheid regime and all of the you know, racist policies that that entailed and the tremendous amounts of Human Rights abuses which were, just increasing regularly throughout this - throughout the 70s and 80s. So it was a seriously bad situation. Plus of course, this very racist regime. Now, Evangelicals in United States, when interviewed, many of them particularly, very conservative ones would say that they were deeply opposed to the racist policies of the Apartheid regime. So they would say we are opposed to Apartheid, but they were worried that if the Apartheid regime was removed, that the new leadership that would come in might come from folks from the African National Congress, which they viewed as a Communist Organization or at least inspired, you know, or in potentially influence by Communism. So they were worried that what would happen would be with the removal of Apartheid leaders in an immediate way, ANC leaders would come in and maybe South Africa would fall to Communism. And if that happened. it would take what they saw as one of the most Christian countries in - on the continent of Africa and maybe create a situation where religious freedom would be restricted. So that was the perception. Now, there was a lot of debate right there, were - there were whole group of Southern Baptist in the Southern Baptist Convention who were calling for a much more kind of progressive response to Apartheid. They were much more supportive of movements that Mainline Protestants and Catholics and Secular Organizations in the United States were advocating for at the time which is they wanted the United States to disinvest from South Africa. They wanted them to sanction the government in order to put pressure on the Apartheid regime to end Apartheid. Those groups in the Southern Baptists were marginalized though because there were these more powerful conservative voices who pushed them out of positions of leadership and really advocated for a different approach. And so, what they were calling form was rather than bringing justice to South Africa rather than an immediate end to Apartheid. They were calling for a kind of gradualism and they were very opposed to the efforts to impose sanctions or to disinvest, or to divest, to have corporations divest. And a lot of it is rooted in this language of religious liberty and the fear that they have that a communist government was going to come in and that would be the end of that. And so they're playing on those anxieties and fears. And, so when there is a movement in Congress to pass legislation, to pass this Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act that would involve some of these four policy levers applied to the Apartheid government, Evangelicals in the United States along with some conservative Evangelicals from South Africa who have a kind of - who are also worried about Communism. They mount this campaign to resist the passage of this legislation and they go on TV, and they write letters, and they do all of this stuff to try to make their case. And we see you know, quite a bit of an effort to bring some of these more conservative South African Evangelicals to speak about what they see as the potential threats of an immediate end to an Apartheid and they kind of call for a gradual end. Now, they are not successful in blocking the comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and in fact, advocates in Congress who support the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act are able to ensure that it gets enforced even though the Reagan Administration, does not approve of it, tries to - tries to sort of veto it and everything. So tthey are not successful in this case unlike in some of the other cases I talked about. What's important though is that there is this focus on again, preventing - it's preventing a certain government change in that country and there isn't as much of a focus on justice. And it is only later that we see in South Africa, South African Evangelicals feeling a sense that they have really messed up, that not focusing on justice, that by focusing only on their desire to continue to evangelize, and so on and so forth, that they have really done harm. And so there's an effort to engage in a kind of reconciliation process there. And so we see some South African Evangelicals who play a key role in that reconciliation process later in the 1990s. U.S. Evangelicals, their thoughts about Apartheid evolved after the end of Apartheid, but it's - but they were certainly, again, not all of them, right? There's a lot of difference of opinion, but - but the core group that are advocating against the - the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, they are slower to kind of have their views about the situation involved over time.
Interviewer: I want to, uh, quote from your book about these South African Evangelicals looking back on their approach as you just brought it up. It was very moving, uh, profound I should say, what they said and I'm quoting here, "In South Africa, I'm quoting from them. In South Africa, we hear more and more that no price is too high to pay for our religious liberty. The fact is that genocide is too high, high a price, and no one, not even Evangelicals, not even for the highest ideals have the right to take measures that might destroy millions of innocent non-combatants." So I think that's, related to what you just said.
Lauren: Absolutely. And it also again, it just - it highlights this ongoing disjuncture between a social justice orientation and this - the Primacy of Evangelism, right? So this is a kind of ongoing discussion and also the definitions of Human Rights. When we think of Human Rights, is it just religious liberty, or is it a broader search for justice?
Interviewer: Right. Lauren, you end the book with this statement, "Evangelicals' impact on U.S. Foreign Relations is a testament to the power of religiously inspired individuals, united in a common cause to shape national politics as well as the international order." Do you want to add anything to that here as we close?
Lauren: I think we're still seeing today a lot of the rhetoric and ideas of this group, from the sort of rhetoric of the 1970s and 1980s still shaping U.S. Foreign Policy in insignificant ways even today. So this was a grassroots movement. They managed to build a large global network and they were able to make significant interventions into U.S. Policy. And so, you know, in terms of thinking broadly about how - how grassroots - grassroots groups can be very influential. I think sometimes we have this perception that only - only kind of elites or the foreign policymakers are the one shaping policy, and grassroots activism doesn't matter, but it does, right? And we can - we can have a range of perspectives and views about whether we think that these policies, that these particular groups put in place were beneficial or not, I won't give my personal opinion, but we can certainly have a range of opinions about that. But it is very clear that religious belief united this group. They're set of beliefs united this group and made them or contributed to their ability to organize very effectively and shape the world around them in really profound ways.
Interviewer: We have been talking with Professor Lauren Turek about her book, To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations". Thank you, Lauren, so much for being with us. It has been very enlightening and I believe helpful to me and all listeners.
Lauren: Thank you so much for having me. It was wonderful to get to talk to you.
Transcript: "Religion and the Shaping of Native Cultures in Early America" with Linford Fisher.
Chris: When European Christians arrived in this vast territory we now call the Americas over four hundred years ago, they found indigenous people here with their own meaningful and personal and sacred religious beliefs. The contact and conflict between Europeans and natives sparked a long-term series of religious encounters that intertwined with other settler colonial processes such as commerce, government, enslavement, warfare, and evangelization.
The taking of Native Americans' land and their lives have been called one of America's two original sins. The legacies of colonialism swirl all about us still including broken treaties, reservations, alcoholism, poverty, despair, misunderstandings, and questions of sovereignty alongside of survival, persistence, cultural and linguistic revitalization, and a return to traditional practices.
Because religion was central to these processes in colonial America and continues to play an important role today, taking a look at the religious interactions between European colonists and Native Americans will help us all better understand these issues and help each other flourish in the American 21st century.
Linford Fisher is a Professor of History at Brown University. He received his Doctorate from Harvard University in two thousand-eight. Professor Fisher's research and teaching relate primarily to the cultural and religious history of colonial America and the Atlantic world including Native Americans, religion, material culture, and Indian and African slavery and servitude. He is the co-author of Decoding Roger Williams: The Lost Essay of Rhode Island's Founding Father. Additionally, he has authored over a dozen articles and book chapters and is currently finishing a history of Native American enslavement in the English colonies and the United States between Columbus and the American Civil War.
He is the Principal Investigator of the Database of Indigenous Slavery in the Americas project which seeks to create a public, centralized database of native slavery throughout the Americas and across time.
We are very happy to have Linford here to help us understand a particular part of America's religious history, religion, and the shaping of native cultures in early America by discussing his book, The Indian Great Awakening, published in 2012.
Also, as with each episode in our podcast series, Religion in the American Experience, we hope listeners come away with a better comprehension of what religion, growing in the soil of the ideal of religious freedom as a governing principle, has done to America and what America has done to religion and, thus, be better equipped as citizens to ensure that the American experiment in self-government endures.
Said Abraham Lincoln, "We cannot escape history."
Thank you, Lin, for being with us.
Linford: Sure. Thanks for having me, Chris.
Chris: First, Lin, I want to make clear that your book covers a specific time periodand a specific location.
Linford: Yeah, you are right in a sense. It does focus on New England. Uh, New York is in their different places. Um, and there are gestures, other parts of the country. It also spans really from the seventeenth century through the early nineteenth century.
The core of the book is about a century, uh, in terms of its purview. But yes. So this cannot stand in for all Native American history everywhere. Um, the Americas are a vast vast area and its history is rich and diverse.
But this little corner of the Americas, I think, represents a process that, uh, can lead to productive conversations about other parts of-- of, this area as well.
Lin, can you tell us about the little, leather pouch found at a Pequot girl's gravesite who died sometime in the late seventeenth century or early eighteenth century and what it means in the framing of your story?
Linford: Yeah. So this is the story I open up with in the introduction to the book, because it represents, uh some of the themes that the book tackles overall. And, it is a challenging thing to talk about and mentioned, maybe, because it has to do with the, um, accidental unearthing of, uh, human remains. And so I want to acknowledge that up front that, um, I, share this story, very respectfully, um, but knowing that it is-- it is actually, uh, not my place and my role, in a way, to talk about human remains in Native communities.
But, this particular instance happened, because, uh, there was a-- a homeowner in Connecticut who was trying to make way for an underground gun range. And so he had a bulldozer come in and plow this whole section of his yard up. And as they were bulldozing the land, they realized that the dirt was really dark in regular sort of intervals as they were plowing stuff away.
And so they brought in the archaeologist from the state. Fortunately, the bulldozer, um, o-- operator did the right thing. And they began to look. And they realized, they just bulldozed through a Pequot grave. The Pequots are these, you know, large in the seventeenth century-- extraordinarily large, native group in the south eastern Connecticut-- southern Connecticut.
And, what they found, in working with the present-day Mashantucket Pequots, who authorized archaeologist to go in and to begin to, to reinter them, but also, in the process, to do some sort of analysis as well.
And, what they found is in one of these graves, the remains of a young Pequot woman, probably, in her teens. And buried with her was this bear-skin pouch, that contains, or actually I mentioned it was bear skin but it is-- it is this pouch, this medicine bundle, that within it was, uh, the remains of a bear paw and also a fragment of a Bible page.
And these two things, you do not often see together in terms of New England, in terms of the archaeological record. And so it got people wondering how can we interpret this? And it is also unusual, as you probably know, for Christians, more generally, to tear Bible pages out and use them separately from the Bible.
And so here we have this, you know, young Pequot woman, who dies, early. She is not, you know, fully grown and not an adult woman.
As we are trying to understand-- not we, but people were trying to understand this, um, you need to realize that maybe there was something about the way in which, um, these two religious influences and backgrounds came together in this medicine bundle.
Uh, so the Bible representing some sort of Christian presence, maybe, Christianization, but also maybe just using the Bible page as like a talisman, like almost a way of you know, bringing on or-- or producing power and the bear paw on the same way.
So these two things are together. They are wielded by a native person, maybe added to her grave, you know? She might have not made that choice. But it meant something in terms of the coming together of two different religious kind of traditions and backgrounds.
The bear paw also represents power as well. So the idea is this that-- that when we think about native religious lives in this time period, it is not always so clear the meanings they assigned. And for too long, we have sort of listened to missionaries and preachers and ministers, especially European ministers and preachers, in terms of trying to understand, conversion and the meaning of the religious engagement.
So I started with that as a way to sort of introduce some larger questions and themes
Chris: Great. Thank you. Right. We will get to some of those themes later. You also write - and this is, I think, foundational to our discussion - that the Native [(16:00)] Americans believed they were given the land by the Great Spirit. How did European colonists see Native American land?
Linford: Yeah. It is a really as you say, foundational piece of the settler colonial process, which is to say that there is a-- a vastly different, way of understanding land and its meaning between Europeans and natives.
As you say, natives, believe that they have been, you know, created on this, land and had been given it to them. It had been given to them to-- to use in different kinds of ways. And they had specific ways that they use it, um, whether it is hunting and fishing or gardens, or whatever else.
But Europeans had a different way of understanding this and the English, in particular, in terms of claiming a plot of land and building a wall or a fence and putting a house on it that is there year-round and using the land in different kinds of ways, cultivating specific kinds of gardens that, you know, are there year-round and so forth.
And, I think Europeans also, generally, saw the land as something that is exploitable in-- in very specific kinds of ways. So the English come over. They see this amazing area and New England that is, just bursting with, you know, naturally, produced kinds of things that they are lacking in England like trees and … the British Isles are, basically, you know, devoid of trees by this point. They have just cannot grow them fast enough.
And they see in their eyes, um, you know, only - tens of thousands of natives. But in their eyes, they see a lot of land that is not used, that is unimproved, the same language I used.
And so within their frame of reference kind of based [(18:00)] on this Biblical mandates of the early, uh, chapters of Genesis to kind of go out and-- and do stuff with the land, to work the land. They believe that they can just sort of come in and take land that is not actively being used. And sometimes they can take land that is actively being used as well.
So it is not only this idea of-- of land, uh, whether there is no one on it. But they have these phrases. And they talk about, yeah, uh, unimproved land or the emptiness of the land. Um, and in doing so overlooked the presence of Native Americans and also how natives understand land, how natives are using land, how natives, are actively cultivating, and are actively growing gardens and so forth.
Chris: Thank you. That is very helpful. Can you tell us, Lin, about the Propagation of the Gospel in New England Company or what is called the New England Company which is featured prominently in your book, why it was formed, what it became, and some of its early work?
Linford: So this company is formed by people for the most part in London, who see, this sort of colonization process as a great opportunity. And so there has been talk from the beginning even with the sort of founding in Virginia in 1607 but also in 1620 up in Plymouth.
The idea is that the English, uh, have said for a long time they want to evangelize natives. That is part of their justification for colonization. But when push comes to shove, they realized pretty quickly it is hard. It is really really hard, in part, because natives are, incredibly vibrant in terms of their culture and religion and their own sort of systems of understanding the world and the way that they organize their lives and so forth. And so it is not evident to them at all that they should adopt Christianity. And so natives, you know, listen. They are very patient often. And then they sort of, [(20:00)], move on.
And so it takes several decades for something that is sort of a viable missionary movement to take root. And when it does begin to take root, it is around a few individuals who begin to learn the native languages like John Eliot with the Mayhews, on Martha's Vineyard. Generally, it is in Massachusetts.
And when these stories, and Eliot-- John Eliot is very good at self-promotion. So he actually publishes a few tracts describing his successes among the natives in the 1640s. And they get published in London. And when they get published, people began to have interest in supporting this sort of, active evangelization that is going on.
And so they formed this company around 1649. It actually, uh-- with the Restoration in sixteen-sixty, the charter gets revoked. And so they have to reorganize in the 1660s. And this persists up through, uh, the eighteenth century, um, as-- as one of the main ways that specific outreach and evangelization of natives gets funded within the New England context.
Chris: Okay. You write that in the 1720s, native communities began inviting Anglo-American ministers and missionaries to reside on their lands. Can you explain why they did this and what it looked like?
Linford: Yes. You have to realize that 1720s, 1730s, uh, the settler colonial process has been in place for a hundred years. It has been ongoing for a hundred years. It is a century of English people living in this area, um, sometimes on land that they have bought in certain kinds of ways with deeds and paper trails no matter how complicated those transactions are. Sometimes it is on land that was forcibly taken. Sometimes it is on conquered lands, so-called, uh, through several wars that were fought.
And, uh, if you think about, how natives looked at themselves and how they perceived what was happening in the 1720s, they have been through a century of-- of that. They have been through two major wars, uh, one, the first Pequot War in the 1630s. That was essentially a genocidal war against the Pequot nation [sighs]. And then King Philip's War in 1675-1676, in which, uh, a whole collection of natives actually tried to kick out the English from New England after decades of, you know, different kinds of broken promises and, uh, infringement on native sovereignty and land and religious infringement as well through evangelization [sighs].
And it was not successful. But the response by-- by the colonists was to essentially try to crush all of that, um, what they termed rebellion and uprising. And, so that resistance movement was put down militarily. And, after King Philip's War in the 1670s, there is really no viable military push back from natives in New England against colonization.
So essentially in 1720, these native peoples are living as defeated people, uh, militarily speaking, um, and subjugated people. Maybe defeated is a wrong word-- subjugated people within this colonial context. They have been pushed back to certain reserve lands, uh, universally in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. Uh, Plymouth gets incorporated into Massachusetts. So it is a single entity in the enti-- in the 18th century.
And, uh, natives, I think, um, having been multiple generations into colonization, began to look around and say, "We have to find a way to form alliances and to get some of the tools, in terms of language and writing, that will help us preserve our communities."
And so that is why they invite teachers in, primarily at first, and not missionaries [(24:00)] or evangelists or preachers, because, literacy and the ability to write was critical to defending yourself in court, to providing a paper trail of the transactions that were taking place, to be able to read the documents that were put in front of you asking you to sign if you are like selling land or something.
So literacy was seen as a really important tool. And natives are very savvy about this and invite in educators to accomplish that in the 1720s.
Chris: You also wrote this in the same section of the book. And I am quoting here, "Although civilization had long been part of the New England Company's evangelization strategy, it received greater emphasis particularly with reference to Indian children." Can you elaborate?
Linford: Yes. On the history of Christian missions, I think there has always been this lurking kind of duality in terms of what is being offered or demanded. And this is definitely true in the seventeenth century and eighteenth century in terms of English missions, meaning that missionaries and ministers might have seen themselves as kind of offering the pure gospel, the pure Christian gospel, its ideas, its, you know, theology, its-- the Bible, its the Bible verses, its salvation, all the sort of metaphysical stuff, right? The reality is to be a really good Christian, to be a-- an authentic Christian, required you to also adopt different kinds of cultural habits not only of your mind but of your body.
And so even in the seventeenth century, when John Eliot had these praying towns, um, that were established in Connecticut and Massachusetts and there is some, also in Cape Cod and Martha's Vineyard - often, natives, that they wanted to join a praying town, had to adopt English dress. They had to, so they had to change their-- their clothing, that they cut their hair. Indian men, especially, had long long hair, and they had to cut them off-- cut that off and use the English language.
So, um, the same kind of trend continues on into the 17th, uh, excuse me, the 18th century in the 1720s when these evangelists and missionaries and-- and educators come, uh, to native communities.
They are also looking to effect a physical change and a cultural change among natives as well. And the easiest way to be-- to plant the seeds of-- of a cultural change and to "civilized native communities" was to start with the children. So if you get the children to speak English, you get the children to wear English clothes, get the children to embrace what it means to be Christian, and that is gonna sort of, overtime, change the whole community. That is the idea of-- of focusing on children.
Chris: Okay. The Great Awakening took place in the 1730s and 1740s throughout the colonies and were quite different in the form of worship the Puritans and other traditional churches practiced. The new form included extemporaneous sermons, personal and experiential redemption including being born again, shaking, fainting, crying, et cetera. Lin, what effect did the Great Awakening have on Native Americans and why?
Linford: I think the Great Awakening was a point of curiosity for natives, uh, initially. So if you can imagine these educators and missionaries coming to your land in like the 1720s and trying to talk to you about the Christian God and trying to read the Bible to you and it is all very dull and boring and, you know, there is no concepts necessarily in native tradition and native, sort of theology that it exists, such that it exists, anyway, like religious worlds, for stuff like “hell”, for ideas even like “sin” are these deeply Christian theological concepts that do not have analogues, um, in-- in native societies, in native culture, in native language, even.
And so John Eliot, again, to return to him, in the 17th century, when he translated the entire Christian Bible or the New Testaments into the Wampanoag or Massachusetts language as they called it back then, too he had to invent phrases, to try to communicate certain kind of concepts to natives in this-- this Bible translation.
So you have this sort of very staid kind of Puritan way of doing church. It is-- it is super boring, I think, for contemporary Americans probably today as well as for natives back then. Two-hour-long services, an hour-and-a-half-long sermon, right, like monotone singing or not-- not monotone, but, you have kind of lined out the songs, in common response.
And what happens in the First Great Awakening - which is why it is also popular for other demographics, uh, you know, in the United-- in colonial America - is to have changes to all those kinds of -- uh, rituals and traditions and how church is done. So [sighs] instead of a spoken out, very dull, long sermon, you have people up front who are dancing around and giving very kind of, uh, enthusiastic, um, deliveries of sermons. Not everyone did this. But some people did this.
You had a multi-part singing. A new hymn is being produced. You had people who, as you described as well, who had what they called the jerks like these-- these, uh, ecstatic experiences where they fall down and be like “slaying the spirit” as what we call them in the 20th century.
Um, you had people who were-- said they were healed. You had people who, you know, spoken strange languages. And you had people who had dreams and visions. And you had women who got up front and preached. And you had African-Americans who were sort of felt free to speak about their own experiences. You had natives who had the same thing happening to them, too.
So again, no matter how you sort of say or how you describe this or how you, understand what was really happening or whether it was the Holy Spirit as they said or whether that there were some sort of other social psychology we could point to, the point is church changed and how church was conducted changed pretty dramatically.
And so natives were part of that group of people who came to kind of see the spectacle. And in some cases, they were drawn in by this sort of more emotive and, revelation-based and also personal, experiential-based, way of doing church. And so, we have natives who kind of are self-conscious about this who kind of say, "I-- I came-- I used to come here, because it was really different. And it was exciting." And-- then they end up-- some of them leave, because it ends up being less exciting and also for other reasons as well. So that initial draw, I think, can partly be explained just by the Great Awakening itself and how different it was.
There’s other reasons. I think they were attracted to the revivalist preachers which has the revivalist preachers often-- not always, but often were advocates for native communities, at least, initially. And I think natives saw this as another possible way to leverage support for their own communities, so just like learning the English language, learning how to write as a tool for native to, um, protect their sovereignty and to, you know, protect their land.
So to, participation in the first Great Awakening, in some cases, was a way to, potentially leverage some sort of favor with certain kinds of White ministers and people they thought could advocate for them.
Chris: We are talking with Linford Fisher about his book, The Indian Great Awakening, published in two thousand-twelve. Dr. Fisher is a Professor of History at Brown University and received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in two thousand-eight.
Lin, in your chapter about affiliating, you discussed the term conversion and quote Wonalancet, a Pennacook tribal leader, who said that "he was willing to leave my old canoe and embark in a new canoe". Will you tell us how Native Americans mentally reacted to the concept of Christian conversion?
Linford: Yeah. You know, when I wrote this book, I think I was thinking about how unique this sort of native way of, um, embracing multiple things at once was. So the Wonalancet quote is really interesting. But also Samson Occom - who was a minister in the mid-eighteenth century as well, a Mohegan minister - told a story where he, um, said that there was a guy who had a knife. And when the blade broke, he just attached another handle and another knife to that existing handle. And when that blade broke, he did the same thing. And soon, he had a knife that had like six handles but only one blade. And he said this was kind of a way to understand how, uh, natives might interact with different religious ideas, right, that-- that you can bring on, uh, you know, mentally, spiritually in terms of rituals, uh, adopts additional kinds of practices without giving up the ones that you had done before. James Axtell, and other historians, have called this an “incorporative approach” to religion that Native Americans incorporated multiple modes and multiple rituals and multiple ideas into their life-world.
I do think there is, different meaning for this, when you have a population that has been colonized and then evangelized. The decisions you make to adopt or not adopt are very very different than for you or I or, humans are complex and how we piece our lives together are also complex. And that complexity, I think, had been flattened for natives in terms of conversion, um, and I think are flattened in terms of a lot of missionary contexts.
And so trying to find a way to express the really, I think real and gritty reality which is that natives kind of sampled and dabbled and went to church and then did not go to church and pray and then did not pray and sing some songs and then did not sing songs, you know? And then they went back and went to a powwow in their, you know, reserve lands.
And so how do we talk about that? Um, what does conversion looks like for people? How did they describe it? So Wonalancet has this great imagery of changing canoes which is pretty interesting. But I do not know that that is how everyone would have described it, right? Um, this idea of the knife and the stacking of the handles is a different way to think about it as well. So just trying to complicate this static and very, uh, black-and-white, um, tsk, notion of what conversion might be and what it does and what it looks like in the long term as well.
Chris: I think, the fact that they were colonized and then evangelized, that, had to-- that changes the paradigm quite a bit if you were colonized and the decisions that go into what you do with the colonizers' religion that they are inviting you to look at? So thank you for that.
Some Native Americans had seemingly sincere conversions to [(38:00)] Christianity that looked and felt how European Christianity looked and felt, and some did not, I noticed in your book. Can you talk to us about that a little bit? And maybe give us a quick description of Samson Occom.
Linford: Sure. So one of the things that I am not trying to do in the book is to rule out the possibilities of what you might call like a more typical Christian conversion, right? So surely, even though we had some natives who kind of dabbled and - and there is clear evidence of this and I have this in a section of the book - they dabbled, they attend, and then they-- they do not attend, right? They go off and do their own thing where they do not believe.
You also have examples of people who embraced this, who embraced European Christianity and even indigenize it in certain kinds of ways, and who embraced revivalism, who embraced Christian concepts that are foreign to natives in terms of sin and hell and all this other stuff.
So Occom, Samson Occom, is one of these people who, comes to some sort of awareness of his own sort of - I guess, in-- in the Christian terminology and as he says himself - his own sinfulness. And he does profess, uh, belief and faith in, uh, the Christian God and in Jesus, specifically, in the First Great Awakening as a youth. And then he goes on to become a-- a minister, unofficially, at first, and an educator and then gets ordained by the Presbyterians and is an ordained Presbyterian-Mohegan-Christian-Indian Minister and all these sort of stacking on of his different identities in a way.
He actually goes to, the United Kingdom and, um, does a fundraising tour for Moor's Indian, Charity School which then becomes, later on, Dartmouth College, where the funds are used to fund Dartmouth College. And so he is a really interesting complex individual, um, who I think has not really been fully appreciated in terms of that complexity. He is just seen as someone who represents a good Christian convert, you know in the way, he is a minister. He seems to fully embrace this. He is-- he dresses like, uh, English person. He speaks really, and he speaks English very well.
But, you know, you start to scratch the surface a little bit. And he has got all kinds of concerns as well. And-- and he really does indigenize, Christianity in a certain kind of way. Um, and I think people like him also need to be part of the story. It is not just a story of rejection. It is not just a story of murkiness, and sampling, but there is also stories of people who really embraced European Christianity. And Occom, I think, is one of them.
Chris: Lin, you write of a new Indian education effort in the seventeen-fifties and seventeen-sixties this way. And I am quoting, "In the face of prior failure, through evangelism and education, English educators were not simply seeking to hand out the rudiments of literacy. They sought nothing less than a totalizing, civilizing transformation which they felt was best done away from the interference of native families and communities." What led to this new approach? And what were its ramifications?
Linford: So if you imagine yourself in the seventeen-fifties as a White English minister or missionary and you, maybe you have been around for thirty years trying to do this, right, and so you might have been involved in the nineteen-twenty-- or excuse me, the seventeen-twenties trying to educate, uh, native children, you have lived through the First Great Awakening, you saw natives join local White churches.
But then within a couple of years, you saw the same natives, who profess Christianity, uh, leave those churches and maybe start their own churches on their reservations. And you are sitting here saying to yourself, "We failed somehow. We did not effect the kind of change among native communities we thought we were going to effect."
And so that is what prompts this sort of, next wave of education and evangelization. And you-- you know, the point of all of these, I think, for many of the missionaries and educators was, as you said in that quote, to, produce a more durable cultural change as well as a religious change.
And so-- and that is-- that had been the case since the seventeenth century. That civilizing component had always been there. But it gets more intense and radical in the seventeen-fifties, because, there is this idea that the way to really, effect this change permanently is to extract children out of their home context, which had not been done, in large numbers previously and to basically re-educate them. I mean it is a re-education camp, essentially. You are, really trying to get them to speak English, all the things I mentioned before. You are getting to wear English clothes. You are getting into, you know, convert to Christianity, to learn about Christianity. And you are essentially trying to get them to then go back to their home communities as Christian missionaries to spread that same sort of sensibility about culture and about language and about religion in their own way to their own people.
So that is the origin of Moor's Indian Charity School, um, that is, uh-- it brings native children far ways-- far away as, New Jersey and to New York, but also Rhode Island, Connecticut to, uh, Lebanon in Connecticut and really tries to-- to educate them in a specifically English Christian model.
Chris: Thank you. Lin, you wrote about a 1778 Indian tribe statement to the Connecticut Assembly that they, the Native Americans, "do not want Negroes or mulattoes to inhabit their lands", and that they wished to keep them out of their tribe. How did Native Americans view African Americans?
Linford: The long history of natives and Africans, maybe in some ways, is not getting along, in other ways, getting along. But if you think about them, in the context of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, they really do not often have a lot in common, at least, at the beginning. The one thing they shared was the, experience of displacements and colonization or colonialism, more generally. And sometimes they shared the experience of slavery, enslavement, because Native Americans were enslaved and sometimes right alongside of Africans as well.
But in other ways, there was a big difference, Natives who were not enslaved and who had their own land and their own sovereignty and their own nation still intact, saw themselves, pridefully, in a way, vis-a-vis enslaved Africans who were brought across the Atlantic to North America. And so there was a little bit of, at least, early on, an attempt to distinguish themselves from Africans.
And so that statement that you read, there is a little bit of that. And then I think there is a longer history of that sort of differentiation that they are trying to make. But there is also something more specific in that statement. This sort of, petition to not allow Africans and African-Americans onto their land is, in part, because of the intermarriage that have been taking place between Africans and Indians, in part, because of the shared experiences of slavery, in part, because sometimes they end up working on, - maybe for wages as well or living together or, occupying the lower social strata in colonial society, in other ways, coming into contact and-- and marrying and-- and intermarrying.
And, uh, the way in which the colonial society viewed the children of these marriages or the children of these, um, these couples and so forth, was that they did not view mixed-race people as being legitimately native.
And so the fear for natives in New England is that as people of mixed race are increasingly on their reservations that the White society would see them as less and less legitimate. And eventually, it would remove their claims for lands, because they are no longer seen as actually, "authentic natives".
So that is a really powerful fear and idea that begins to take root. And so this, petition is-- is so sad in some ways, because you know that if they are barring natives-- excuse me, uh, mixed race and African- Americans from their lands, in some cases, they are barring their [(50:00)] own flesh and blood, their own relatives.
But that impulse to preserve their land was so strong that at times, that was what, they thought needed to be done. And there is other cases though of outsider, Africans, African-Americans coming onto their land and just squatting and claiming land, too. And that also, was a problem.
So there is multiple reasons, I think, why that petition comes into play. But there is something-- if you can understand the core of it, as a concern for land and protecting land and the way in which race is being coded and read in certain ways by the White or White society, I think that helps understand, uh, but, otherwise, might be a somewhat confusing petition.
Chris: In the period after the Revolutionary War, the so-called National Period in American history, how are the interactions between Native Americans and Americans different? And how were they the same?
Linford: Yeah. So it is a huge topic and question. It is a really good one, because a lot of changes very, very quickly. And I would even go back to think about seventeen-fifty compared to seventeen-eighty, for example. So you have, the French and Indian War, the Seven Years' War, internationally, that is the result of that in seventeen-sixty three is the French are kicked out of North America. And even for natives in New England, the idea that the French are just counterbalance to the English is really powerful and really important.
And so that is one of the changes that takes place. And then in the American Revolution, the British and the British Crown are essentially removed from the equation within what becomes the United States. And that is important, because there was always this tension between what the colonies and colonial rulers and legislators said and did regarding natives and then what the Crown back in England might say or do.
And so natives were constantly petitioning the Crown - the English Crown, the English King or Queen - asking for redress, asking for help, asking for aid, asking to return their rights in the face of colonial governments. And with the American Revolution the English Crown is out of the picture. There is no more possibility of having this like other party to counterbalance the American colonists.
And in its place, it is not George Washington that is not who is sort of structurally put at the sort of center of Indian diplomacy, although I think he plays that role in some ways but, instead, the Congress. So the US Congress is now the arbiter of all things Indian.
And the US Congress is not a favorable entity. They look very hungrily just like, you know, Americans do at lands out to the west of what had been Proclamation Line of 1763, this imaginary line that ran up to the Appalachian Mountains. And previously, um, speculation and land purchasing and expansion was-- was prohibited by the British government after the American Revolution, uh, passed that line, that is. After the American Revolution, um, essentially, that line goes away. There is a lot of very fast westward expansion. And natives really have nowhere to turn in terms of advocacy.
And so it is a-- it is a pretty massively different political environment, cultural environment, and even religiously. Most of the Anglican and English missionary societies pulled out as well. So, um, it is a whole new-- a whole new world, literally, for a lot of natives.
Chris: So the-- the New England Company, as you say, pulled out. And that was, a large player in the religious interactions between European colonists and the Native [(54:00)] Americans. It was gone. What took its place? Specifically or just generally, what-- what were the changes in their religious interactions?
Linford: Yeah. There is a missionary society that is formed in the seventeen-eighties, a kind of New England. And it has replaced the New England Company, basically. And it has a very long name which I will certainly not get right. It is the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England and Parts Adjacent, I think it is, something to that effect.
Anyway, the point is that there is another missionary society that-- that emerges in this time period. And then in eighteen-ten, a more important missionary society is formed, again, in New England. But that has, um, a broader reach. So if the-- this society I just mentioned from the seventeen-eighties that was formed after the American Revolution is founded really to-- to evangelize natives in New England, um, the-- what is called the ABCFM, the American, um, Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, excuse me. Uh, they, have a global vision. And natives are part of that. So they are sending missionaries to India. They are sending missionaries to Hawaii. They are sending missionaries everywhere as well as to the Cherokees, for example, right?
So there are missionary movements and bodies and entities that end up playing some of those same roles, but, again, within the sort of new national context, um, that feels different in some ways.
Chris: Lin, towards the end of your book - and this is the last question - you write that distinct echoes of these various threads of Christianization, affiliation, and the appropriation of Christian forms, and surprising in nominal ways, can be found in the form of church buildings. Can you describe one of these Church buildings you have in the book and emphasize the visible religious and cultural legacies of the time period covered in your book?
Linford: Yeah. I think the most striking one for me is the Mohegan Church on the Mohegan land in Connecticut today. These churches play really important roles. And I will get to the religious, symbolism in a second. But, these churches are often what anchors native communities through the really dark periods of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. And by that, I mean that, starting even in the eighteen-twenties and eighteen-thirties, there is this idea that natives are disappearing, that they are not authentically native unless they are a hundred percent native in terms of their blood and heritage.
And, the removal ideology even comes in New England. People have not written about this very much. But there’s some federal agents that come to different New England native nations. And they suggest to them like, "Hey, if you would just move, you know, out west, we could give you more land. And you could be happier and everything else. You want to fight with the local people here." And, to a tribe, they turn that offer down. And there is no forced removal here like there is elsewhere.
But through all of these different kinds of trials, the Narragansetts were detribalized, in the eighteen-eighties, for example. They were bought out, person by person, of their Narragansett identity for about thirteen dollars. I mean it is kind of this amazing story and super sad story.
So there is this ideology of disappearance. There is this ideology of removal. There is this ideology of detribalization. There is this notion that, again, authentic natives cannot be of a mixed, multiple races.
And so, as their land base gets stripped away, as, people are [(58:00)]-- are moving and dispersing for various reasons, often, the only piece of land that has a paper trail back to the colonial period is the land on which these churches sit. And these churches become vitally important in the late twentieth century and the seventies and eighties when these same native nations are trying to apply for federal recognition. And sometimes the only paper trail in terms of the consistent land use they can point to are these churches.
And so the Mohegan Church is one of those examples. The Mohegans had been asked by federal agents if they wanted to move out west to Mississippi. They were like, "No. Thank you." And quickly build a church, like you know, in a way to stave off removal, because they believe if they would sort of visibly show that they were Christian in some ways, and have this sort of visible sign of being Americanized and Christianized that it would help them to retain their sovereignty.
So the church was built. It is not super well attended in any meaningful way. The minister for a long time was White. But it is a visible, important presence on Mohegan lands.
And today, when you go there there is a way in which it still operates in this sort of murky way, uh, culturally speaking. So you go in. And, at the very front of the church is this, you know, impressive wooden cross on the wall. And above it, hanging above it, is an eagle feather.
And you know, native life-world in the way they understand, assigned meaning and-- and value in terms of spiritual power, eagles are-- and eagle feathers are immensely important. They had been, historically and traditionally, way before the American bald eagle became protected by the federal government. So this eagle feather represents native and indigenous spiritual power. And it is hanging above the cross, right? It is on the wall with the cross, but it is above the cross.
And so somehow this just symbolizes for me, again, this complexity of the way in which the natives historically been on, also, up to the present have thought about the relationships between their own lives and spiritual, investments and involvements, the way it is tied to notions of sovereignty and protecting land and protecting even language and their own physical bodies, and the way in which, these things have coexisted. And it is not like-- there is only an eagle feather. It is not that it is only across but-- together.
And so the book cover actually tries to put those things side by side to illustrate, in a way, the complexity of these kinds of relationships over time that we can still see today and still hear-- hear people narrating today as well. I mean, one of the things that was the most meaningful to me is in the conclusion for the book is getting out and actually talking with people, having conversations with present-day tribal members who have, you know, become friends and people that I turn to for questions about, native history in this current book project that I am working on.
And the idea, I think, I hope my readers get when they finish the book is that this is not just a story about the past but actually native communities are here. They are alive and well and, despite some centuries of, uh, settler colonialism, are thriving and are working on reclaiming their language. They are working on reclaiming their traditional ways of living and being. And, they are diverse. And-- and they are just really vibrant and wonderful.
And so to find a way to communicate that as well to the reader and also to listeners of this podcast, I think, is actually maybe one of the most important takeaways is that this history as well as this current colonizing process, I would add, is not done. My native friends will remind me that the colonial period for them does not end with American Revolution. It is still ongoing. And that is a really important perspective, I think, for, White Americans to have.
Chris: Thank you, Lin. We have been talking with Linford Fisher about his book, The Indian Great Awakening, published in two thousand-twelve. He is a Professor of History at Brown University and received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in two thousand-eight.
Thank you so much, Lin, for taking time to participate and for all your efforts in studying the religious interactions between the Native Americans and the European settlers which undergird America's relationship and interactions with Native Americans today, as you so well said.
Linford: No problem, Chris. Thanks for having me. It is really a delight to have this conversation.
Transcript: "Are Race and Religion Intertwined in American History?" with Paul Harvey.
Religion has often influenced how Americans understand and see race. And race has often influenced how Americans understand and see religion.
For our purposes today, we will define race as any one of the groups that humans are often divided into based on physical traits regarded as common among people of shared ancestry. For example, the twenty-twenty Census race categories are White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Hawaiian Native or Pacific Islander, or some other race.
As we all observe and participate in the national reckoning with racism after the death of George Floyd on May twenty-fifth of this year, a fuller and more accurate understanding of how race and religion have been intertwined in the United States history will be of use.
Paul Harvey is the Distinguished Professor of History and Presidential Teaching Scholar at University of Colorado - Colorado Springs where he researches, writes, and teaches in the field of American history from the sixteenth century to the present. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California Berkeley in 1992.
Dr. Harvey is the author of many books including Howard Thurman and the Disinherited: A Religious Biography; The Color of Christ: The Son of God and the Saga of Race in American History; and Freedom's Coming: Religious Cultures and the Shaping of the South from the Civil War through the Civil Rights Era.
We are very happy to have Paul here to help us understand a particular part of American religious history, the intersections of religion and race, by discussing his new book "Bounds of their Habitation: Race and Religion in American History" published in 2017.
Also, as with each episode in our podcast series, Religion in the American Experience, we hope listeners come away with a better comprehension of what religion has done to America and what America has done to religion, and, thus, be better equipped as citizens to ensure that the American experiment in self-government endures. As Abraham Lincoln said, "We cannot escape history."
Thank you Paul for being with us.
Paul: Thank you. Very glad to be here.
Chris: You start your book by saying that race and religion are co-constituting categories. Can you tell us just briefly what you mean by that? And why it is important to our discussion?
Paul: Yeah. So what I was trying to do in that part of the book was take a, uh, uh-- that is an academic language co-constituting categories which does not maybe mean anything to a more general audience. But what it means is that, um, race has been fundamental to how religion has come to be defined that American history to the very definition of religion itself. And religion has come to also be something that has defined racial categories over time. So they in-- in effect they both define each other.
Chris: Okay. Thank you. Paul, in your chapter about race and colonial American religion, you state that as European colonizers tried to bring others into the Christian fold, they faced questions of how an Indian or a Negro could also be a Christian person. And given-- and I am quoting here, "And given that raced bodies claimed Christian privileges – [and I will insert here "such as freedom"] - Euro-Americans puzzled over how to convert but deploy it on behalf of racial hierarchy." Can you give an example or two of how this played out?
Paul: Yeah. So the big question in the seventeenth century was the question of that historically you were not supposed to enslave people of your own religion. And so if an African-American, for example, became a Christian, as sometimes happened in the seventeenth century - usually Anglican Christians, in fact then how could you possibly keep them enslaved?
So some of the first laws, uh, written in the sixteen-sixties, sixteen-seventies addressed precisely this issue by saying essentially just because one converts to the faith does not mean that one has-- one changes once status in the in the social world. And that they keep, they actually keep rewriting that law and keep sort of updating it, because, it remains I think-- the-- I think they have to do that, because it remains a problem; it remains a dilemma in their own mind that they cannot quite figure out how to deal with.
And so the law becomes more strict and more-- it becomes longer and more explicit over time until in the-- in the-- in the 1720S it is a much lengthier version of the same law which basically says, "Neither you nor your children, albeit you have become or will become Christian, will ever change your status in-- in the social world." They try to make that as-- as clear as possible.
And one of the reasons they do so is because the, slave owners do not want to introduce slaves to the Christian faith. And, therefore, Christian missionaries - Anglican missionaries, mostly - um, have to, uh, find a way to persuade slaveholders that Christianity will not lead to freedom. The problem is slaveholders are - in this era, at least - are never really fully persuaded of that. I think that is why the-- they have the profusion of these laws that-- that they kept trying to persuade slaveholders. But slaveholders were largely resistant to having missionaries come on their plantations and that-- and that kind of thing. And I think it is because they still had-- implicitly is they still had this older view that, Christianity was tied to freedom, therefore, a slave Christian was just a contradiction in terms .
Chris: You write in your book that as a result of these laws, I am quoting here, "Christianity and enslavement were theoretically compatible."
Paul: Yeah. Exactly a summary of what I just said. Yeah. But they-- they had to be made compatible over time. It was not something that came naturally in the seventeenth century world.
Chris: Right. Also, in that same area of the book, you write this sentence, and I am quoting here, "Race trumped religion as the most important category in an ordered society." Why did you say that? That is a powerful statement.
Paul: Yeah. precisely, because the Racial category into which-- which someone had been put became the most important category that defined their lives rather than the religious category that they either had or that they could opt for so that, African-- the category African was a more important category in terms of defining your status than the category Christian or Muslim or whatever other religion you would want to put in there.
So the first-- the first category that defines your life principally is the-- the racialized category, African and African-American.
Chris: Right. So Paul, regarding Native Americans now, you quote one of their prophets as saying, "The great spirit did not mean that the White people and the red people should live near each other," which sounds familiar to this statement also in your book from an anti-immigration advocate during the influx of Chinese in the late nineteenth century in the western United States, "It is the economy of providence that man shall exist in nationalities and that they shall be divided by the antipathies of race." What did all this mean?
Paul: Yeah. So those are two quotes that sound alike, but actually are-- come from very different context, because one comes from a Native American prophet. So what is happening in the eighteenth century is, Indian peoples, Native American peoples who had conceptualized themselves as all different-- all different groups of people, tribalized peoples, for example are coming to use terms like “Red men”-- the Red Men, the Indian, the singular terms like that. In other words, they-- they begin to adopt the racialized categories that were imposed upon them, as part of the necessity, part of the need to defend their communities against the colonizing, orders of their day.
And so a statement like that is part of the kind of Indian self-defense that emerges in the eighteenth century, an Indian self-defense that ironically used the racialized categories invented by Europeans in the first place.
The second quote from the later-- when was that - later nineteenth century, I suppose-- I do not remember--when that was. It is quote that comes from those in positions of power, uh, who were attempting to define who can be an American.
So for the question of that-- that day was can a Chinese person, a person of Chinese descent racially be an American citizen? Is a Chinese person racially capable of comprehending American liberty, for example?
One of the anti-- there is many anti-immigration arguments. But one of the anti-immigration ar-- arguments is they are racially incapable of understanding, freedom, liberty, Christianity, et cetera. Of course, there were Chinese Christians at the time who were pointing out that they were perfectly capable of understanding Christianity, because that was their religion, in fact.
But that was one of the principal, um, tsk, themes of-- of anti-immigration polemics from the li-- from the later nineteen century. But that quote is coming from those who have the ability to define, uh, the power relations of that society. The quote from the Native American prophet is coming from the other side: those who were being displaced, those who were - the colonial subjects of the Europeans.
Chris: And then you quote Frederick Douglass, saying this, um, "Revivals in religion and revivals in the slave trade go hand-in-hand together. The church and the slave prison stand next to each other. The groans and cries of the heartbroken slave are often drowned in the pious devotions of his religious master while the blood-stained gold goes to support the pulpit. The pulpit covers the infernal business with the garb of Christianity." What effect did such rhetoric have in the United States?
Paul: That is one of, uh, Douglass', uh, classic, uh, passages pointing out the hypocrisy of slave-holding Christianity; he was-- he was a master at doing that.
And it is interesting. The effect is it helps to galvanize abolitionism, uh, because the-- the abolitionists adopt exactly that rhetoric that comes from Douglass, because he is so-- he is so good at-- at mocking and i-- imitating in a mocking style, for example, a pro-slavery sermon. He does that sometimes and will deliver a pro-slavery sermon in a style that clearly is mocking it at the same time. It is a paro-- self- parody of that sermon.
So that-- that is a-- that quote comes from the context in which he is doing that. And that helps to galvanize abolitionism. But ironically, also helps to galvanize pro-slavery, because the pro-slavery forces recognize the power of that critique. And they have to figure out how to respond to it.
So if you think of the big picture kind of as the18th century as the, uh, the-- the pro-slavery argument is the so called “necessary evil” argument. We were sort of left with this institution. And there is not much we can do about it except hope it goes away, kind of a Thomas Jeffersonian, uh, view, but when you read sermons from the eighteen-thirties, forties, fifties, basically after the eighteen-thirties, they increasingly adopt a-- a pro-slavery stance which makes slavery not only compatible to but instrumental to the spread of-- the spread of Christianity. And part of that comes from a response to exactly the fact that they were being mocked for their hypocrisy. And they know that they have to respond to that. And they do respond to it with some very powerful sermons of their own.
Chris: Paul, I’m going to move into your chapter about religious ways of knowing race before the Civil War. Um, the first couple of chapters were more introductory. In this chapter you explained that Nat Turner's 1831 slave rebellion led to a strengthening of how Christianity would be woven into the ideology of the masterclass. Can you help us understand how that was done?
Paul: Yeah. So Nat Turner was a Baptist Minister, and a slave in Southampton County Virginia. Very very interesting life story. Very controversial life story, because we-- we know very little about him. And most of what we know comes from the, uh, confessions of Nat Turner which were collected by a lawyer named Thomas Gray. And there is a great controversy among historians about how much we can trust that particular document, because some people think Thomas Gray embellished, parts of Nat Turner's story to help-- to make a more spectacular story, because Thomas Gray basically wanted to make money out of selling this book. That was his motive for doing it.
However, I tend to think it is reasonably reliable. That is my personal position. And so, Nat Turner is someone who takes the apocalyptic passages of the Bible as symbolic of how he should act in this world and to rise up in revolt against slavery basically by slaughtering Whites in his-- in his county.
White seeing that-- this is that, exactly at the moment that the abolitionist movement is being born in 1831. So 1831 is a hugely important year of American history in terms of how slavery comes to be viewed. And it is also usually important here, because you really-- maybe a few years before 1831and the 1820s but certainly after 1831, you see the full rise and development of the pro-slavery theology that I spoke of before, uh, most famously enunciated by James Henley Thornwell, a Presbyterian Minister in 1850.
And he gives a famous sermon in 1850, ironically, a sermon in which he was consecrating a chapel that Whites had built for Black Presbyterian parishioners. Uh, and there were-- there were so many Black Pre-- Presbyterian parishioners in this particular church that they-- they needed a separate place to meet, cos they could not fit all in the segregated balcony.
So he-- he comes to give this, and he says, uh, "One, I am not ashamed to call the Negro my brother. I am not ashamed to call the Negro my brother." He disavows a racist, justification for slavery. But then he goes on to give a kind of what we would think of as a-- a nineteenth century conservative argument based-- that comes out of European thought really which is that, uh, slavery and other forms of social order are necessary to prevent anarchy. And it may be that slavery has evils in it. But, it is our job to restrain those evils. But there are much greater evils in the abolition of slavery.
The New York Catholic, priest, John Hughes, the Archbishop John Hughes in New York, he basically makes the same argument. And so he ends up saying, "Slavery is evil as many institutions-- human institutions are, because humans have sinned in them. And they create evil institutions."
But the one thing that is more evil than slavery is abolitionism, because abolitionism leads to anarchy. It leads to the complete dissolution of all social order. And it leads to kind of the worst of all possible worlds.
And so slavery may not be the best of all possible worlds, but it is the best world that we can hope for given the situation that we were handed, uh, as an inheritance of-- from the 17th and 18th century. And we may hope that this world will become a better and freer world for everyone at some indeterminate point in the future. But for now, this is the best world that we can hope for.
So it is getting woven in in that-- in that particular pro-slavery, uh, way in which, God creates a social order that resembles a family. The slaveholder is kind of like the father. And, the rest of the family fall into place. And each person in the family has their place in the social order. The slaves are like children who are cared for by the father, but who also have to obey the father.
So that is the model that God has provided for us in the social world-- in the religious world but also in the social world.
Chris: Fascinating. Can you tell us, Paul, how slaves saw Jesus? And how it differed from how non-slaves “saw” Jesus"?
Paul: So slaves adopt, not all, but many slaves adopt Christianity in the nineteenth century, uh sometimes, at the behest of, uh, White ministers, oftentimes, at the behest of their own ministers. And they begin to have their own visions of Jesus. And what is interesting is they often refer to Jesus of a White man, uh, and as a-- a small particularly a small White man who is kind of like a small friend to them.
Tsk, so, uh, I have authored a previous book called The Color of Christ with speculates about-- uh, co-authored, as you said, uh-- previous book called The Color of Christ which speculates about what is the meaning of a White image of Jesus in the mind of slaves? And my conclusion there, our conclusion rather, was that there was no other choice but to conceptualize Jesus as a White man, because that was the predominant, prevailing image in the nineteenth century. That was the image that was being massed produced and-- by steam printing presses.
And so they conceived of him that way, uh, because that is how he is handed down to them. But that does not mean that they conceived-- so Jesus is White. But Jesus is not a White man in the sense of the White man like their master. He is the White man who is their friend. We would now say almost like a White ally, I think, is the-- the contemporary, uh, version of that-- of that-- of that same kind of language. Uh, and they perceived him as their ally in overcoming the struggles and toil and strife of the world of slavery they have to live through.
Chris: How did that differ from how the White man saw Jesus?
Paul: Yeah. So Whites obviously had this, an evangelical conception of Jesus. And Jesus-- and so it is like half of it is the same, because Jesus is their comforter and their friend as well. So Jesus is the comforter and friend of the slaveholder as well as the slave. Uh, but Jesus as a-- as it comes-- as he comes to be institutionalized in the church is also representative of the social order, I think, in a way that he-- it was simply not the case, uh, with slaves, because Jesus was the way to conceptualize a different social order for slaves as opposed to the defender of the social order.
Chris: You also write, Paul, that school books envision Hindus and Buddhists as Oriental others, different not just in terms of religion but also different racially from Caucasian Christians. What were the implications of this?
Paul: The implications-- there is many different implications. Some of those implications become more evident in the later nineteenth century with, uh, Chinese Exclusion Acts and anti-immigration laws and that kind of thing. But for the antebellum sort of mid-19th century which is where that particular quote comes from, you have this interesting phenomenon that New England intellectuals have become, uh, fascinated by so called "Oriental" religions. Ralph Waldo Emerson, for example, was, Henry David Thoreau, et cetera, the-- these kinds of people.
So they are kind of inventing, the field of what we would now call comparative religion. Uh, but in inventing it, as it comes to be passed down in school books and other things, they-- it comes to be passed down as sort of like religions that are interesting by people who are racially other than us, uh, and who cannot conceive of the world that we live in, because they have different-- both racial categories of their mind and religious categories of their mind.
So the popularization of these ideas of Emerson, et al, end up, uh, perpetuating the racialization of other peoples.
Chris: We are talking with Paul Harvey about his book, Bounds of their Habitation: Race and Religion in American History, published in 2017. Mr. Harvey is the Distinguished Professor of History and Presidential Teaching Scholar at University of Colorado Colorado Springs where he researches rights and teaches in the field of American history from the 16th century to the present.
Paul, presenting White and Black religious thought after the Civil War, you share these observations, "If God had sanctioned White caretaking of Negroes in bondage as the divine plan for Southern Christian civilization, then what was God's will in a world without slavery?" And, "African-Americans understood that Black freedom and Black Christianity were just at the moment of their true rebirth at the end of the Civil War. They perceived that their constricted bounds of habitation for Black Americans was about to expand. And they trusted their God was the author of that revolution."
Did the country at large understand this? And where did this divergence of opinion lead America during Reconstruction?
Paul: No. The country at large did not understand that. Uh, some people did. Some Whites did. Uh, uh, nearly all Blacks did. Uh, the-- the country at large did not.
So what I am referring to there is, first of all, the dilemma for White Southerners is when you have the entire-- when your entire intellectual universe is constructed with this pro-slavery ideology and God has a certain will, uh, to preserve slavery in order to spread in order to help Christianity diffuse itself and so forth. When-- when your entire mental world is constructed on that and then slavery suddenly violently disappears, then, uh, what really is the will of God? They have to figure that out. It is-- it is a great theological dilemma for many people, many White Southerners at the--- at the end of the Civil War.
Uh, it is not a dilemma for Blacks owners, because they had much more of a theology that God would provide them liberation in God's time. And they, in fact, saw that happen. So they saw the Civil War, in effect, as a fulfillment of prophecy.
Uh, but they faced the challenge of creating-- the challenge and the opportunity both of creating, uh, independent religious institutions. So what happens in, uh, southern churches after the Civil War is Whites, uh, insist that Black should remain a part of the church in exactly the way that they had been before, that is, a segregated part of church-- of White churches: sitting in balconies, not being in positions of power, and so forth. Because they-- they think Blacks are not civilized and Christianized enough to run their own institutions.
Blacks obviously, want no part of that. And by, uh, in very great numbers, uh, separate out and formed their own independent churches sometimes with the cooperation of Whites, more often, with either the resistance or simply the, tsk, um, uh, the resistance of Whites or simply Whites, uh, acknowledging that they have left and having wanting nothing more to do with them, uh, and feeling in a-- and ironically feeling betrayed by the people that they thought were their loyal slaves. Then they have come to discover that they were never loyal slaves. In their own minds, that was always a kind of act that they had to play in the-- in the antebellum south.
Uh, so that-- but that is-- that is a part of-- of Black, free Black men of color and free Black women of color in the antebellum era had created a theology that-- that had prepared this moment that the Civil War created. And-- and so Black churches stepped into that role, played their social roles, played their political roles, played all the multi various roles that Black churches did, because there were not other Black institutions to-- to fill all of those different kinds of roles at that time.
Chris: Paul, can you tell us the background, in effect, of Reverend HN Turner's declarations in the late 19th century that in America White is God and Black is the devil and God is a Negro?
Paul: Yeah. So that is-- that comes from a speech he gave in the 1890s to the-- to a-- a group of Black Baptists. Uh, Henry McNeal Turner was a Methodist. Interestingly, Turner was a free man of color before the Civil War. He was never a slave. Uh, he becomes a Methodist Minister in the eighteen-fifties, the Union Army Chaplain during the Civil War, and a State Rep-- a State Senator in Georgia after the Civil War for a couple of years.
He was basically kicked out of the State Senate, in a sort of coup that White Democrats, um, tsk, enact against Black Republicans in Georgia. That was just part of the process of redemption-- political, so called redemption, after the Civil War.
And he becomes increasingly embittered and disillusioned by American society in the 1880s and 1890s. And one of the sources of that bitter disillusionment was that he perceived clearly the connection of the White image of Jesus with the divinization of Whiteness as a property that people have and, therefore, the demonization of Blackness.
So he says, "All people have the capacity to envision God in their own image." Obviously, White people have done that. Black people have the same right to envision God in their own image. And so that is what I am going to do when I say, "God is a Negro." He does not mean that as a literal phrase. He means that God metaphorically identifies with the struggle of Black people. He is basically making exactly-- exactly the same argument that Black theologians of the 1960s and forward - James Cone, et cetera - make. Uh, but he is making it in the 1890s. So I think of him really as the Father of-- of Black Theology in the nineteenth century.
Chris: During this time, after the Civil War, the United States, especially in the southern states or entirely in the-- in the southern states, experienced lynchings. And in your book, you call them acts of purification where clergymen pronounced benedictions as men crucified and set afire Black bodies. So there is a lot of religious language in those discussions.
Tell me more about that, or tell us more about that, please.
Paul: Yeah. So this is obviously one of the most horrific episodes of American history, the lynching of Black people about five thousand or so from the 1880s to the 1950s. Uh, we do not have an exact figure. But that is a-- that is a sort of a round-- approximate round figure, probably, more that are not known about but, um, tsk, e-- enough that it is one of the great scandals of American history. It is also one of the great scandals of American religious history that, um, many White churches either-- the-- the typical response simply would be not to acknowledge that at all, simply to turn your back and sort of pretend like it did not exist.
A less common but very powerful response was to either justify it or to, in some particular occasions - that is what I am referring to there - to participate in it.
So for example, there is a very famous-- I will just give you one story that illuminates the complexities of this. There is a very famous lynching of a Black man in Waco, Texas in the 1910s. And there is actually a Baptist Minister there, James Dawson, who was there and watches it, White Baptist Minister, and he is, um, he is horrified by it actually. Uh, but he also says, "What could I, a single individual, possibly do about this?"
And this is an event in which several thousand people set the Black man on fire. And the use of fire is an obvious image of purification. So there has been a lot of theological scholarship about the meaning of this. And one argument that has come out of the theological scholarship is the right of, the evangelical right of purification of sin comes to be invested on the body of the Black men and Black women, mostly Black men, who are kind of the representative of societal sins and, therefore, must be sacrificed in expiation of our own sins. So the Black body becomes the vehicle of-- of societal expiation in this theology.
Chris: Now, Paul, regarding Native Americans in the early twentieth century, the American Missionary Association's Charles Shelton said, "The Indian must go down. Extermination or annihilation is the only possible solution of the question. You can send to the Indian the rifle and exterminate him in that way. Or we can send to the Indian the gospel of Christ its great power of civilization and through its influence, exterminate the savage that
save the man."
Chris: Tell us about this and what it represents.
Paul: Yeah. So that-- that is referring to the famous, uh, slogan from the nineteenth century, "Kill the Indian; save the man." Kill the Indian; save the man. And the idea was that the same process-- and-- and by the way, these are, these are many times ex-abolitionists and people who are very involved with Black civil rights. And they-- they have an idea that-- that, uh, they are going to help Blacks rise in American civilization.
And what happens is they, uh-- and they-- they do many heroic things in-- in the process of doing that, create Black colleges and universities, for example, uh, oftentimes against, uh, the attacks of the clan. Many of these are the same people who are involved in, tsk, the creation of this idea - kill the Indian; save the man - the creation of Indian boarding schools which really had the same basic idea as Black, schools of the time.
The idea was to take, uncivilized, uneducated people. Civilize them, train them in the ways of American civilization so that they could then rise up an American civilization. And over a period of several generations, let us say, become, equal partners to Whites and American civilization.
So the great irony of this, in my opinion, is it had a kind of, it had a kind of idealistic, uh, motive. But it has an utterly disastrous end that we all know about in how Indian boarding schools actually functioned in which Native children were beaten so that they would not speak their native language, for example, and all kinds of stories that, that come out of these, uh, come out of these institutions.
But the, the more pluralistic idea that emerges later in the twentieth century is simply not present, largely not present, in the-- in the later nineteenth century. And there-- there was only one path to civilization. Uh, and so it comes to be applied to Indians, by many of the same people who are applying it to African-Americans with idealistic motives but with disastrous ends.
Chris: Thank you, Paul. In your chapter about race, religion, and immigration, you relate that the early twentieth century increase in Russian and Eastern European Jewish immigrants caused "the relationship of Jews to Whiteness to be more in question". Why is this significant?
Paul: It is significant, because there had been a long period of Jewish immigration in American history, German Jews, mostly. Uh, and these are the people who, for example, create Reform Judaism in Cincinnati in the, uh, in the later nineteenth century, for example.
Uh, in the later nineteenth, twentieth century, you have, uh, this whole period of immigration from Poland, Eastern Europe, uh, uh, Russian Jews, and so forth. And they are really-- they are perceived as racially different, uh, in a way that German Jews were not.
Uh, and there is a lot of reasons for that. One is they are more likely to speak, uh, languages unfamiliar to Americans, Yiddish in particular. For another, they are very much crowded into, uh, tenements in New York and places like that. Uh, and they-- they come to be seen as a foreign people and unassimilable people by some Americans see them that way, uh, in a way that-- that German Jews were not. Also, I would say this is because of the-- they were coming in such large numbers, much larger numbers than-- than German Jews had ever come in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Um, so they, uh, are thought of as a-- a racialized people. And that is-- that is not characteristic of how Jews had been thought of in American history. That is something that is a relatively new thing in the later nineteenth century, I believe.
Chris: Thank you. Tell us about the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago, its purpose, and what it meant.
Paul: Yeah. So the world, uh, across Chicago 1893 had the great world's fair. This-- this amazing spectacular event in Chicago in 1893. All kinds of things, uh, things-- things happened there, uh, one of which was the World's Parliament of Religions.
And the idea actually came from Liberal Protestants, and they wanted to bring everyone, all different representatives of different religious groups, together from all over the world. And their goal, the Liberal Protestant goal, was actually to show that all world religions had something to contribute, some moral message to contribute. And that Liberal Protestantism was kind of at the summit, because it combined all the great messages of all the other liberal religions.
Uh, they would not have said it that explicitly, but their implicit goal was-- was that. But what happens is, tsk, uh, you see many Americans for the first time being introduced to, Hinduism, to Buddhism, in a way that they had never heard before by people who are not consenting necessarily to this Liberal Protestant project. Some of these people go on to have rather famous careers as kind of purveyors of eastern, religious with wisdom.
Uh, tsk, the practices of yoga and things like that begin to take off from the World's Parliament of Religions. It is a kind of central moment in terms of how people are going to come to think of-- of pluralism in American religion.
Chris: Also in this, uh, same time period, you talk about the former Southern Baptist Minister, Thomas Dixon "Transforming the suffering savior of the lost cause into a herald of American power." Paul, can you tell us about how religion wove itself into the Ku Klux Klan and what it meant for twentieth century America?
Paul: Yeah. So, lost cause refers to the idea common in the late 19th century south that, um, tsk, the --the cause of the self was holy and that the Southerners had lost that cause, because God was testing and purifying them for some greater purpose in the-- in the future. That is a very common idea many White Southerners had at the time.
Thomas Dixon comes from a family of Baptist Ministers in North Carolina, uh, but he is also very interested in theater. He is a Shakespearean theater actor, and he does all kinds of other things.
In the early twentieth century, he writes a couple of famous novels; The Clansman was one in which the clan played the role of saving American civilization from the "brutalities of Negro savages", around all that stuff.
So these novels are important partly because they are very popular as novels, but then they become the-- the screenplay as it were for the famous film, Birth of a Nation, in 1915 that many people are familiar with which basically retells the story of the Civil War as White Southerners understood it.
And, again, the plan-- the clan in the film plays the heroic role of saving, uh, women from being raped and saving American civilization as it were from being raped. Women in the film were kind of a symbol for American civilization as a whole which is being raped by Negro savages.
And the film comes out. And the Ku Klux Klan, second-- so called second Ku Klux Klan began, not coincidentally, at exactly the same moment, because the film is a kind of inspiration for the clan. And, of course, the clan famously becomes very, very huge in the 1920s, uh, with many millions of members not primarily in the South. Actually, Indiana was the center of the clan at that time. And the clan becomes a purveyor of, uh, certainly racism, of course, but principally of anti-Catholicism and anti-Judaism more than anything else.
Um, so all of those things from-- so Dixon plays a-- a key role in the recreation and reformation of the clan in the early twentieth century, uh, through the 1920s and, uh, you know has a, tsk, has a sort of a demonic role in American history for that reason.
Chris: During the 1906 Azusa Street Revivals in Los Angeles, one participant wrote, "I, being southern-born, thought it a miracle that I could sit in a service by a colored saint of God and worship, or eat at a great camp table and forget I was eating beside a colored saint. But in spirit and truth, God was worshiped in love and harmony. " What did these arrivals-- what did-- I am sorry. What are these Azusa Street Revivals? And what did they do for religion and race in America?
Paul: Yeah. So the Azusa Street Revivals are kind of one of the-- one of the founding moments of what we now call Pentecostalism which is to say Pentecostalism is the idea that after salvation and baptism, there was a kind of baptism of the Holy Spirit which allows the recipient of the Holy Spirit to speak in tongues, uh, and to become a purely, holy person.
One of the-- and there is much scholarly controversy about who exactly founded Pentecostalism. But certainly, one of its founders - I think the principal one in my opinion - was William Seymour, an African-American, uh, former Baptist Minister from Louisiana, who goes to some, tsk, uh, holiness meetings. Holiness is kind of like the predecessor to Pentecostalism in Houston. Uh, he is actually required to sit it by himself in a segregated part of the room.
And he ends up in Los Angeles, uh, rents a former horse stable, uh, and next to a African Methodist Episcopal Church, and begins the series of revivals which miraculously catch the attention of the local papers. Those stories in the local papers are picked up by international papers, and, pretty soon, you have people coming from all over the world including some White Southerners to receive this so called baptism of the Holy Spirit at the hands literally of William Seymour.
So the White-- I cannot remember the name of the person who wrote that. But it is a White Southerner who was remarking that he could not have conceived of an interracial, physical interaction, religious and physical interaction at the same time, outside of this context, because it was so foreign to the way White Southerners thought of race relations.
But it speaks to how Pentecostalism, in its early days, had, a kind of religious power to overcome racial barriers. Pentecostalism, after a generation, quickly segregates itself just like all other things in American society are segregated. But in this kind of originary moment, there are, uh, particular moments of racial interaction that are rather remarkable to contemplate.
Chris: Paul, now, moving into religion and civil rights, can you tell us how Black churches had been criticized? And then what role some played in the Civil Rights Movement going forward?
Paul: Yeah. So there is a great-- there is a-- a lot of literature written by African-American intellectuals in the middle of the twentieth century would say basically this "The church is the largest institution in the Black community." And, as W.E.B. Du Bois writes in the 1930s, I think it was, "What has the church done on behalf of social progress? The flat answer is nothing, if not, less than nothing." And Du Bois was one of these critics that you just, refer to there. And he is talking about the church has all this potential power that is going unused.
Now, I think that is a somewhat of an unfair criticism, because when you look at what churches were actually doing, there is actually a lot going on. It is just not very publicly visible. But Du Bois and others thought that the church could do a lot more.
Lo and behold, in 1950s and 60s, of course, you have the grand representative of the Black church, Martin Luther King, rise up. But he rises up from a, uh-- he-- he grows up in the 1930s and 40s where his father was a minister of Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta. His father was protesting, for example, the fact that there were no Black high schools for any Black students in Atlanta. And he forces the city government to build the Booker T. Washington High School where Martin Luther King, Jr. went to high school, went to junior high, rather.
So there is-- there is a kind of history of activism which then becomes public in the 50s and 60s. Uh, but in the era before the fifties and sixties, there-- there is the idea that the Black church has a kind of social-- potential social power that is unrealized.
Chris: rights leader, Fannie Lou Hamer, summed up her life's work with this statement, which you have in your book, "We cannot separate Christ from freedom and freedom from Christ." Can you tell us about her and what this meant?
Paul: Yes. Fannie Lou Hamer was a poor African-American, uh, sharecropper in, um, tsk, Mississippi, uh, growing up in the 40s, 50s, and 60s who goes to a civil rights meeting. And I believe it is 1962, if I remember correctly, uh, at that time that the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee has come to Mississippi to organize people.
And she kind of catches the-- the message of-- of the young, uh, people who are leading SNCC. And she becomes very much involved with SNCC, tries to register to vote. Uh, she is arrested, uh, undergoes basically torture in Mississippi jails, is really beaten quite brutally, is physically damaged for life as a result of that, but emerges.
And she enters the national stage, because she goes to the Democratic Convention in 1964. And there is a controversy about who is going to represent Mississippi at the Democratic Convention. And, of course, White Mississippians want no Black people. Black people from Mississippi want to be fairly represented as part of the delegation. And eventually, the compromise comes that-- that there will be two seats for Black delegates from Mississippi.
And-- Fannie Lou Hamer famously says, "We did not come all this way for no two seats," Uh, because the-- the compromise to her is an unacceptable, loss of what the Civil Rights Movement had stood for. And then she, -- actually, Lyndon Johnson is watching this. And he cuts off the -- the TV, cos he does not want the-- the nation to watch Fannie Lou Hamer.
But Fannie Lou Hamer, uh, has a great voice begins to sing This Little Light of Mine which is a song that is, uh, sort of associated with her now. And she ends up being basically the symbol of what the Civil Rights Movement represents in the State of Mississippi. She is kind of like the-- the representative of that from the ordinary class or folk that the Civil Rights Movement organized.
Chris: Thank you. Could you paint for us a religious portrait of Cesar Chavez and what he did?
Paul: Yeah. So Cesar Chavez was something of a figure parallel to Martin Luther King in the sixties. Uh, Caesar Chavez--except from the world of Catholicism.
Cesar Chavez, uh, grows up as a Mexican-American Catholic in the 40s and 50s. In the 50s begins-- and-- and especially in the sixties begins to organize, um, tsk, farm workers, predominantly Mexican-American, uh, farm workers but some Filipinos as well in the California fields in the 1960s. And he does so using a Catholic religious imagery very similar to how Martin Luther King uses Protestant religious imagery.
But in Chavez's case, he is not-- he is different than King, because Chavez is not a great orator in and of himself. King was a great orator, and Chavez was not. But Chavez is a person who has mastered this-- the symbology of suffering that comes from Catholicism.
So one of Chavez's means of portraying the goals of the farm workers' union is to engage in public fast and to engage in the public suffering of a fast which for him represents the public suffering of Jesus on the cross. And he wants to make that point clear.
So he does that more through his actions, I think, than his words per se. But he becomes the symbol of farm workers' struggles as a result of that.
Chris: Thank you. In the 1960s, the Civil Rights organizer and Mennonite Minister, Vince Harding, wrote this in his “Black Power in the American Christ”: "Perhaps, God is writing on the wall saying that we Christians, Black and White, must choose between death with the American Christ and life with the suffering servant of God." What did he mean? And what effect did this have?
Paul: Yeah. So he is talking about how Christianity had been so enmeshed with White supremacy through most of American history that the only choice now was whether to try to extricate the message of Christianity from White supremacy. And if it was not ex-- if it could not be extricated, uh, then the message simply could not, uh-- then-- then it was essentially a dead, form. It would not have any meaning whatsoever.
Chris: And did this have an effect in the country?
Paul: Yeah. So Vincent Harding was an associate's of King and was someone who was important in the development of Black theology in the nineteen-sixties. And he is a kind of representative that of the-- the idea-- King had this idea, too, that-- that Christianity was-- was-- at the end of the day, Christianity was salvageable, was, uh, was-- you were able to extricate Christianity from White supremacy, because Christianity has an essence that does not have to be, does not have to be covered in White supremacy.
Of course, many critics of Christianity is 60s Malcolm X, et cetera, said, otherwise, that it was so enmeshed in White supremacy that it could not be extricated, and Harding and others had a different idea and were important in-- in propagating kind of idea of a new Christianity in American history.
Chris: Towards the end of your book, you quote a scholar saying that in 21st America, race and religion are increasingly decoupling. What went into that statement? And what are its implications for us?
Paul: Yeah. Um, I used to think that more than I think that now, honestly, uh, but just because of what we have seen over the last year. Uh, but I was-- I was referring there to the fact that, churches in America are more likely-- much more likely to, uh, be of diverse membership now than it would have been the case in the past. And we do not think of the White church as a thing as we would have in an earlier generation.
And, for example, twenty percent of churches affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention are African-American churches. They often have multiple affiliations. They may be affiliated with a Black denomination. But they also affiliate with this denomination, Southern Baptists, who historically came out of the slaveholding South. So that-- that is what he means by the-- the-- by the decoupling.
Uh, I think recent books, really just in the past year, such as Jemar Tisby's The Color of Compromise, have challenged the notion that that there really has been this decoupling. Yeah, There has been a decoupling institutionally, but there is not been a decoupling ideologically effectively is what he says.
Chris: Paul, that leads us into this closing question. You mentioned in your book, the book Divided by Faith, published in 2001 by two religious sociologists and its treatment of what you call or what they call heart change and systemic institutional change. Can you elaborate on these and how understanding them might help us 2020?
Paul: Yeah. So, uh, the evangelical emphasis has always been on the individual that the transformation of the individual through salvation by Christ is the key to transforming society.
Critics of that view have always held, kind of the social gospel critics and so forth - and Martin Luther King had the same idea - held that the transformation of society is necessary also in the transformation of individuals. And the two really cannot be, uh, separated out in the traditional way.
So what Emerson and Smith say in Divided by Faith is, um, there are many White evangelicals who-- who clearly want to overcome the racist history of American evangelicalism. But they conceived of doing so through individual relations. And the problem with that is individual relations do not address the structural causes, the structural impediments that American racism historically has imposed.
Uh, this is a realization, I believe, that Martin Luther King was really coming to later in his life. And he really presses this point in the last three years of his life, 1965 and 1968.
Contemporary, uh, critics have picked up this point and have said that the phrase we now use is “structural racism” which is a sort of the collective structural racism embedded in the very institutions of American history have to be addressed. And you cannot simply address it at the level of better individual race relations. As important as those might be, as laudable as those projects might be, they do not address this kind of structural problems.
So, Black evangelicals tend to see the structural racism that are embedded in American history White evangelicals do not. And that is-- that is basic problem that American Christianity faces. That is the argument of Emerson and Smith, and one that I think still holds a lot of weight.
Chris: Thank you, Paul. We have been talking with Paul Harvey about his book, Bounds of their Habitation: Race and Religion in American History, published in 2017. Mr. Harvey is the Distinguished Professor of History and Presidential Teaching Scholar at University of Colorado - Colorado Springs where he researches rights and teaches in the field of American History from the sixteenth century to the present.
Thank you so much, Paul, for taking time to participate and for all your efforts in studying race and religion.
Paul: Thank you so much for this opportunity, Chris. I really appreciate it.
Transcript: "Has Religion Influenced American Diplomacy and War?" with Andrew Preston.
Chris: United States foreign policy is of great interest to all Americans because of the important thread in the American narrative that says we should use our blessings of freedom and wealth to benefit the world: Foreign policy matters. The burning question for us on this podcast is how did religion influence American foreign policy and war if at all? To help us answer this question, we will talk with Andrew Preston, professor of American history at the University of Cambridge and author of Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy. Mr. Preston specializes in the history of American foreign relations, specifically the intersection between national and international, including the influence that domestic politics and culture, particularly religion, have had on conduct of US foreign policy.
Also as with each episode in our podcast series, Religion in the American Experience, we hope listeners come away with a better comprehension of what religion has done to America and what America has done to religion and thus more fully comprehend the necessity of this idea of religious freedom to America in fulfilling her purposes in the world.
Thank you, Andrew, for being with us today. Your book is absolutely fantastic. I read it years ago and it revealed to me an entire part of American history that I had not really heard of and that's almost endless in its influence and that is, religion's role in US foreign policy. So before I start any specific questions, can you tell us just generally how religion has influenced US war and diplomacy?
Andrew: Well, thanks for having me, Chris. I should say that first off. It's a real pleasure to be here. And thanks for the questions and the, and the discussion around my book. When I wrote this book almost 10 years ago, you said you read it a while ago, not many people were working on religion and US foreign policy. And now it's a whole subfield in political science and in history. So it's really, it's been, it's been really exciting. The religious influence in American foreign policy has been sometimes tricky to demonstrate because you don't always find policymakers saying I want to do A, B, or C or X, Y, Z because of my religious beliefs, especially when you're talking about high-level diplomacy. You don't always find that kind of record in NSC meet meeting minutes or, you know, things like that.
Andrew: So sometimes you have to read between the lines. Sometimes it's tricky but once historians and political scientists began to know what to look for, the job became easier. And it also became much more interesting because, as you said, it all of a sudden opened up this whole vista on how we should see American foreign policy. And then to get, to get back to your question, what is the general influence? Religion has over time, over a long period of time acted as a kind of conscience for American foreign policy and for American foreign policy makers, even for policymakers who themselves weren't religious because of American domestic politics, because of the the very vibrant role that religion plays in American domestic politics. And then the fact that domestic politics and political actors then apply pressure to policymakers and force them to confront moral questions in foreign policy. Religion has in, in that way had a huge influence on the conduct of American foreign policy and not just in the last 10 or 20 years, but the last 200 years.
Chris: Okay, so it took some sleuthing on your part to get at those tools that allowed you to see the influence. So it was a little bit of a, a job to do, I guess.
Andrew: Absolutely, and that's what, that's what is fun about it. That, that's the, that's the most fun you can have as an historian is, is piecing things together and reading between the lines and getting to know the context and getting to know the people.
Chris: Sure, absolutely. Well, thank you for doing that because it's just super revealing. So the second sort of introductory question would be tell us about the title. The title grabbed me. It just grabbed me in all ways. Tell, tell us about that title, where it came from? Why you used it?
Andrew: The title comes from the Book of Ephesians and it's where Paul is telling new Christians what they need to do. They need to what they need to wear effectively, he is using this metaphorically. And they need to wield the sword of the spirit and also brandish the shield of faith, along with another number of other accouterments. And he doesn't use those two phrases side-by-side in Ephesians in this, in this passage. But I put them together uhh because to me they capture exactly what the religious influence on American foreign policy was and still is all about.
Andrew: So on one hand, you have the sword of the spirit, which is the kind of, which is familiar to a lot of people. That's the kind of interventionist Messianic, we are going to reform the world type of ideology that has been present in American foreign policy from Manifest Destiny all the way up to the present. And in fact, when I began my book, I began my book during the, the years of the George W. Bush administration and at the height of the Iraq War. And a lot of people a friend of mine actually put it like this. A lot of people assumed that I was sort of writing a history of the Bush administration's foreign policy. And when I told a friend that actually I was going back much further in time uhh 200 years, I ended up going back 400 years. But he said, "Are you're writing a history of Bush backwards?" Basically the use of religion to justify war and empire and all that kind of thing. And that's definitely a part of the story and that's the sword of the spirit. But as I did more research, the shield of faith was also extremely important.
Andrew: And historians had not paid nearly enough attention to internationalism and pacifism and solving conflicts and promoting interfaith dialogue, promote, using religion as a, as a tool for peace. And so I have called that the shield of faith. And where the religious influence is most powerful is a blend of the kind of reformist interventionist impulse and the more pacifistic kind of internationalist impulse and where the two have combined in order to produce this very, very compelling moral vision for American foreign policy. And that, that's why the book is called Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith. If I could say one more thing about that, it I, I can't claim any credit. I can't claim credit for thinking of that, even though I came across that John Foster Dulles used the, used those those verses.
Woodrow Wilson did, lots of my historical actors in the book talked about the sword of the spirit and the shield of faith. But my wife and I were I, I live in England and based in England. We were going for a walk in the country with our dog and one of the things we love to do is to stop into these little village parish churches that are, you know, like a thousand years old and full of history. And we went into one in Northamptonshire, which is a neighboring county to, to where I'm from, Cambridgeshire. And there was a large memorial plaque on the wall of the church, this beautiful little church in the middle of nowhere. And it was to the dead of the two World Wars which is very common in English village churches. And this plaque had the, the passages, had the verses rather, and my wife said because I was, we were just talking about my book and I was just talking about what I would later identify as the sword of spirit and the shield of faith. And she said, "There it is. There is your title right there," because it just perfectly captures the book.
Chris: I agree. It perfectly captures it. So let's dive in. Andrew, thanks for that helpful foundation you laid there for us. We are just going to cover four of your thirty chapters. So we are going to talk about FDR and his faith, the religion and religious freedom used by the Johnson and Kennedy administrations, the Vietnam War, religion's influence on that, it's prosecution and then we are going to touch lightly on the epilogue of 9/11 a little bit after that. So Andrew, can you paint for us a religious portrait of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
Andrew: He was - so if I was painting just a quick portrait, he was by instinct non-theological as in non-doctrinal. To him, religion was a living thing. It was about spirituality, but it was also about ethics. But it wasn't something that you would think about, think a lot about. He wasn't a theologian but his religion was very deep. It was very profound. His wife Eleanor, who wasn't a religious person as far as we know, said that that was the most it was the thing that he felt deepest and was most mysterious in him was his faith. He was an Episcopalian and he was also by instinct as well as I would say not by doctrine because I just said he wasn't doctrinal. But to him, religion was inherently interfaith. He was an Episcopalian. As I just said, he was a Protestant. But to him, religion was a force for community, a force for coming together as well as a source of ethics. And he thought that religious commonalities inherently trumps religious differences and that should be then the basis not the only basis but a basis for politics and foreign policy.
Chris: Okay, and I should say we are starting with FDR but there is a whole, I don't know the chapter number of that chapter. But there, we're, we're skipping all this other religion, religious influence on American foreign policy pre mid-20th century and yeah.
Andrew: It's a big book. It's a big book, you know, so you can just go and say... [chuckles]
Chris: Uhh so anyways, people should read it and, and from the beginning.
Andrew: Oh thank you.
Chris: Okay, so that’s the portrait. That's helpful. I just visited Hyde Park last summer and you know, was moved by his religion sort of in the same spirit of what you relate there. I'm going to quote something from your book regarding FDR, "Building on Lincoln's ecumenical civil religion, Roosevelt was the first president to prioritize faith itself as opposed to Protestantism or even Christianity as the essence of American democracy." Can you tell us, Andrew, about how FDR used his religious beliefs and his faith in the prosecution of foreign policy, its significance and ramifications?
Andrew: Yeah. It's, it's a huge question. I should, I should sort of prefaced my answer by talking about that quote that you just read and say that I wanted to sort of pay due respect here to previous presidents who also made gestures to what we now call or what came to be called in this, in FDR's period in the 1930s and 40s, the Judeo-Christian tradition. So George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson spoke in very vague terms and not very often in ways that we would later call the Judeo-Christian tradition. So looking at how Christianity owes its roots to Judaism and how Jews and Christians should cooperate in American politics and American society and in American culture.
Chris: Right.
Andrew: But it was FDR who really elevated that notion to something that we might, to, to something that was included in the American civil religion and even I would say in the American body politic and the political fabric of the nation. This idea that Will Herberg in 1955 called the idea of a nation as Protestant, Catholic Jew. And from there, we can talk about this perhaps later in the podcast if you want, although other historians have, have talked about this a great deal from, from that notion of this kind of tri-faith America, what the historian Kevin Schultz calls tri-faith America. You then have it opens up spaces for further and further religious pluralism. For FDR in the 1930s, it was a way of distinguishing what was good about America and what was bad about what was going on elsewhere in the world, especially in Nazi Germany, but also in the Soviet Union as well as, well, to a lesser extent in Japan. But really it was about Nazi Germany.
And for FDR the religion was important for the reasons I already said because it was a source of personal comfort, a source of spirituality, a source of ethics. But for him, it was a source of democracy. And the reason it was a source of democracy is because without freedom of conscience, you couldn't have a democracy and without democracy you couldn't have peace. Peace either at home or in the context of the late 1930s and early 1940s, you couldn't have peace abroad. And one of the reasons why the freedom of religion was so politically important and geopolitically important to FDR is because if everything rested on freedom of conscience, you couldn't have, you couldn't have freedom of conscience without the freedom of religion. And he talked about this endlessly in the late 1930s and early 1940s. It's there in the Four Freedoms, in the second of the Four Freedoms, in the freedom of worship.
And it's there in some of his most important speeches leading up to World War II. Remember, this is a time when most Americans did not want to get involved in Europe. And his biggest task was convincing not the people we now call isolationist. Your Charles Lindberghs and your Gerald Nuys, people like that. His biggest task was because the isolationists, those sort of hardcore isolationists weren't the majority. The biggest task was convincing probably a plurality of Americans who were very internationally-minded, including Christian pacifists, including a lot of Protestant and Catholic and Jewish leaders. Very internationally-minded but did not want to get involved in Europe. And so one way of, of co-- of winning this argument was by appealing to what was starting to be called the Judeo-Christian tradition in a way that meant this is what is good about America, but even if Nazi Germany isn't going to attack us, this is why we have to worry about the Germans because what they're doing is they are snuffing out the freedom of religion.
And if we go back to this idea of what we might call FDR's faith-based democratic peace theory, democracies don't go to war with one another. You can't have peace without democracy. You can't have democracy without freedom of conscience. You can't have freedom of conscience without freedom of religion. That's why Americans should pay attention to what was going on in Germany. That's why they should worry about what the Germans were doing to religion. And if you're listening to this podcast or watching this video and you're interested in this, just do a quick Google "1939 State of the Union Address". And FDR's 1939 State of the Union just begins by laying that all out. Here is why we should care about freedom of religion because it's not just about what is happening to Jews and some German Christians. It's really about the fate of the world.
Chris: In the chapter that you call interestingly "The Revolutionary Church In A Revolutionary Age." And in that chapter, you write, I'm quoting here, "Perhaps without realizing it, Kennedy and Johnson reflected a shift that was taking place in religion's influence on politics and especially on foreign policy. In a modernizing society that was both increasingly secular and pluralistic, religion's role could never again be assumed. The presidents could look to faith but they could not rely on it." Why did you use the term "Revolutionary Church" in the chapter's title? And can you take us through a few examples of how the Kennedy and Johnson admin-- administration saw religion and religious freedom as part of their foreign policy toolkit or not?
Andrew: One more thought about FDR. One of the reasons I enjoyed, I did not expect to do anything on FDR when I began this book because if you read much of the biographical literature on him, including by people who knew FDR better than I ever will, people like Arthur Schlesinger, they either ignore his religious values and his, his religious faith. Or they say that it was a kind of on, you know, it was kind of superficial that he would go to church on Sundays sometimes. And that, that I kind of took that at face value took that assessment. And the more research I did, the more interesting if FDR became, FDR's religion became because it, religion was such a central part of his life. It was a very, very important part of his life and it was a very important part of his, his politics and then he made it a very important part of his foreign policy.
Chris: Yup.
Andrew: One of the trickiest chapters or the, the two of the trickiest chapters that, that I wrote that we're going to discuss I think in the 1960s deal with those, that deal with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. And partly because of Kennedy's Catholicism, which a lot of people have written about, but I'm not sure anyone is really, politically there is a lot of really good stuff on, on the politics of Kennedy's Catholicism. But I'm not sure we've got to the bottom, just like I'm not sure we had got to the bottom of FDR's Anglicanism. I'm not sure we've got to the bottom of JFK's Catholicism as a personal faith. Although Fred Logavell's biography on JFK that came out recently just starts to get us there. He doesn't deal with the presidency in this volume, but it starts to get us there. And LBJ was this like a lot of other presidents like Ronald Reagan was like some other presidents had and sort of was wonderfully but frustratingly eclectic and diverse in his religious views, not just in religions he respected or read or but he would dabble in all sorts of religions and I don't mean in a superficial way but in a fairly, I would say in a fairly profound way.
And you ask why the revolutionary church, one of the really interesting things in writing these chapters in the 1960s was trying to get to grips with JFK and LBJ and some other people too. I've got some stuff that I found really interesting on Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his faith in the Vietnam War. But it was also trying to get to grips with their religion in this time of incredible turbulence, socially and culturally, including in religion. And so the revolutionary church is about Vatican II. It's about the Death of God Movement. It's about Liberal Protes--Mainline Protestantism and a lot of the activism that Mainline Protestants took part in in civil rights and second like feminism and all sorts of things. And then of course, it's also I have a later chapter about, I don't want to call it the backlash because I think that does an injustice to conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists and conservative Catholics. But then you have this kind of counter, what I call the Counter Reformation of the 1960s coming in as well.
Chris: Okay, you write in this chapter this "Neither Kennedy nor Johnson nor most of their advisers understood the new American religious landscape or grasped the importance of religious pluralism in a globalizing world." Why did you say that and what were the effects of this?
Andrew: Yeah, so this is one of the, the trickiest things about these about these chapters. So Kennedy and Johnson, especially Kennedy, came in as a modernizing pre-- not just a modern president but a modernizing president. And he surrounded himself with modernization theorists, people who called themselves modernization theorists. And inherently tied up in modernization theory is this assumption of secularization, that is it, you know, it goes back to Freud and it goes back to Weber, it goes back to all sorts of thinkers from the 19th and early 20th centuries. Then as societies become more modern, they will become more secular. And it's just, it's, it's an inescapable process. And people like Walt Rostow and other modernization theorists in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations weren't that concerned with religion. But as far as I can tell, they did have this, this kind of assumption that as the world was becoming more modern, it would become more secular.
And therefore, they didn't have to deal with religion. By the same token, Kennedy's Catholicism, which of course was a white-hot subject in 1964 for liberals as well as conservatives. I mean, for a lot of people, a lot of a lot of people who supported the Civil Rights Movement said they weren't going to vote for Kennedy because he was a Catholic. I mean, it's, it, it, it just seems so foreign to us today when the Supreme Court has a Catholic majority and Catholics are just part of the mainstream. It's easy to forget just how visceral anti-Catholicism was as late as the early 1960s. Even more so, I would say, than Mormonism is for political candidates in today in politics, where people like Mitt Romney have to deal with that issue of Mormonism and there where some people just wouldn't vote for him no matter what because he is a Mormon.
Andrew: The point here is that after Kennedy gets elected in 1960 because Catholicism is such a third rail he doesn't want to deal with religion. He talks in very vague platitudes about religion, but he is not going to go down the route that FDR and Truman and Eisenhower did in using religion as a political tool because if he does that he tries to use it as a political tool. The risk that this is going blow up in his face is really, really enormous. So he just tries to contain it and move it aside and that, as I was saying, it works quite nicely with his administration because most of them, even the religious ones like Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk, but they are happy to deal with foreign problems in this containerized way where religions is, is just not a part. And the consequences for foreign policy for that I argue in the book were actually quite profound because it made them miss a lot of the ferment, the growing ferment in for lack of a better term what was happening in world religions. What was happening in the 1960s with Islam and into the 1970s, what was happening in Southeast Asia. There, there is this quote that I, in the, in the book, I don't have it in front of me so I, I hope I don't mangle it but what?
Chris: I have it. But I have it, yeah.
Andrew: Is this the one about, is this the one about the Buddhist Crisis?
Chris: Yeah. Should I read it?
Andrew: Right, you please do. Thank you.
Chris: As we got it. Yeah.
"The 1963 South Vietnam Buddhist Uprising caught the Kennedy administration flat-footed. ‘How could this have happened?’ A perplexed JFK asked his advisors about the Buddhists, 'Who are these people? Why didn't we know about them before?'"
Andrew: Yeah, it's an amazing and I think I go on to say something like it's shocking that Kennedy was shocked that, that by the Buddhist Uprising.
In 1963, the Catholic leader of South Vietnam ,because there was a substantial uhhm uhh population of Catholics because Vietnam had once been a French colony. And Ngo Dinh Diem, the leader of South Vietnam was a Catholic. His brother, his brother, his older brother was the bishop of Hue. They weren't just Catholics. They were a prominent, very active Catholic family and they were America's allies in the fight against communism in South Vietnam. And in 1963 uhh the Buddhists who felt repressed under the Diem government launched a peaceful, a, a series of peaceful protests. This is, these are the protests that led to that very famous and, and very troubling image of the Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc burning himself alive in protest. Probably one of the most famous if not the most famous photo image from the Vietnam War.
And this is what Kennedy is talking about when he says who are these people because he doesn't know the Buddhist themselves, you know, but of course, they are the largest religious group in Vietnam. They are absolutely essential to politics and the fact that Kennedy, the president of the United States who is escalating the conflict that would be later, not much later become the Vietnam War. The fact that he is perplexed by, by these people just is, is to me still baffling when I think about that. And the, the Kennedy administration just didn't have a handle and I argue in the book that they didn't have a handle on it just as they didn't have a handle on the early signs of the Shia Revolution in, in Iran because they just didn't want to deal with religion. They just didn't, they thought religion was a dying force that it, it was politically irrelevant that you had these kind of wild-eyed mystics either and in terms, in terms of Muslim clerics or Buddhist monks or whoever. And the fact that they were burning themselves to death in protest just showed how irrational they were and these people aren't the way of the future. And that of course was just a, it wasn't only a fundamental misreading of what was happening because they weren't taking religion seriously. It, it was a fundamental error and it was a basic error in the conduct of American foreign policy.
Chris: Right. You talked about, a few minutes ago Robert McNamara, and then you mentioned the Buddhist who burned himself alive? Can you tell us that story about the Quaker who left his home one morning and asking his wife what can I do to help him stop this war?
Andrew: It's right. This is, this is Norman Morrison. So this is in 1965 and Norman Morrison was very idealistic and very, very much against the war. And he drove to the Pentagon and got close enough. He was right under McNamara's window, but got close enough to McNamara's window where McNamara could see him. And he covered himself with gasoline and was still holding his daughter. And then somebody who realized what he was about to do, people who were kind of mystified as to what was going on and they saw what he was about to do, told him to, to, to put the baby down so the baby wouldn't be hurt, which he did. And then he, in protest against the escalating war in Vietnam, burned himself to death. And that shook, we know that that shook McNamara up, even though McNamara was a very, very buttoned-up guy and didn't talk about his feelings and just wanted to repress that image and just not deal with it and just move on. And he was like that with everything in life.
He was known as an IBM machine on legs and as somebody who is extremely clever, very rational, one of the founders of systems analysis when he was at Harvard Business school. Ran the Ford Motor Company, brought it back to profitability in the 1950s. Was a master of data. It was always stats, stats, stats with McNamara. So a very rational man, but also it turns out quite spiritual. So there is this, this kind of, you know, we talked before about how do you get to know someone's faith? Well, it's a mysterious thing. It's a very powerful, powerful thing. And McNamara later turned against the war without saying he turned against the war. But he started testifying in Congress as to how badly the war was going and how it wasn't going to go well and he was implying that the US should leave.
This is in 1967 and privately at the, in the, at the Pentagon in, in the White House, he would have these breakdowns into 1966-67 and early '68 where he would burst into tears. I think a psychologist would probably say it's because he wasn't talking about his problems. He wasn't talking about the war directly. He was trying to bottle it all up. And I argue that this, that this, this moral act of conscience by Norman Morrison, the guy who burned himself in protest, contributed to McNamara's spiritual crisis about the Vietnam War. And it awakened in him a lot of the values that he held as a Christian, as a Presbyterian. And also his, his sort of his ethical compass. It sort of set his ethical compass off. And it made for him the war, this war that was going badly, that was costing the United States so much not just in, in blood and treasure but also in terms of the, of the the conscience of the nation, the morality of the nation. As Martin Luther King said in 1967, it really caused McNamara to have this breakdown on the war and to leave the administration.
Chris: Do we know anything about his religiosity besides that he was a Presbyterian?
Andrew: Well, he was an Elder. He wasn't just, you know, a, a notional Presbyterian. He was a, he was, he was an active Presbyterian. He read widely in, not just sort of conventional Protestant books in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, but he read widely on ethics and spiritualism morality and how religion either influenced or in-- intersected with a lot of those currents of thought that were becoming of course extremely popular in the 1950s and 60s. So he was certainly well-versed in a lot of these, in a lot of these issues.
Chris: Okay. Thank you. Again with this, with this chapter we could go on and on and on, but we have to move on.
We are talking with Andrew Preston, professor of American History at the University of Cambridge and author of Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy.
Now, to Vietnam and the religious beliefs that supported it or agitated against it. Andrew and so then influenced American political processes in the US prosecution of that war, I want to talk about two sides of the coin here. I want to talk about the religions and religious influences that supported it and those that criticized it. I'm going to start with the latter by quoting Martin Luther King in 1967. In his “A Time To Break Silence”, responding to criticism of his anti-Vietnam War stance, "Have they the critics forgotten that my ministry is in obedience to the one who loved his enemies so fully that he died for them. What can I say to the Viet Cong or to Castro or to Mao as a faithful minister of this one? Can I threaten them with death or must I not share with them my life?" Andrew, what is this representative of in context of American religious reaction to the Vietnam War?
Andrew: I think first and foremost what historians have recovered over the last 10 or 15 years, it is, it's first and foremost about Martin Luther King's own, the importance of his own spirituality and his own theology and his own Christian witness. And I think we, we do him an, an injustice if we forget that first and foremost, he was a man of faith and a preacher. But it also speaks to a wider crisis of conscience and a crisis of ethics in the United States. Vietnam was a difficult war to explain, right? It was the, I mean, the Johnson administration had difficulty explaining it even just to the general public. The Johnson administration had difficulty explaining it why America was fighting, had difficulty explaining it to the, to the Congress, to the national media. So it was a, it was a very, very tricky war to justify. That's not to say that Johnson didn't believe in what he was doing. I think he did. I think he was tormented about it and he would ask the Secret Service to drive him to churches in the middle of the night so he could sit in silence and pray. So he was tormented about it.
And it didn't matter what church, this again speaks to Johnson's inherent, his instinctive ecumenism. It's no coincidence that FDR was Johnson's hero on almost everything but also on religion which is something we often forget. But King speaking out in 1967, not for the first time. It's a myth that that's and he partly contributed to the myth by calling it a time to break silence, calling his address the time to break because it wasn't a sermon. It was just, it was, it was a speech but it was in Riverside Church and he, he called it a time to break silence. But he had spoken out against the war in March of 1965 just as it was beginning to take off and he got so much pushback on that from all quarters, including people within the Civil Rights Movement that he then kept quiet for another two years. And when he did speak out against it, it was, it was actually he was a latecomer in the sense to this angst, this moral angst that, that a lot of the country, not all of the country but a lot of the country was having about the war.
Andrew: How do we justify, you know, the, the most powerful nation in the history of the world. The richest with the most powerful military, this industrial giant that can project power halfway across the world and rain down devastation on this incredibly impoverished, non-industrial society that was fighting for national independence, right? I mean, if you put communism to one side, which a lot of historians of the Vietnam War do or at least separated from Vietnamese nationalism, at the heart of what the Vietnamese were fighting for was national self-determination, which is, you know, going back to Woodrow Wilson, going back to the founders. That's a very American thing. So it was a, it was a, it was a really it was a really tough war to support and it was a very tough war to remain silent about. And King's, King's speech is the most eloquent testimony to that.
Chris: Can you mention some of the religions that would have sided. You say Martin Luther King was a latecomer. What, what religious traditions were generally opposed to the war? Is that a fair question?
Andrew: It, it's a fair question but it's a difficult one to answer because it was pretty much across the board. So certainly Mainline Protestants the, the National Council of Churches and a lot of their affiliates, the main, the mainline denominations, most of the leadership of those organizations and churches were opposed to the war, some earlier than others. I should say in defense of King, one of the reasons he was a, a slightly latecomer to this is because when he did, when and when he was one of the first to speak out about it, there was a worry in the Civil Rights Movement that he was going to damage the Civil Rights Movement by getting on the wrong side of Johnson. So it was a political decision to, to, to then be quiet about that.
But American Jews were very critical of the war from a very early point. Quite a few Catholics, obviously, there were also quite a few Catholics who were supportive of the war because it was a very complicated thing for America, for not just American Catholicism, but for the Catholic church because of the prevalence of Catholicism within Vietnam and the religious issues in, at play in Vietnam. But a lot of Jesuit priests spoken against the war most famously the Berrigan Brothers. And eventually an organization formed called CALCAV, Clergy And Laymen Concerned About Vietnam. And it was led by Richard Newhouse a Lutheran later Catholic but at the time Lutheran. Abraham Heschel and Daniel Berrigan. So Protestant-Catholic-Jew, tri-faith nation. And they, they were one of the earliest along with new left student organizations like SDS. They were one of the earliest segments of American society to, to, to campaign against the war.
Chris: Okay. Well, let's flip that coin over and I'm going to quote something from also a 1967 statement, this one from the American Council of Christian churches, which supported the war, "America must win Vietnam. There is no other acceptable course. To surrender or show weakness before the communist onslaught would be the greatest disaster ever to befall America. The conflict with communism is God versus anti-god, Christ versus Antichrist." What does this represent Andrew?
Tell us about the, the religious influence supporting the Vietnam War.
Andrew: So that represents a lot of things. But at heart, it represents two things. One is just the, the fervency of American anti-communism in the Cold War. And I'll, I'll unpack that a little bit. But the other it represents is just what Vietnam came to stand for by the time that statement was issued in what we now call the cul-- or what would later come to be called the culture wars, which don't begin in the 1990s when the term was coined but I would argue began in the 1960's and 1970's. And so when people are forced to choose sides and if, if the other side is uhh seen as unpatriotic and critical of America in a time of crisis and so on and so forth, then the people who are naturally inclined to support the president's or to fight communism are gonna double down. And there is this kind of something that, that we see in American society or indeed in lots of societies. Bur we have seen in American society uhhm periodically, but I would say unfortunately increasingly up to, up to the present.
Andrew: And so in the 1960s what the American Council of Christian Churches wanted to highlight was the fact that yes, this is a difficult war to support in some ways. But when you boil it right down to its, its essence, it's what Reagan would later call a noble cause. This is a, a struggle against communism, Godless communism. Communism that was if you, if you inverted everything that communism stood for, this is what people used to say during the Cold War. If you inverted everything that communism stood for, Americanism was on the other side. So you'd have the dictatorship of the proletariat and you'd have a liberal democracy. You would have atheism and you would have freedom of religion. You would have a command economy and then you would have the free market and so on and so forth. So it was, it was kind of the ultimate other and it was assumed to be and there was a lot of evidence for this that it was inherently aggressive and that communism wanted to spread. Uhhm and so, there are moments where fault lines, it could be in China, it could be in Korea, it could be a Vietnam, Latin America, Berlin, or other places in Europe where, where communism was see-- was being seen to advance.
And this gets to the kind of almost eschatological flavor of that statement that you've just read that you quoted from my book that if communism wins in one place, it's going to keep winning. And it's going to snuff out everything that America stands for and eventually it's gonna snuff out those freedoms in the United States itself. Now, it seemed far-fetched to a lot of people at the time that Vietnam would be that important uhhm but to a lot of other people it made total sense. And by this time, by the late 60s, there is this inexorable logic to that, right? We go back to Franklin Roosevelt and what I said about FDR and the, and the Germans. That's the exact same argument that FDR made about the Germans. And then when the Nazis are gone from 1945 when they're defeated and as the Cold War begins to escalate, Harry Truman and then later Dwight Eisenhower applies it to the Soviet Union. It's the exact same logic and as I said, given that what was, what was happening in world politics in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s there is, you know, there was, it wasn't like the people like Carl McIntire were making this up out of whole cloth. Now, what they were doing was following that logic to its, to the nth degree, to the absolute end of that logical chain in making Vietnam so important in this global struggle against communism.
Chris: Right and they definitely, you know, put it into a very stark religious language. God and [crosstalk]
Andrew: Can I, can I say one more thing about that too.
Chris: Absolutely.
Andrew: So it is, it is, so and so I don't mean to drone on a bit but, so really interestingly Billy Graham in the 1960s paid a lot of attention to what was going on in world politics and also in Vietnam. And Billy Graham is one of the people who of course helped launch the Cold War crusade in a very ideological sense in the 1940s and 50s. But by the 1960s, he certainly hadn't lessened his anti-communism. He still didn't like communism at all. But what was going on in Vietnam? This is why Billy Graham perfectly symbolizes the struggles of the 1960s. The struggles I was referring to earlier about what a difficult war it was to support with conscience and also to argue in favor of and to justify. Billy Graham stood by his friend Lyndon Johnson. He stood by his friend Richard Nixon. But privately, we know that he was anguished about what was going on in Vietnam. And so, to me, Billy Graham's dilemmas, his struggles this kind of turmoil that he saw in the world and where Vietnam didn't really fit into any of those neat categories in the 1950s and seeing him struggle with that to me is very profound but also very telling of the turbulence of the decade.
Chris: I agree. I, I have read a biography, a couple biographies of Billy Graham and I think you're right, right on there. We are out of time just about but I don't want to end the podcast without giving you a chance to at least bring us up to speed through a decade after 9/11. Give us in a nutshell religion's influence on America's response to 9/11and everything that sort of has, sort of has come after that with regard to war in, in the Middle East.
Andrew: Well, as I said earlier when I began this book in I began in 2003. That's when I began research on it and began telling people I was writing it and I said that a friend of mine said, "Oh you're writing a history of Bush backwards." And there is certainly there has been over the last 20 years, there has been a strong religious strain of supporting the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the war on terror, a kind of American exceptionalism to remake the world, to spread democracy, and especially to protect religious freedom. But that's not the only part of the story. And even that part of the story is much more complicated than we allow for. So Bush is remembered for Iraq and I think that's probably right. That's the, the most important thing that he did as president and that is what historians are going to be spending most of their time trying to puzzle out and work through in the coming decades.
But Bush was also the president who did more to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa than any other president. He made it a real cause of his including at the height of the Iraq War. He would take time away from the war planning in the war on terror to consider HIV/AIDS. And I don't think you can really comprehend that without understanding Bush's own personal faith, the faith of some of his advisers like Michael Gerson and others and then how that faith then translated into politics. So I would say about Bush that he is more complicated than I think we realize now and we won't sort of like with Eisenhower where our understanding of Eisenhower underwent a real revolution in the 1980s because of scholarship finding new sources and thinking, having time to reflect about Eisenhower. I think something similar might happen with George W. Bush, certainly with his religion.
Andrew: And then Obama is, is no easier to figure out in a lot of senses. And, and I don't mean in a lot of senses of the way that people talk about in, in highly political terms, in highly politicized terms. Obama's heroes were a lot of peace activists and community developers, but it was, it was also Reinhold Niebuhr and he cited Reinhold Niebuhr is his favorite philosopher and he actually very bravely invoked Niebuhr in his speech in Oslo accepting the Nobel Peace Prize and saying look, I'm, I'm an American president. I, I can't live a pacifistic life. I can't be a pacifistic president. There are times where I might have to, as Niebuhr said, choose the lesser evil, but do so for moral reasons. And to be a Christian realist. To be a realist but to have Christianity kind of be his moral compass through there. So I found both Bush and Obama very interesting. I, I only deal with them as you said very briefly in an epilogue to at the end of a very long book that was published in 2012. But I do conclude by saying that both Bush and Obama, in their very different very eclectic ways, fit perfectly within the tradition of the religious influence on American war and diplomacy.
Chris: Thank you for bringing us up into the 2000s. Andrew, as we conclude, do you want to share any lessons or takeaways from the book, either in terms of perhaps important historical transformations you have charted or in terms of simply helping us better understand our present moment?
Andrew: I wish I could help us understand our present moment better. If, if I could I would be a very famous man because understanding the present moment is a challenge for us all right now. But the one thing I would take away, I would want people to take away from my book is that religion and politics, it does not just mean, it doesn't just push in one direction. It's not shorthand for the Christian right or the religious right or whatever, whatever shorthand people want to come up with. That it's, that it's more complicated. And as Obama had, said many times that it's also more productive than a lot of people assume. On the other hand, I would also want people who don't need reminding of religion's importance in politics and foreign policy to consider that it's not the only story and that it fits in with a much wider puzzle of what American politics is, what American foreign policy is and what it, what they mean within the American body politic.
Chris: Thank you, Andrew. We have been talking with Andrew Preston, professor of American History at the University of Cambridge and author of Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy. Mr. Preston specializes in the history of American foreign relations, specifically the intersection between national and international, including the influence of domestic politics and culture, particularly religion have had on conduct of US foreign policy. Andrew, thank you for being with us. It has been very enlightening and I hope you have enjoyed the time with us as well.
Andrew: Very much, Chris. Thank you.